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xForeword
I
nterest in the effect of trade liberalization on agriculture and poverty in 
developing countries has increased during the past decade, with the agri-
cultural sector and the effect of trade liberalization on the poor being the 
focus of numerous debates in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions. The inability to find common ground on these and other issues stalled 
the negotiations. The global food crisis of 2007–08 further highlighted some 
of the risks associated with relying on imports for staple foods, as well as the 
need to strengthen the rules-based agricultural trade system, despite the dif-
ficulties involved. The crisis has also led policymakers and researchers to pay 
greater attention to factors contributing to agricultural growth. 
  Given that global trade liberalization would (probably) raise agricultural 
prices, concern has focused on net food-importing regions, including the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA). Many of the countries in the MENA region 
have implemented reforms to lower agricultural tariffs, liberalize domestic 
markets, and improve targeting in consumer-subsidy programs. Nevertheless, 
trade restrictions and domestic price supports are still prevalent, particu-
larly for strategic commodities such as wheat. In addition, the countries vary 
widely in the degree of liberalization.
  There is a large volume of research on trade liberalization in the MENA 
region, but few studies focus on the impact on small farmers and other poor 
households. This monograph addresses this gap, combining a review of the 
existing data and literature on the topic with a new analysis of four case 
studies of Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco. The country case studies use 
household survey data and computable general equilibrium models to esti-
mate the effect of different types of trade reform on small farmers or poor 
households or both. 
  The results paint a complex picture, in which the impact depends greatly 
on the type of liberalization, the initial degree of trade protection in the coun-
try, and the structure of the economy. For example, global trade liberaliza-
tion tends to raise world food prices, which hurts most of the MENA countries 
on aggregate, but benefits the agricultural sector within these countries. 
On the other hand, trade liberalization within the MENA countries would 
lower the price of food, particularly imported staple foodgrains. Finally, the
effect of food prices on poverty is somewhat ambiguous because urban house-
xiholds and many rural households benefit from lower prices, while some farm 
households gain from higher prices. The analysis suggests that the net effect of 
higher agricultural prices is to lower poverty, but the impact is quite small. 
  The monograph also discusses the importance of complementary poli-
cies to accompany trade liberalization. For example, a favorable investment 
climate, streamlined customs procedures, lower nontariff barriers, and com-
petitive markets for transportation services may promote trade and growth at 
least as much as tariff reduction. Similarly, decoupled payments to farmers, 
labor-intensive public works programs, and conditional cash transfers can 
be more effective in assisting farmers and poor households than maintaining 
trade barriers. 
  We hope that the study will be useful to development practitioners and 
researchers, and will provide policymakers in the region with the empirically 
based analysis they need to make informed pro-poor decisions in the area of 
trade policy.
Shenggen Fan 
Director General, International Food Policy Research Institute
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1 We define major oil exporters as those countries whose exports exceed 80 percent of domes-
tic consumption. Although Egypt and Syria export oil, they are not major exporters under this 
definition.
Summary
T
his report examines the impact of trade liberalization on non-oil-
exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with 
particular emphasis on its impact on the poor. First the report describes 
the basic characteristics related to agriculture, trade, and poverty for eight 
MENA countries and reviews previous studies examining the impact of trade 
liberalization on these countries. The eight are the developing countries in 
the MENA region that are not major oil exporters: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza.1 Second, the 
report uses household survey data and computable general equilibrium mod-
els to simulate the effect of trade liberalization on low-income households in 
four of these countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco.
Background
The MENA region has experienced relatively slow economic growth, with 
insufficient expansion of formal sector employment and high rates of un-
employment. Almost all the MENA countries are net food importers. Wheat 
is the staple food and a major import in most of the countries under consid-
eration. Many of the MENA countries maintain relatively high levels of agri-
cultural protection, partly to support their farmers, partly to reduce import 
dependence, and partly to generate revenue. Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia 
are among the 15 most protected economies in the world, according to one 
study. The commodities that are the most protected in the region are wheat, 
sugar, dairy, and livestock products. The E.U. is the most important trading 
partner of most of the countries in the region.
  The MENA countries have signed a series of multilateral, regional, and 
bilateral trade agreements. Multilateral agreements are within the frame-
work of the World Trade Organization (WTO), of which, with the exception 
of Syria and the West Bank and Gaza, all countries in the region are members 
or have observer status. Within the WTO, the bound rates are often far above 
the applied tariff rates, particularly for agricultural products. Thus, the WTO commitments to reduce the bound rate have had little effect on the actual 
level of agricultural protection, which reflects the various regional and bi-
lateral agreements.
  Ten MENA countries have signed European Union–Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAAs) with the E.U. These agreements replace the preferential 
access to European markets for goods from African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
countries with a reciprocal reduction in tariffs on many goods. However, these 
agreements generally exempt agricultural commodities.
  Under the U.S.–Middle East Free Trade Initiative, the United States has 
signed bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) or entered into trade and 
investment framework agreements with several MENA countries. The poten-
tial effects of these agreements are expected to be small in the case of the 
U.S.-Jordan FTA because Jordan’s level of protection is already low and 
because the amount of U.S.-Jordan trade is small. The effects of the U.S.-
Morocco FTA are expected to be larger because Moroccan trade barriers are 
higher. Of particular importance, Morocco’s wheat tariffs will be phased out 
over 10 years.
  Both the E.U. and the United States have launched initiatives specific to 
the poorest countries. Under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, the 
least developed countries have duty-free access to E.U. markets for almost 
all goods,2 while the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) allows duty-
free access to U.S. markets for Sub-Saharan African countries that meet cer-
tain criteria. Within the MENA region, only Djibouti and Yemen qualify under 
the EBA, while only Djibouti qualifies for preferences under the AGOA.
  A number of bilateral and regional agreements within the MENA region 
have been signed, but their effectiveness has been limited by the structural 
similarities of the MENA economies, the prevalence of nontariff barriers, 
and the granting of exceptions for sensitive products. A number of MENA 
countries, most notably Egypt and Tunisia, have reduced their tariff barriers 
unilaterally in recent years. In other words, trade liberalization has occurred 
outside the context of global, regional, and bilateral trade agreements.
The Impact of Trade Liberalization
The evidence suggests that global trade liberalization will increase world 
agricultural prices by reducing agricultural support policies in countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and by 
xviii  SUMMARY
2 Duty-free access for bananas, rice, and sugar was phased in under the EBA initiative. Duty-free 
access for bananas was delayed until January 2006, while sugar and rice were scheduled to be 
liberalized in the second half of 2009.reducing protection. The markets for wheat, rice, sugar, cotton, and dairy 
products are the most distorted, and simulation models suggest that trade 
liberalization will increase the price of these commodities by 3–20 percent. 
Almost all the MENA countries are net agricultural importers, so there is 
clearly some basis for concern that global trade liberalization will worsen the 
terms of trade for these countries. A simple analysis finds that the terms-of-
trade losses associated with a 15 percent increase in world agricultural prices 
for eight non-oil-exporting MENA countries would be US$922 million, or 0.4 
percent of regional gross domestic product (GDP). This estimate is an upper 
limit because it assumes no response on the part of producers and consum-
ers and because it does not take into account the efficiency gains associated 
with reducing distortions in domestic agricultural markets. Most studies of 
trade liberalization suggest that the efficiency benefits are larger than the 
terms-of-trade losses.
  Several dozen studies have been undertaken to examine the macro-
economic impact of various types of trade liberalization in MENA. These stud-
ies suggest that multilateral trade liberalization generally results in net gains 
to countries in the region, with real GDP expanding between 1 and 3 percent. 
Other studies have illustrated the importance of complementary policies in 
increasing the benefits of multilateral trade liberalization, including the 
countries’ own domestic liberalization and reforms. Finally, the benefits of 
multilateral trade liberalization are shown to yield greater gains than the 
gains associated with bilateral and regional trade agreements. This is because 
bilateral and regional agreements are more likely to result in trade diversion 
than is a global agreement.
The Effects of Trade Liberalization on Poverty
Few studies have examined the effects of trade liberalization on the poor 
in the MENA region. We use household survey data and computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models to simulate the impact of trade liberalization on 
poor households in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco. Egypt has undertaken 
significant trade liberalization, but costly obstacles to doing business and 
investing remain. The country is a major wheat importer and exports cotton, 
rice, and horticultural products. We analyze the data from the 1998 Egypt Inte-
grated Household Survey to simulate the distributional effect of hypothetical 
changes in agricultural prices due to global trade liberalization. According 
to this analysis, a 40 percent increase in the wheat price would lower the 
poverty rate among wheat farmers by 3 percentage points. In the case of rice 
and cotton, the effect would be to reduce the poverty rate among growers of
each by 7 percentage points, in the case of fruits and vegetables, by 5 percent-
SUMMARY  xixage points. And a 40 percent increase in sugar prices would reduce poverty 
among sugarcane growers by 20 percentage points, largely because they are 
poor and highly dependent on sugarcane income.
  However, the effect of each of these price increases on national poverty 
would be very small. The higher wheat price would lower national poverty by 
1 percentage point, while higher rice and fruit and vegetable prices would 
raise national poverty by 1 percentage point. The effect of higher prices of 
cotton and sugarcane on the national poverty rate would be negligible (less 
than 0.5 percentage points). Finally, a 40 percent increase in all five com-
modity categories would increase poverty in urban and rural areas, though by 
just 1–2 percentage points.
 Unlike  Egypt,  Tunisia maintains high tariffs on many products, including 
agricultural commodities. At the same time, Tunisia has a relatively good invest-
ment climate, which contributed to significant inflows of foreign direct invest-
ment and a healthy growth rate through the 1990s. Tunisia’s main exports are 
olives and dates, while its principal imports are wheat and maize. In order 
to study the distributional impact of trade liberalization in Tunisia, we use 
a CGE model linked to survey data for 397 representative households. The 
model is used to simulate the elimination of industrial tariffs on goods from 
the E.U., the removal of all tariffs on imports from the E.U., the elimination 
of all tariffs from all countries, and the elimination of all tariffs combined with 
global liberalization, which it is assumed would raise world agricultural prices 
by 15 percent. Domestic trade liberalization would have the largest positive 
effect on GDP, but the fourth scenario (global trade liberalization) would have 
the most positive effect on agriculture and poverty. In this scenario, poverty 
would decline to its lowest level among the four scenarios.
  Syria has one of the most highly regulated economies in the region. 
Reforms in recent years have only begun to dismantle some of these restric-
tions. Although Syria has been successful in achieving wheat self-sufficiency 
and promoting cotton exports, these accomplishments have come at a high 
cost in terms of inefficiency and an unsustainable fiscal burden. The likely 
depletion of oil reserves is forcing the government to reduce costs and find 
new sources of revenue. We use a CGE model to simulate the effect of lib-
eralizing wheat markets on households in 10 income categories. The macro-
economic effects would be relatively modest, although government savings 
would increase by almost 3 percent of GDP. Complete liberalization would 
reduce the producer price of wheat by about 17 percent and production by 
about 2 percent. The effects of subsidy removal on Syrian households would 
be regressive in the sense that high-income households would gain, while low-
er-income households would lose. The size of the effects, however, would be 
less than 1 percent of the base income of all but the richest income group.
xx  SUMMARY      Since the mid-1980s, Morocco has carried out a series of economic reforms 
to allow the market to play a larger role in the economy, including price liber-
alization, reduction of the role of state enterprises, and the promotion of pri-
vate investment. Morocco has signed an EMAA with the E.U. and an FTA with 
the United States. The level of agricultural protection remains quite high but 
will be reduced under the U.S.-Morocco FTA. One study combined household 
survey data and a CGE model to simulate the impact of liberalization of cereal 
imports. Our analysis uses two versions of a global CGE model. The static ver-
sion of the model is used to simulate the impact of alternative types of trade 
liberalization. An FTA with the other North African countries appears likely to 
have little impact on the Moroccan economy because of the similarities in the 
economies in the region. A bilateral FTA with the E.U. would stimulate exports 
significantly but would have a small negative effect on national income and 
returns to unskilled agricultural labor. Global trade liberalization would com-
bine a strong positive effect on exports and a small positive effect on national 
income but would have a large negative effect on unskilled agricultural labor. 
Simulations with the dynamic version of the model show that liberalization in 
services, trade facilitation, and increased investment would have a positive 
effect on exports and income but would not fully offset the negative effect of 
trade liberalization on the returns to unskilled agricultural labor.
Implications for Trade Policy
Global trade liberalization will likely increase world agricultural prices by 
3–20 percent, imposing a terms-of-trade loss on all the MENA countries under 
consideration. The net food-importing countries have used the expected 
terms-of-trade loss associated with global trade liberalization to request 
special concessions in the form of reduced commitments to opening their 
own borders. This mercantilist logic is flawed in that it takes into account 
only the gains and losses of producers, ignoring the effects of trade policy on 
consumers. Studies of trade liberalization suggest that most of the benefits to 
a given country from trade liberalization are the result of reforms within the 
country. Thus, the net food-importing countries appear to be demanding the 
right to forgo the efficiency gains associated with domestic trade liberaliza-
tion as “compensation” for the terms-of-trade losses associated with reforms 
in other countries.
  The effect of agricultural trade liberalization on poverty varies widely 
across countries, in part because the effect of liberalization on agricultural 
prices is ambiguous. Global agricultural trade reform is likely to increase world 
agricultural prices, but domestic trade liberalization will reduce domestic 
agricultural prices relative to the world price. The net effect of liberalization 
on domestic agricultural prices will depend partly on each country’s trade 
  SUMMARY  xxipatterns, the original level of protection, and the details of the liberalization. 
If the initial level of domestic agricultural protection is high, as in Morocco 
and Tunisia, full trade liberalization is likely to reduce domestic agricultural 
prices. If, on the other hand, initial agricultural protection is modest, as in 
Egypt and Lebanon, full trade liberalization should have no effect or slightly 
increase domestic agricultural prices.
  Furthermore, the impact of changes in agricultural prices on poverty is 
ambiguous. Higher agricultural prices benefit farmers who can produce a 
marketed surplus, but they hurt the urban poor and rural net buyers. The 
analysis presented in this report suggests that higher agricultural prices gen-
erally benefit the poor on balance, but the effect is quite small.3 Thus, the 
link between trade liberalization and agricultural price changes is ambiguous, 
and the effect of agricultural price changes on poverty is weak. This suggests 
that trade policy is a poor instrument for addressing overall poverty in the 
MENA region.
  The economic benefits of regional integration (such as that achieved 
through the agreement to create the Greater Arab Free Trade Area) have 
been limited to date. One reason is that these agreements tend to be fairly 
flexible, allowing numerous exceptions for “sensitive goods.” A relatively 
small number of exceptions can largely negate the gains from trade liber-
alization. To generate significant gains for member countries, the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area and other regional trade zones will have to achieve 
a greater level of discipline over tariff and nontariff barriers. The second 
reason for the modest benefits associated with these trade agreements is 
that regional trade is hampered by a variety of factors in addition to trade 
policy. The transportation infrastructure linking MENA countries is generally 
poor, transportation services in the region are characterized by a lack of 
competition and high costs, and many of the countries in the region suffer 
from cumbersome customs procedures that raise the cost of trade. Measures 
to streamline customs procedures and introduce greater competition in 
regional transportation services would enhance the benefits of regional trade 
agreements. The third reason for the modest gains associated with regional 
trade agreements is the similarity of the economic structures in the member 
countries. If all member countries import wheat and maize, export fruits and 
vegetables, and have similar wage rates, the gains from agricultural trade 
are likely to be limited.
 Regarding  bilateral agreements, the EMAAs generally exclude agriculture. 
Simulation studies confirm the economic intuition that the gains from these 
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3 In Egypt this is true for wheat but not for agricultural prices in general.agreements would be much larger if they included liberalization in the agri-
cultural sector. The five countries with EMAAs should begin to explore the 
feasibility of a second round of negotiations that would include agriculture. 
While recognizing the political sensitivity of agricultural prices, MENA coun-
tries should keep in mind that most of the benefits of an expanded associa-
tion agreement will be related to the degree of domestic liberalization in 
their own countries. At the same time, the liberalization of E.U. tariff and 
nontariff barriers on fruits, vegetables, olive oil, and sugar would be particu-
larly beneficial to the MENA countries.
  Regarding the U.S. FTAs, the United States is a relatively minor trading 
partner with all of these countries, so, the MENA countries should not expect 
large impacts, positive or negative, as a result of these agreements. On the 
other hand, these agreements may facilitate investment (local and foreign) in 
the MENA countries, partly because they include measures to create a more 
favorable climate for private investment and partly because they signal a 
commitment to greater integration in the global economy.
 Regarding  unilateral liberalization, economic analysis suggests that, in 
general, unilaterally reducing import protection and domestic support of 
agriculture will increase aggregate income. Indeed, it is easy to demonstrate 
that, in most cases, the benefits of lower domestic prices to consumers are 
greater than the losses to producers. Yet policymakers, trade negotiators, 
and many noneconomists see reducing domestic protection as the “price” a 
country must pay to gain access to markets in other countries. One argument 
is that poor farmers in developing countries cannot compete with large-scale 
technologically advanced farmers in developed countries, particularly if the 
latter receive production subsidies. Certainly commercial farmers in develop-
ing countries are hurt by the subsidies given to farmers in the countries of the 
OECD. However, in spite of these subsidies, Egypt is a competitive exporter 
of cotton and rice, Morocco is able to export tomatoes to Europe, and Tunisia 
is a major exporter of olive oil. These examples suggest that the MENA coun-
tries can compete in markets where they have a comparative advantage.
  According to another argument, domestic import barriers to agricultural 
products help poor farmers by raising domestic agricultural prices. The analysis 
presented in this report suggests that higher agricultural prices have mixed 
effects on poor households. This is because (1) higher agricultural prices 
benefit some poor households (farmers with net sales) but hurt other poor 
households (the urban poor and net buyers in rural areas); (2) the percent-
age of households that are net sellers of agricultural goods is relatively small; 
(3) farmers who are net sellers tend to be richer than the average farmer, 
so higher farm income does not always translate into lower poverty; and (4) 
even those farmers who are both poor and net sellers rely on nonagricultural 
  SUMMARY  xxiiiactivities for a significant share of their incomes. In other words, agricultural 
protection is a costly and imprecise tool with which to address the problem 
of rural poverty.
Complementary Policies
The impact of trade liberalization on small farmers and other poor households 
in the MENA region partly depends on nontrade policies. Several studies have 
indicated that the size of the gains from trade liberalization will be greater 
when there are flexible factor markets that allow land, labor, and capital 
to be reallocated from formerly protected sectors to newly profitable sec-
tors. Regulations that constrain the response of these factor markets reduce 
the positive impact of liberalization. In agriculture, flexibility is likely to be 
enhanced by effective agricultural services such as extension and market 
information systems that can provide farmers with useful information about 
the agronomic and economic aspects of shifting into new commodities.
  Another type of policy that enhances the economic effect of trade liberal-
ization is trade facilitation. This refers to measures that reduce the trans-
action costs related to trade, including the costs of excessive documentation 
requirements, the need to obtain authorizations from multiple agencies, 
unclear or subjective criteria for applications of duties, and delays and 
uncertainties related to customs clearance. One study found that the gains 
from trade liberalization are twice as large if combined with trade facilita-
tion measures.
  Under WTO rules, the agricultural sector can be directly supported through
a variety of green box expenditures, such as investments in agricultural research 
and extension, pest and disease control, inspection services, marketing infra-
structure, market information services, environmental protection programs, 
and regional assistance programs. Most of these investments involve the provi-
sion of public goods, implying that they may be justified in terms of economic 
efficiency as well as in terms of supporting poor farmers.
  One type of green box support does not involve the provision of public 
goods: decoupled payments to farmers. Payments are decoupled when they 
are based not on current production but rather on some fixed measure such 
as production or area planted in a base year. Over the past 15 years, econo-
mists and policymakers have become increasingly interested in agricultural 
reform that shifts from producer subsidies and import protection toward 
decoupled payments to farmers. This type of reform has been tried in the 
E.U., Mexico, Turkey, and the United States with some success. At the same 
time, it should be recognized that switching from import protection to a 
program of decoupled payments implies both a loss in tariff revenue and 
significant new expenditure.
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  If the objective is to assist poor and vulnerable households regardless of 
their occupation, a different type of measure should be considered. A wide 
variety of safety net programs have been established in developing coun-
tries with the goal of reducing poverty. Targeted food subsidies make sub-
sidized food available to selected households either geographically, through 
low-priced shops located in poor neighborhoods, or through some form of 
ration card that entitles the bearer to purchase food at subsidized prices. 
Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia have attempted to introduce targeting into food 
subsidy programs. Labor-intensive public works programs usually combine 
infrastructure development (such as road building) with hiring policies to 
maximize their pro-poor impact. If designed well, they can improve com-
munity infrastructure and provide assistance to the poorest households with 
able-bodied members. Conditional cash transfer programs have generated 
considerable interest in the past 10–15 years. These programs provide cash 
grants to households that comply with certain requirements, usually keeping 
children in school, attending health clinics, or receiving pre- and postnatal 
care. Conditional cash transfers serve a dual purpose: providing assistance to 
poor households and encouraging investments in human capital that reduce 
the chance that poverty will be transmitted to the next generation.CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Agriculture and Trade Liberalization
A
griculture is one of the most problematic areas in international trade 
negotiations. Although significant progress has been achieved in 
reducing trade barriers and other policy distortions in manufacturing 
through various multilateral agreements, in regional and bilateral arrange-
ments and under unilateral trade reforms, agricultural markets remain highly 
distorted. Both industrial and developing countries still provide relatively 
high levels of protection to agricultural sectors. In addition, many countries, 
particularly the industrialized countries, provide various forms of support for 
agriculture. Agricultural trade liberalization is a politically sensitive topic in 
developing countries because policymakers are concerned about the poten-
tial impact on small-scale farmers, who typically account for a large share 
of the poor. The issue is politically sensitive in industrialized countries as 
well, at least partly because of the disproportionate political power of farm 
groups.
  In spite of this sensitivity, there is a widespread belief that reducing the 
trade barriers and policy distortions affecting agriculture will increase eco-
nomic efficiency and aggregate income. The theory of comparative advan-
tage suggests that aggregate income is higher when trade barriers are lower. 
Empirical studies of trade liberalization generally show that the aggregate 
benefits of trade liberalization outweigh the costs. Studies also show that 
more outward-oriented countries tend to grow more rapidly over time, sug-
gesting that trade liberalization generates dynamic gains through the free 
flow of investment and technology. By this logic, even unilateral trade lib-
eralization should usually benefit a country. In the political arena, however, 
there is strong resistance to unilateral liberalization. In the view of many 
policymakers, reducing domestic protection is a necessary cost used as a bar-
gaining chip to gain access to markets in other countries. In addition, there 
is concern that even if liberalization brings benefits in the aggregate, it may 
adversely affect the poor or exacerbate income inequality.
1  Economic theory and empirical studies suggest that current agricul-
tural  policies suppress the world price of many agricultural commodities 
below what they would be under liberalized trade. This is because import 
restrictions reduce world demand and agricultural producer support tends to
stimulate supply. The effect on domestic agricultural prices in countries that 
protect their agriculture is ambiguous, however, because multilateral trade 
liberalization would probably increase world agricultural prices, but tariff 
reduction within a country will reduce domestic prices relative to world 
prices. In addition to trade barriers, imperfect transmission of world prices 
resulting from transaction costs may mute the signals from changes in world 
prices.
  The impact of trade policy reforms varies substantially across commodi-
ties, countries, and households within a country. Some commodity markets, 
such as those for sugar and rice, are more distorted than others, so trade 
liberalization will likely have a larger effect on the prices of these commodi-
ties. Some countries are net exporters of agricultural commodities, so they 
would gain from the higher agricultural prices associated with multilateral 
liberalization. Net importers of agricultural commodities could lose from 
multilateral trade liberalization, though this will depend on the degree of 
reform they carry out in their domestic policies.
  The issues of trade liberalization and agriculture are of particular impor-
tance to the non-oil-exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) for several reasons:
•   The growth of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the MENA region 
stagnated at around 2 percent between the periods 1990–99 and 2000–06 
and in the more recent period lagged behind the average of most of the 
developing country groups (Table 1.1). The slow economic growth has led 
to various social problems, including high levels of unemployment.
•   The countries of the region generally have levels of trade protection that 
are higher than in most of the developing world (see “Structure of Pro-
tection” in Chapter 2). This is particularly true in agricultural protection 
among the non-oil-exporting MENA countries.
•   High rates of agricultural protection in countries like Morocco and Tuni-
sia imply that domestic trade liberalization will have significant adverse 
effects on farmers, and thus on the rural poor.
•   Almost all the MENA countries are net food importers, so they are vulner-
able to fluctuations in food prices, such as the dramatic rise in commodity 
prices in 2007–08. The non-oil-exporting MENA countries are more vulner-
able to commodity price shocks because they do not have increased oil 
revenue to offset the higher cost of imported food.
2  CHAPTER 1•   The proximity of the MENA region to the high-income markets in Europe 
creates significant opportunities for international trade, yet the importance 
of trade in the economy is no greater than in Sub-Saharan Africa or in 
developing countries in general.1
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Table 1.1  Summary statistics for selected MENA economies, 2006
Region/country
MENA
  Djibouti  817  –4.3  0.8 62.0 87.0 87.0 56.0
  Egypt  1,724  2.5  2.5  11.0  43.0  43.9  3.1
  Jordan  2,173  0.7  3.3  12.0  83.0  6.9  2.0
  Lebanon  5,059  6.9  1.9  9.0  87.0  18.0  6.3
  Morocco  1,667  1.0  3.7  10.0  59.0  14.3  2.0
  Syria  1,287  2.6  1.4  12.0  51.0  —  —
  Tunisia  2,513  3.3  3.6  14.0  66.0  6.6  2.0
  West Bank   1,014  1.8  –5.4 27.0 72.0 36.0 24.0
    and Gaza     
  MENA average  1,862  1.9  2.2  14.0  57.0  19.7  1.5
East Asia and   1,475  6.8  7.4  4.9  42.0  40.7  14.9
    the Pacific 
South  Asia  604  3.2 4.7 5.3  29.0  77.8  31.3
Latin America   4,329  1.3  1.8  8.9  78.0  22.6  9.5
    and the 
    Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan   578  –0.5  2.0  —  36.0 74.9 46.4
    Africa 
Sources:   Laithy, Abu-Ismail, and Hamdan (2008); World Bank (2008a, 2008b); CIA (2009).
Notes:   —, data not available. The poverty rates for Lebanon are based on estimations by 
Laithy, Abu-Ismail, and Hamdan (2008) relative to two poverty lines of US$4.00 and 
US$2.40 per day instead of the World Bank’s lines of US$2.00 and US$1.00 per day, 
respectively.
aLatest year available: 2007 for Djibouti; 2004 for Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa), South Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean; 2006 for 
Morocco; 2003 for Syria; and 2005 for Tunisia and East Asia and the Pacific.
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1 A common measure of the importance of trade in the economy is the sum of the value of 
exports and imports as a ratio of GDP. The ratio is 65–70 percent for the MENA countries and for 
developing countries in general (World Bank 2008b).These patterns raise the question of whether there is a connection between 
the relatively high rates of protection among the non-oil-exporting MENA 
countries and the relatively low rates of economic growth in the region. The 
distributional impact of trade liberalization is important because it has impli-
cations for the desirability of trade liberalization, its political acceptability, 
and the need for complementary policies to ameliorate the adverse effects.
Objectives
In light of the previous discussion, this report has four objectives:
•   to describe the current agricultural and trade policies of the non-oil-
exporting MENA countries and their impact on the agricultural economy of 
the region;
•   to describe the current status of agricultural trade liberalization in the 
region and the extent of additional agricultural trade liberalization that 
will result from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) agreements, 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) multilateral trade negotiations;
•   to analyze the potential impact of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral 
trade liberalization efforts (including the reduction of domestic support) 
on the agricultural economy in the MENA region, with particular emphasis 
on their distributional impact; and
•   to explore the types of measures that could be used to mitigate the poten-
tial negative impact of trade liberalization on the poor, particularly the 
rural poor, in the MENA region.
  This study adopts two levels of geographic focus. First, we provide a 
descriptive analysis of trade patterns and levels of trade protection and a 
review of previous research on the impact of trade liberalization for eight 
MENA countries: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
and the West Bank and Gaza. This list was derived using two criteria:
•   Among the 21 MENA countries, we exclude major oil exporters, defined as 
those whose oil exports are more than 80 percent of their domestic con-
sumption, that is, Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.2
•   We also exclude the two high-income countries in the region, Israel and 
Malta, for which poverty is not a major issue.
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2 The MENA region, as defined by the World Bank, includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.Second, we use household survey data and computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models to simulate the effects of trade liberalization on the poor in four 
of them: Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. Although we do not claim that 
these countries are representative of the region, we hope that the study con-
tributes further to the empirical evidence on the distributional effects of agri-
cultural trade liberalization in a region that has received limited attention.
Organization of the Report
Chapter 2 of the report provides a regional overview on agriculture, trade, 
and poverty in the non-oil-exporting MENA countries. MENA is an economi-
cally diverse region that comprises 21 countries. The region’s economic 
development over the past 25 years has been influenced by both the price 
of oil and the dominance of the role of the state in economic policies and 
structures (World Bank 2009). The MENA region has experienced slow eco-
nomic growth in recent years, leading to various social problems, including 
high levels of unemployment. The growth of per capita GDP in the region 
has generally lagged behind the average of developing countries (World Bank 
2008b). Agriculture contributes modestly to GDP but employs a sizable share 
of the labor force.
  This chapter also explores the global and regional trade environment by 
analyzing the structure of protection that the countries in the region apply 
and face and examines the trade integration options in the region. These 
countries share levels of trade protection that are higher than the levels in 
many other regions of the world, especially in agriculture. But the countries 
enjoy good market access to developed economies due to the multiple trade 
preferences granted by their two main trading partners, the E.U. and the 
United States. In spite of high applied tariffs, nontariff barriers constitute 
even a higher trade impediment in the region. For these countries, comple-
mentary policies aimed at reducing the transport costs and improving the 
quality standards of traded goods must accompany a more outward-oriented 
trade policy in order to stimulate more rapid growth in the region and con-
tribute positively to reducing poverty.
  Chapter 3 reviews the evidence on the impact of trade liberalization 
in the selected MENA countries, with emphasis on studies that examine its 
impact on poor households. The relationship between trade liberalization and 
poverty alleviation is a complex one because although the relationship can be 
positive, it must take into account several key factors in addition to prices 
(Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004). The traditional argument focuses on 
prices of goods and factors. Given that the majority of poor people live in 
rural areas and work in the agricultural sector, where trade distortion is usu-
ally higher, global trade liberalization could imply higher world agricultural 
INTRODUCTION  5   prices and increased activity and returns to the sector in developing countries 
(Bouët 2008).
  Chapters 4–7 address the potential distributional impact from trade liber-
alization in four MENA countries. As described in Chapter 4, Egypt represents 
an early reformer with relatively low levels of agricultural protection, though 
it maintains a large system of consumer food subsidies. We simulate the 
impact of trade liberalization on different types of households using a partial 
equilibrium analysis that combines household survey data and hypothetical 
changes in the price of individual agricultural commodities. This analysis 
allows us to estimate the change in poverty overall, in urban and rural areas, 
and for specific types of households.
  Chapter 5 examines Tunisia, a country that has made significant progress 
in recent years by opening its borders to trade and foreign investment, though 
the overall level of agricultural protection remains high. A CGE model of the 
Tunisian economy is linked to data from 397 representative households, allow-
ing estimation of the impact of three variants of domestic trade liberalization 
and one scenario combining domestic and multilateral trade liberalization.
  In Chapter 6 we focus on Syria, which has retained many of the policies 
that characterized the region 20 years ago: fixed producer prices, large-scale 
public procurement of major crops, and high levels of agricultural protec-
tion. The Syrian CGE model incorporates 10 household groups represented 
by income deciles of the population. Because wheat is the most distorted 
agricultural market and the most sensitive crop politically, the model is used 
to simulate a reduction in producer wheat subsidies and consumer bread 
subsidies of 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent.
  Chapter 7 describes the case of Morocco. Although Morocco has negoti-
ated a number of trade agreements with the E.U., the United States, and 
its neighbors in the region, it maintains relatively high levels of protection, 
particularly on wheat. We use a global trade model to examine the impact of 
different types of trade liberalization on the returns to different categories 
of labor, including unskilled agricultural labor.
  In the final chapter of the report we summarize the main findings and dis-
cuss the implications for policy. In particular, we explore alternative policies 
and programs that might enhance the positive impact of trade liberalization 
and alleviate some of its negative effects, with attention to its impact on the 
poor, particularly the rural poor.
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Overview of Selected MENA Economies
T
he MENA countries form a heterogeneous group of countries with respect 
to income, food security, and their integration in the global economy. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, we focus our overview on the lower- and 
middle-income non-oil-exporting countries of MENA: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza. These coun-
tries fall under the categories of low-income food-deficit countries or net-food-
importing developing countries. This second category is a WTO classification 
that has implications for the negotiations in agriculture. WTO recognizes that 
this last group of countries (together with the group of least developing coun-
tries, or LDCs) is vulnerable to the possible negative effects of implementing 
agreements for free trade in agriculture and experiences difficulties in financ-
ing food imports (WTO 2006).1
Economic Performance and the Role of Agriculture
Among the selected MENA countries, the per capita GDP ranges from US$817 
in Djibouti to US$5,069 in Lebanon, though most fall in the range of US$1,000–
2,500 and the average for all MENA countries is US$1,862 (see Table 1.1).2 
The average growth in per capita GDP for the region as a whole was around 
2 percent over the periods 1990–99 and 2000–06, but growth was uneven 
among countries. Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, and Tunisia experienced 
7
1 The net food-importing developing countries are a WTO-defined group that is subject to dif-
ferential treatment under a special ministerial decision agreed during the Uruguay Round WTO 
negotiations. The decision recognizes that trade reforms in agriculture could have negative 
effects on these groups “in terms of the availability of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs 
from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions, including short-term difficulties in 
financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.” The ministerial decision 
recommends such measures as food aid and aid for agricultural development. It also refers to 
the possibility of assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to finance 
commercial food imports (WTO 2006). The definition of low-income food-deficit countries pro-
vided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations may overlap with the clas-
sification of net food-importing developing countries.
2 These figures are expressed in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.solid economic growth (above 3 percent in per capita GDP) during the 1990s. 
While Tunisia continued to enjoy solid growth in 2000–06, joined by Jordan 
and Morocco, Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza experienced a sharp 
slowing of their economies due to conflict. Most regions experienced higher 
growth over 2000–06 than in the 1990s, but growth in the MENA region barely 
increased. During 2000–06, growth in the MENA region was comparable to that 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and lagged behind growth in South Asia and in East Asia 
and the Pacific (see Table 1.1).
  Various hypotheses have been advanced for the relatively weak growth 
rates among the MENA countries:
•   Conflict: While some of our selected countries have known relative stabil-
ity, many have been affected by the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Iraq 
war, and the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon. For 
example, Lebanon’s economy went from a strong growth rate (6 percent) 
in 2004 to negative growth (–1 percent) in 2006 (World Bank 2008b). 
Conflicts have direct costs in terms of lives and property, but they also 
destroy social capital (Collier 1999). Moreover, conflicts create a climate 
of uncertainty and discourage investment.
•   The policy and regulatory environment: In 2005, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank started ranking countries annually on 
the ease of doing business within them based on 39 indicators grouped 
into 10 categories. The categories include starting a business, dealing with 
construction permits, employing workers, registering property, obtaining 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforc-
ing contracts, and closing a business. While on average the MENA region 
is on an upward trend with regard to the ease of doing business, only one 
country, Tunisia, is ranked in the top half. On the other hand, Syria ranks 
in the bottom 25 percent of all countries (IFC 2009).
•   Trade barriers: High import barriers in the region distort economic incen-
tives and impede the flow of new technology, thus reducing productivity 
growth. As discussed later, import protection is higher on average in the 
MENA region than in other developing countries. In Morocco and Tunisia, 
agricultural import tariffs are 30 percentage points higher than the aver-
age for other developing countries.
  A serious economic problem facing many of the MENA countries is un-
employment. Reflecting the low rates of economic growth combined with the 
rapid population growth in some countries, the unemployment rate averaged 
14 percent for the MENA region, higher than in other developing regions. A 
recent report summarized the situation as follows:
8  CHAPTER 2Average unemployment rates are highest among both youth and adults 
in MENA, when compared to all other developing regions. The share of 
young people among the region’s unemployed is higher than 50 percent 
in most countries. In Egypt and Syria, youth make up more than 60 
percent of the unemployed. In Tunisia, the unemployment rate for 
20–24 year olds is more than three times higher than that for people 
above 40. And low labor force participation rate among females per-
sists, even among younger cohorts with higher educational attainment. 
(World Bank 2007)
  The MENA region is relatively urbanized, with 57 percent of the popula-
tion in urban areas. Djibouti, Jordan, and Lebanon are the most urbanized, 
with urbanization rates of more than 80 percent (see Table 1.1). According 
to Fedjari (2000, cited in Radwan and Reiffers 2003), there are 180,000 rural 
migrants per year in Morocco, and 60,000 of these head for Casablanca. The 
high proportion of the population in urban area contributes to the depen-
dence on food imports to satisfy domestic demand.
  The incidence of poverty using the poverty line of US$2 per day is on aver-
age 20 percent for the MENA region, but the incidence varies greatly across 
the countries (see Table 1.1). Using the poverty line of US$1 per day, Djibouti 
has the highest poverty incidence (56 percent), followed by the West Bank and
Gaza (24 percent). The subnational indicators (not shown here) reveal un-
ambiguously that poverty in the MENA region, as in many developing countries, 
is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban ones (World Bank 2008b).
  The GDP structure of the MENA countries indicates the dominant role of 
services and industry in these economies. On average, in the region the ser-
vice sector contributes nearly half of GDP and industry more than a third. 
But countries differ widely around these averages. Services account for 
two-thirds or more of GDP in Djibouti, Jordan, and Lebanon (Table 2.1). In 
Djibouti, port and transport services are an important part of the economy 
because the country serves as the main trans-shipment route for Ethiopian 
trade.
  The contribution of industry to GDP averages 40 percent for the MENA 
region, but it is less than this in all eight of the non-oil-exporting countries 
under consideration. For most of these countries, manufacturing dominates 
the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are 
the most industrialized, with this sector accounting for 30 percent or more 
of their GDP (see Table 2.1).
  The agricultural sector accounts for 12 percent of GDP on average for the 
MENA region. Among the eight countries under consideration, the contribu-
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etion is less than 10 percent in Djibouti, Jordan, and Lebanon. On the other 
hand, it is more than 15 percent in just two countries: Morocco and Syria.
  Although the agricultural sector in most MENA countries is relatively small, 
this does not imply that it is a stagnant sector. As shown in Table 2.1, the 
agricultural sector grew at 4 percent per year on average over 2000–06 and 
at more than 5 percent per year in Jordan, Morocco, and Syria.
  Furthermore, the agricultural sector accounts for an important share in 
national employment. As in most developing countries, its share of employ-
ment is significantly larger than its share in GDP. This pattern reflects the low 
productivity in agriculture in these countries and, consequently, the relatively 
large share of poverty in rural areas (IFAD 2003). In the MENA region, Morocco 
has the highest share of employment in agriculture, 45 percent, followed by 
Egypt and Syria, with 30 and 27 percent, respectively (see Table 2.1).
  Another measure of the importance of the agricultural sector is the share of 
agricultural exports in total exports. The contribution of agriculture to exports 
is below 10 percent in the region as a whole and for most selected countries 
with the exception of Syria (see Table 2.1). However, the impact of agricultural 
trade liberalization on households may be large even if only a small share of 
exports is from the agricultural sector because agriculture trade affects food 
prices, and thus food security, especially among poor households.
The Structure of Agricultural Production and Trade in MENA
Trade liberalization is expected to result in relative price changes that will 
affect each country at the national level according to its pattern of produc-
tion and trade. MENA countries are characterized by a high dependence on 
food imports, a situation that may threaten their food security when inter-
national food prices rise significantly, as they did in 2007–08 (Benson et al. 
2008; Von Braun 2008). This section examines the patterns of agricultural 
production and trade in the eight countries under consideration.
Production
The MENA region faces adverse climatic conditions, including low and highly 
variable annual rainfall patterns and poor soils for the most part. According 
to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO 2004), 62 
percent of the region is hyperarid, 17 percent arid, 11 percent semiarid, and 
4.4 percent subhumid. Agriculture in the region operates under severe limita-
tions in water resources. Irrigation plays an essential role in the agricultural 
sector of Egypt, where all cropland is irrigated, and an important supporting 
role in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, where 24–31 percent of the cropland is 
irrigated (Table 2.2). Agriculture in the other MENA countries relies largely 
on rainfall (FAO 2003).
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)  Yet irrigated agriculture often plays a critical role in agricultural exports. 
For example, in Morocco products from irrigated land account for 75 percent 
of the total primary and processed agricultural exports (Roe et al. 2005). In 
the countries where irrigated agriculture is important, water for expansion 
will have to come mainly from efficiency savings on existing schemes (FAO 
2004).
  In Egypt, agricultural production is highly concentrated along the Nile 
River and in the Nile Delta. About 97 percent of the area of Egypt is un-
cultivated due to the extremely limited rainfall. Virtually all agricultural 
land is allocated to crop production, and all crop production is irrigated 
(World Bank 2008b and Table 2.2). Although the amount of arable land per 
person is quite small (0.04 hectares), this is offset by multiple cropping and 
intensive production.
  For the other countries, fruits and vegetables and meat products consti-
tute an important share of agricultural production. Cereal production is sub-
stantial in Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. Wheat is the dominant cereal 
in all eight countries, though rice is also important in Egypt.
  Sugar crop production is concentrated in Egypt, Morocco, and Syria. In 
Egypt it is mainly in the form of sugarcane, while in the other two countries 
sugar beets are dominant. Egypt and Syria are the only cotton producers in 
the region. Egyptian cotton commands a premium in world markets because 
of the length of its fibers. Almost all the countries under consideration grow 
olives and produce olive oil, but production is concentrated in Tunisia, Syria, 
and, to a lesser degree, Morocco (see Table 2.2).
Trade
The MENA region is a net importer of many agricultural commodities, includ-
ing cereals, sugar, and cotton. Among the eight MENA countries under con-
sideration, all but Syria are net importers of wheat, and all but Egypt are net 
importers of rice. On the other hand, all the countries under consideration 
are net exporters of olive oil except Djibouti. Tunisia is by far the most 
important olive oil exporter among the eight (Table 2.3).
  Agricultural imports are dominated by food and animal products, which 
represent about three quarters of the total value for the MENA region. Cere-
als represent 25–40 percent of the value of agricultural imports in all the 
countries except Djibouti and Lebanon, where the share is less than 15 per-
cent. Within cereal imports, wheat accounts for almost half of the total for 
the MENA region. Egypt is one of the largest wheat importers in the world, in 
part due to its policy of subsidizing some types of bread. Morocco and Tunisia 
are also major importers of wheat. Fruit and vegetable imports are a par-
ticularly large share of agricultural imports in the West Bank and Gaza and in 
OVERVIEW OF SELECTED MENA ECONOMIES  13   Lebanon. Other significant components of agricultural imports include dairy 
and eggs (particularly in Lebanon), meat and meat products (most notably in 
Egypt), and sugar (particularly in Syria) (Table 2.4).
  Fruits and vegetables make up the main export sector in the MENA region 
as a whole and in most of the selected countries. Fruits and vegetables 
account for nearly two-thirds of agricultural exports in Morocco and over half 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Tunisia is an exception; there olive oil repre-
sents 60 percent of total agricultural export revenue. Egypt and Syria display 
a more diverse export structure, with an important role played by cereal 
exports, rice in Egypt and wheat in Syria (Table 2.5).
  Cotton is the most important nonfood agricultural export of Egypt, con-
tributing 22 percent of its total agriculture export revenue. It should be 
noted, however, that the cotton export revenue in Egypt has been quite vola-
tile due to fluctuations in the world price and in domestic production. Over 
the period 2004–06 (the latest years available from the FAO database), the 
annual cotton export revenue was US$265 million, a third below the 2002–04 
average of US$393 million, after reaching a record high of close to US$500 
million in 2004. Higher world prices were recorded between 2006 and 2008, 
which may spur export revenues, especially if production follows the same 
trend. Cotton is also used in Egypt’s textile sector, which produces cloth 
and garments for domestic use and for export. The Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 
which established quotas to regulate trade in textiles and apparel, expired in 
January 2005, exposing textile and apparel exporters in the MENA region to 
greater competition, particularly from China, India, and Pakistan.
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Table 2.3  Average net exports of selected commodities, 2004–06 
(thousand metric tons)
       Sugar
 Total    Rice  (raw  Cotton
Country cereals  Wheat  (milled)  equivalent)  lint  Olive  oil
Djibouti –149  –102  –19  –34 0  –0
Egypt –8,099  –5,290  911  –336  64 1
Jordan –1,967  –671  –134  –243  0  3
Lebanon –802  –401  –45  –146 0  1
Morocco –4,110  –2,368  –1  –63 –33  21
Syria –1,383  683  –177  –574  135  41
Tunisia –2,337  –1,145  –19  –372  –18  197
West Bank   –626  –126  –19  –78  —  1
  and Gaza 
Total MENA  –54,108  –26,962  –3,067  –7,703  –393  328
Source:   FAO (2009a).
Note:   MENA, Middle East and North Africa; —, data not available.OVERVIEW OF SELECTED MENA ECONOMIES  15   
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.  The high dependence on food imports of the MENA region as a whole and 
of individual MENA countries in particular challenges the countries’ efforts 
to improve their food security. In the study by Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000), the 
authors generated indicators of the food security status of countries. They 
used cluster analysis to classify 163 developed and developing countries 
based on five measures of food security: food production per capita (measur-
ing the ability of a country to feed itself), the ratio of food imports to total 
exports (an indication of a country’s ability to finance its food imports), 
calories per capita and protein per capita (measuring the level of nutrition), 
and the nonagricultural population share (an indication of how vulnerable 
the population is to changes in trade and agricultural policies). Results from 
the cluster analysis classify the six middle-income MENA countries, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, as “food neutral” but suggest 
that these countries are nonetheless trade stressed due to a high ratio of 
food imports to total exports. Figure 2.1 shows that these ratios have been 
on a declining trend for some of the countries under consideration in this 
study, but the ratio is still above 15 percent in Egypt and Jordan and reached 
an average of 42 percent in Lebanon for the period 2000–06. This trend in 
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Figure 2.1  Ratio of food imports to total exports for selected MENA 
countries
Source:   World Bank (2008b).
Note:   Data not available for Djibouti or for the West Bank and Gaza.some of the MENA countries may have reversed during the recent spike in 
food prices, which worsened the terms of trade of non-oil-exporting MENA 
countries (World Bank 2009).
The Pattern of Trade and Protection of MENA Countries
The potential effects of trade liberalization on the MENA countries are depen-
dent on the patterns of trade flows of the countries and the original level 
of protection they apply and face with respect to their trade partners. This 
section uses the MAcMap–HS6 database developed by CEPII (2008) to illustrate 
the patterns of agricultural trade in the region and compute average levels 
of protection among the selected MENA countries and their trading partners. 
The MAcMap–HS6 database provides a set of consistent and exhaustive ad 
valorem equivalents (AVEs) of applied border protection for 165 reporting 
countries, 5,111 commodities, and 208 trading partners. The tariff equiva-
lents reflect tariffs (ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound, and antidump-
ing duties), and tariff quotas, taking into account all regional agreements and 
trade preferences. The trade data in MAcMap–HS6 are sourced from Base pour 
l’Analyse du Commerce International (BACI) (CEPII 2008).
Patterns of Agricultural Trade Flows
Intraregional trade in MENA with respect to agriculture is dominant in exports, 
representing 41 percent of the region’s total agricultural exports. Outside the 
region, the EU25 and the group of developing countries absorb 29 and 20 per-
cent of MENA agricultural exports, respectively.3 Among single-country des-
tinations, the United States is the destination of 2 percent of MENA exports. 
Imports present a different structure in which intraregional trade represents 
only 13 percent of agricultural imports and developing countries and the EU25 
are the main sources of MENA imports, 42 and 26 percent, respectively. The 
United States plays a larger role in the region’s imports than in its exports, 
contributing 9 percent of the region’s total agricultural imports (Figure 2.2). 
Developing countries as a group play a dominant role in MENA trade: imports 
are much more concentrated and dominated by large exporters of agriculture 
in Latin America, such as Argentina and Brazil, which together contribute 15 
percent of MENA agricultural imports. China and India are also active sources 
of agricultural imports for the MENA region.
  Among single MENA countries, the direction of trade varies: North African 
countries like Morocco and Tunisia are more likely to trade with the EU25, 
18  CHAPTER 2
3 EU25 refers to the membership of the European Union as of 2004. In 2007 two more countries 
joined the E.U.: Bulgaria and Romania.while Middle Eastern countries favor South–South trade within the MENA 
region, with shares of exports ranging between 39 percent for Egypt and 82 
percent for Jordan. In terms of imports, all countries mostly import from the 
EU25, with the exception of Syria, which seems to favor imports from devel-
oping countries (see Table 2.6).
The Structure of Protection
Table 2.7 indicates that although overall protection continues to be higher 
in developing countries and in the MENA region than in developed countries, 
agricultural protection is very similar across various groups of countries. 
MENA protection in agriculture is slightly higher on average than the level in 
developed countries and lower than the average protection in developing coun-
tries and the LDCs. Among the MENA countries, overall protection is highest 
in Tunisia followed by Morocco, Syria, and Egypt. Bouët (2006) ranks Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia among the 11 most protectionist countries among coun-
tries in the MAcMap–HS6 database for 2001. For these countries, the results 
are consistent with earlier tariff rankings generated between 1988 and 1998 
by various international organizations, including the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Organisation for Economic 
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Exports Imports
LDC 3%
MENA 41%
EU25 29%
Other
developed 5%
Developing
20%
United
States 2%
LDC 1%
MENA 13%
EU25 26%
Other
developed 9%
Developing
42%
United
States 9%
Figure 2.2  Composition of trading partners in agricultural trade for the 
MENA region, 2004
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on the MAcMap–HS6 database, 2004.
Notes:     Developing, developing countries not including LDC; EU25, European Union (25 
members as of 2004); LDC, least developed countries; MENA, Middle East and North 
Africa; Other developed, other developed countries.20  CHAPTER 2
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.Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), summarized in Oliva (2000). These organizations rank 
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia as more often restrictive than not, but the rank-
ings differ among the studies.4 There is less consistency on Jordan and Syria, 
which appear restrictive in some studies (such as that of the IMF and Oliva’s 
own index in the case of Syria) and open in others (that of UNCTAD). Zarrouk 
and Zallio (2000) argue that industrial strategies founded on import substitu-
tion and a large public sector have led to high protection in MENA countries 
and that governments have ended up relying on import duties as a main 
source of revenues. By contrast, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon are more open, 
with levels of protection in agriculture that are comparable to the average 
in developed countries.5
  Table 2.7 identifies countries as protectors of agriculture if the ratio of the 
level of agricultural protection to industrial protection is at least 1.4. On aver-
age, countries protect agriculture more than industry, and this is particularly 
notable for developed countries, which have low levels of industrial protection 
combined with high rates of protection of agriculture (Japan and Switzerland 
are the most illustrative). The MENA countries are protectors of agriculture 
on average: the level of their protection in agriculture is more than twice the 
industrial rate. Since the advent of structural adjustment programs and acces-
sion to the WTO, which curtailed industrial protection, the average global tariff 
has decreased (WTO 2002), but agriculture protection has been reduced at a 
much slower pace. The exceptions are Djibouti, Egypt, and Syria, which have 
higher rates of protection in industry than in agriculture. Morocco and Tunisia 
have very high levels of agricultural protection, matched only by Switzerland 
among the OECD countries and India among the developing countries and more 
than double the average for the MENA region.
  These results testify to the shift in protection by developing countries 
since the findings in Schiff and Valdes (1992), which illustrate the bias against 
agriculture emanating from agricultural sector policies (direct effects) and 
from industrial protection and macroeconomic policies (indirect effects) in 
18 developing countries. Considering only the direct effects, the study esti-
mated that taxation on agriculture was 25 percent in Egypt over the period 
1964–84 and 15 percent in Morocco over the same period.6
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4 These assessments do not take into account the substantial liberalization of trade policy in 
Egypt in 2004, as discussed later.
5 In this aggregation, the beverages and tobacco sector is not included in agriculture. This 
classification matters in the case of Egypt, which has an AVE of 818 percent for beverages and 
tobacco.
6 To maintain consistency in comparing the results of Schiff and Valdes (1992) and the MAcMap–
HS6 database, we do not include the indirect effect of the tax on agriculture from the former 
study.  Agricultural protection in the MENA countries also varies relative to their 
trading partners. Table 2.8 shows applied protection by importers along the 
rows and the protection faced by exporters along the columns. MENA coun-
tries apply, on average, slightly higher rates on agricultural imports from the 
rest of the world than on those from other MENA countries. In particular, 
Morocco and Tunisia are more protectionist with respect to the rest of the 
world than to other MENA countries, applying rates of 45 and 50 percent, 
respectively. The protection faced by MENA countries varies across countries. 
Djibouti and the West Bank and Gaza face higher protection in MENA than in 
developed countries, as is the case for Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. But 
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Table 2.7  Applied levels of protection by region, 2004
  Level of protection (%)
         Is  agriculture
 Overall  Agriculture  Industry  Ratio  more  protected? 
Region/country (1)  (2) (3)  (2)/(3)  (ratio  > 1.4)
MENA 30  14  32  0.4  No
  Djibouti
  Egypt  15   8  15  0.5  No
  Jordan   8  11   8  1.3  No
  Lebanon   4   9   3  2.7  Yes
  Morocco  19  44  17  2.6  Yes
  Syria  16  13  16  0.8  No
  Tunisia  20  50  17  2.9  Yes
  West Bank and Gaza  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
  Rest of MENA   8  14   8  1.7  Yes
  MENA average  11  14  10  2.5  Yes
OECD   4  23   4  0.6  No
  Australia         
  Canada   3  16   3  6.2  Yes
  EU25   2  11   1  8.0  Yes
  Japan   3  27   1  18.5  Yes
  Switzerland   5  51   1  44.7  Yes
  United States   2   8   2  4.0  Yes
  Developed-country    2  13   2  6.5  Yes
    average 
Other
  Argentina  11  11  11  1.0  No
  Brazil  11  10  11  0.9  No
  China   5   6   5  1.3  No
  India  19  61  15  4.0  Yes
  Developing-country    8  18   7  2.4  Yes
    average 
LDCs average  12  15  11  1.4  No
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on MAcMap–HS6 database for 2004.
Notes:  EU25, European Union (25 members as of 2004); LDCs, least developed countries; 
MENA, Middle East and North Africa; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment; n.a., not applicable.24  CHAPTER 2
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scountries such as Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia face higher tariffs among devel-
oped countries, especially with respect to the EU25 in the case of Tunisia and 
Switzerland in the case of Syria.
  The regional average translates to a wide range of equivalent tariffs among 
MENA countries. The highest AVEs are applied by Tunisia and Morocco, rang-
ing from 26 to 68 percent in the former and from 13 to 63 percent in the 
latter. Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon apply some of the lowest rates to most 
other MENA countries (see Table 2.8).
  Among developed countries, Japan and Switzerland apply the highest 
protection to imports from MENA countries, especially with regard to Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Syria. Among developing countries, protection is higher, in 
India ranging from 41 to 68 percent. MENA countries face lower tariffs with 
respect to the United States than the EU25, but Lebanon is an exception. 
The rates are particularly low for Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia in the case 
of the United States, which has signed FTAs with the three countries, and for 
Lebanon and Morocco in the case of the EU25 (see Table 2.8).
  The MENA countries with the highest average tariff rates also have very 
high tariffs on selected commodities: Morocco has a 172 percent equivalent 
tariff on livestock, 71 percent on meat, and 140 percent on milled rice. Tuni-
sia protects fruits and vegetables at an average tariff of 137 percent and olive 
oil at 152 percent. Both countries apply high protection to wheat, 58 and 50 
percent, respectively. Fruits and vegetables, olive oil, meat, and cotton are 
consistently protected across the region (Table 2.9).
  Egypt has a more evenly distributed protection pattern and lower rates 
on agricultural imports. Since the swearing in of a new cabinet in July 2004, 
Egypt has reduced its tariff bands, annulled import fees and surcharges 
incompatible with the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
and made drastic cuts in tariff rates on most imports. These reforms are 
reflected in Table 2.7, which shows that the AVE in agriculture is less than 
half the one computed from the 2001 version of the MAcMAP database (IFAD/
IFPRI 2007). Egypt also exhibits the highest reform progress ranking, 100, 
in the World Bank’s structural reform indicators, which rank countries with 
respect to the restrictiveness of their current trade policies and the progress 
they made in trade reforms over 2000–04 (World Bank 2005).7 According to 
these indicators, Lebanon also ranks high, 87, implying that it has made more 
progress than 87 percent of the world’s countries. On the other hand, Morocco 
and Tunisia are among the 5 percent of countries with the most restrictive 
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strade policies, and both rank 49, indicating some progress in trade reforms 
(World Bank 2005).
  Among the protection instruments used by MENA countries, in addition to 
standard tariffs there are paratariff measures (customs surcharges, additional 
taxes and surcharges, stamp taxes, statistics taxes, and sales taxes levied 
on imports) and nontariff barriers (quantitative restrictions and technical 
requirements). A recent study by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006) provides 
indicators of trade restrictiveness that include measures of both tariff and 
nontariff barriers for 91 developing and developed countries. One of these 
authors’ main observations is the contribution to the level of trade restric-
tiveness by nontariff barriers (NTBs): on average, 70 percent in addition to 
tariffs. In Egypt and Tunisia, NTBs add an additional 50 percent to tariff 
restrictiveness. In Jordan and Morocco, measures with NTBs are twice the 
equivalent tariffs indexes, and in Lebanon the contribution of NTBs is higher 
than that of tariffs (Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 2006).
  NTBs are usually not addressed by trade liberalization policies, but they 
represent institutional constraints that would lower the ability of MENA 
countries to benefit fully from trade liberalization. For example, the elimi-
nation of tariffs among the partners in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA) by 2005 has not led to free intraregional trade in practice because 
of the requirement of import permits for exporting countries to benefit from 
the trade preferences. These permits are often not granted if it is felt that 
import-competing industries can be harmed by imports (World Bank 2009).
Trade Agreements
Trade reform in the MENA countries has been motivated in part by the 
region’s participation in multilateral negotiations in the context of the WTO 
framework and in North–South regional agreements with the E.U. and the 
United States. Most countries in the region also participate in South–South 
regional and bilateral integration.
  In most cases, regional and bilateral trade accords are driven by politi-
cal interests. For example, the creation of associations agreements (AAs) 
within the EMP is seen as a key element in support of peace and stability 
in the region because these agreements both promote the security of the 
E.U. and reduce the problem of illegal immigration (McQueen 2002). These 
agreements are usually limited by lack of coverage (agriculture and services 
are effectively excluded), lack of depth (technical barriers to trade remain 
because of differences in regulatory requirements and the need to duplicate 
testing), and restrictive rules of origin that limit the degree of effective mar-
ket access (Zarrouk and Zallio 2000; World Bank 2005). Next we briefly cover 
the main trade agreements pertinent to the region.
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In 1947, the GATT was signed with the goal of reducing protectionism and 
discrimination in international trade. The agreement was followed by a series 
of rounds of international negotiations to reduce protectionism and other 
distortions in trade. These agreements have been successful in dramatically 
reducing the protection on manufactured goods; the average tariff fell from 
38 to 4 percent between 1947 and 1994. Because of a reluctance to extend 
trade liberalization to agriculture, however, the average agricultural tar-
iff remained high, 60 percent in 1994 (Ingco and Nash 2004). The Uruguay 
Round, signed in 1994, established the WTO to monitor and enforce the trade 
agreements; it also included the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA), which attempts to reduce agricultural protection, limit agricultural 
subsidies, and make trade policy more transparent.
  The URAA reduces agricultural protection through the following commit-
ments:
•   Quantitative restrictions (such as import quotas) and other NTBs (such as 
variable levies) were to be converted to tariffs or tariff rate quotas. An 
exception is import requirements related to sanitary and phytosanitary prod-
ucts; these are regulated by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures, which also came out of the Uruguay Round.
•   Each country sets a maximum (bound) tariff rate for each product. In 
industrialized countries, the bound tariff is the tariff equivalent of the 
earlier quantitative restrictions.
•   Countries agree to reduce the bound tariff rate for each product according 
to a specific schedule.
•   Developing countries are given special and differential treatment. They 
are allowed to set bound tariffs above the tariff equivalent of the earlier 
quantitative restrictions. They have a longer schedule (10 years instead of 
6 years) to implement the changes, and their tariff reductions are gener-
ally two-thirds those required of industrialized countries. The LDCs are 
exempt from commitments.
  In order to reduce farm subsidies, the URAA defines different types of 
government spending on agriculture, as follows:
•   Green box expenditures include those on agricultural research and exten-
sion, infrastructure, animal and plant health programs, food safety programs, 
disaster relief, anti-poverty feeding programs, and farm credit. These are 
not subject to limits by the URAA.
•   Blue box expenditures include payments to farmers, which are combined 
with supply controls and are based on production or planted area in a base 
period. These are not subject to limits by the URAA.
28  CHAPTER 2•   Amber box expenditures include those for subsidies on agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizers and irrigation, as well as price supports for agricultural 
production. Under de minimis exemptions, product-specific subsidies are 
permitted if they are less than 5 percent of the value of the output of the 
commodity, and non-product-specific subsidies are permitted if they are 
less than 5 percent of the value of all agricultural output. The value of 
nonexempt amber box expenditures is called the aggregate measurement 
of support. Some 30 countries declared this support spending and made 
commitments to reduce it over 1995–2001.
  Developing countries are given “special and differential treatment” in 
that their de minimis exemption is 10 percent rather than 5 percent and they 
had ten years (1995–2005) to reduce their aggregate measurement of support 
spending. In addition, the LDCs are not required to cap or reduce such sup-
port spending.
  With the exception of Syria and the West Bank and Gaza, all MENA 
countries are members of or in the process of accession to the WTO (Table 
2.10). As developing countries, the MENA countries that are WTO members 
have been given greater flexibility under the URAA with regard to cutting 
their subsidies and lowering their tariffs: the average cuts for all agricul-
tural products are two-thirds the rates of developed countries. The MENA 
countries in the WTO were also given more time to meet their commit-
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Table 2.10  MENA countries’ trade agreements outside the MENA 
region, 2009
     United
Country  WTO status  European Union  States  Other
Djibouti Member  (1995)  EBA  AGOA
Egypt  Member (1995)  EMAA (2004) + ENP  MEFTA TIFA  EFTA (2007)
Jordan  Member (2000)  EMAA (2002) + ENP  MEFTA FTA  EFTA (2002)
Lebanon  Observer  Interim AA (2003) + ENP    EFTA (2007)
Morocco  Member (1995)  EMAA (2000) + ENP  MEFTA FTA  EFTA (2004)
Syria Nonmember  Initialized
Tunisia  Member (1995)  EMAA (1998) + ENP  MEFTA TIFA  EFTA (2005/6)
West Bank   Nonmember  Interim AA (1997) + ENP
  and Gaza 
Sources:   WTO website; USTR (2006); European Commission (2009).
Notes:   AGOA, African Growth and Opportunity Act; EBA, Everything But Arms initiative; 
EFTA, European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzer-
land); EMAA, Euro-Med Association Agreement; ENP, European Neighborhood Policy; 
MEFTA, Middle East Free Trade Area (includes other members such as Bahrain, Israel, 
and Oman); TIFA, Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (within MEFTA); WTO, 
World Trade Organization.ments: 10 years from 1995 instead of 6. Djibouti, a LDC, is exempt from all 
URAA commitments.
  The Doha Round, launched in 2001, was supposed to reflect both the 
increased prominence of development concerns in WTO negotiations and 
the increased participation by developing countries in the trading system 
(Hoekman, Mattoo, and English 2002). Specifically, the new round was to 
incorporate the negotiations on agriculture and services that started in 2000. 
But this new round, originally targeted to conclude by January 2005, has been 
marked by missed deadlines, failed discussions, and inconclusive conferences 
(Pal and Prakash 2005). Ministerial meetings in Cancun (2003) and Hong Kong 
(2005) saw few results in terms of achieving better market access for devel-
oping countries. Developing countries continue to complain that they still 
face exceptionally high tariffs, “tariff peaks,” on selected products that are 
important for their exports (textiles, clothing, fish, and fish products). They 
are also subject to tariff escalation whereby an importing country protects its 
processing or manufacturing industries by setting lower duties on imports of 
raw materials and components and higher duties on finished products (WTO 
2005c). This is especially important for MENA countries, which experience 
high levels of unemployment and would benefit from better market access 
for their processed products.
  According to Hanrahan and Schnepf (2005), in the Doha Round negotia-
tions the U.S. made proposals to do the following:
•   eliminate agricultural export subsidies,
•   cut amber box ceilings by at least 60 percent,
•   limit blue box expenditures to 2.5 percent of the value of production,
•   reduce de minimis exemptions to 2.5 percent of the value of production,
•   cut tariffs by 55–90 percent,
•   set maximum agricultural tariffs at 75 percent (100 percent for developing 
countries), and
•   limit “sensitive products” to 1 percent of tariff lines.
  In contrast, the E.U. made proposals to do the following:
•   eliminate agricultural export subsidies,
•   reduce amber box ceilings by 60–70 percent,
•   reduce de minimis exemptions to 1 percent of the value of production,
•   tighten the limits on blue box programs,
•   reduce tariffs 35–60 percent,
•   limit sensitive products to 8 percent of tariff lines,
•   establish new provisions to protect geographic indication labeling,
•   implement smaller tariff cuts for developing countries, and
•   eliminate tariff cuts for LDCs.
30  CHAPTER 2  Multilateral trade liberalization as it is negotiated under the WTO can 
lead to the erosion of trade preferences for developing countries. The nego-
tiated tariff cuts are applied to bound tariffs, which can result in rates that 
are higher or equal to most favored nation (MFN) applied tariffs, which are 
greater or equal to preferential tariffs. The difference between the MFN 
rate and the preferential tariff rates is the preferential margin enjoyed by 
countries benefiting from trade preferences, and they can vary greatly across 
countries. This variation in preferential margins across countries combines 
two effects: a composition effect, which reflects the variation in product spe-
cialization and the geographic destination of exports, and a true preferential 
effect, which reflects on average the preferences from which the countries 
benefit (Bouët, Fontagné, and Jean 2006).
  Decomposing preferential margins for the MENA countries shows that, 
overall, these countries have positive but modest true preferential margins, 
meaning that they benefit on average from preferential treatment. On the 
other hand, they all have negative composition effects, meaning that the 
countries concentrate on exports on which import tariffs are high globally. 
This means that for middle-income MENA countries, multilateral trade liber-
alization is more likely to improve market access than to result in erosion of 
trade preferences.
  These indicators computed for agriculture show a much more diverse 
situation. Half of the middle-income countries in MENA, Egypt, Jordan, and 
Lebanon, have a negative apparent margin in agriculture, meaning that they 
face on average higher tariffs than the world average, but the contribution 
to this margin is different across these countries. Egypt and Jordan have 
negative composition effects, meaning that they export agricultural prod-
ucts that are highly protected globally or to countries that are protectors of 
agriculture. So for these countries global trade liberalization is expected to 
improve their market access; only in the case of Egypt, which has a positive 
true preferential margin, could trade liberalization also result in erosion of 
preferences. All the other countries have negative true preferential margins 
in agriculture. This is not surprising because agriculture has been left out of 
most regional agreements, so the countries do not benefit from preferences 
in agriculture. Morocco and Syria both have enjoyed positive composition 
effects, meaning that they already export goods on which import duties are 
low. For these countries, erosion of preferences may not be an issue and 
market access may not improve much as a result of trade liberalization in 
agriculture (Bouët 2006).
  Increasingly, WTO member countries are forming groups and alliances 
within the WTO to increase their bargaining power in negotiations. The G20, 
a group of developing countries that became active at the WTO meeting in 
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sidies and protection. Other alliances, such as the G10 and the G33, have 
made separate proposals (Hanrahan and Schnepf 2005). Djibouti, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia belong to the African group and the G90. Egypt and 
Morocco have submitted their own proposals arguing for the substantial and 
rapid dismantling of tariffs and the elimination of domestic support on the 
part of developed countries, more flexibility for developing countries that is 
consistent with their development needs, and an increased level of technical 
and financial assistance to net food-importing developing countries and LDCs 
(WTO 2001a, 2001b).
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The EMP, or Barcelona Process, was signed on November 28, 1995, by the E.U. 
and 12 Mediterranean partner countries to create a framework for political, 
economic, cultural, and social ties among the partners.8 The main instruments 
of the EMP, European Union–Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs), 
have replaced the cooperation agreements of the 1970s, which were char-
acterized by nonreciprocal preferences accorded by the E.U. to developing 
countries (McQueen 2002).
  EMAAs are based on reciprocal liberalization for industrial trade and 
eventual liberalization for agricultural and fisheries products. The measures 
to liberalize trade in manufactured products are well defined and adhere 
to fixed timetables. However, with regard to agriculture and services, the 
measures are less clear and involve no specific schedule (McQueen 2002). 
Under the EMAAs, at the end of a fixed schedule for phasing out the tariffs 
on manufactured products the E.U. will benefit from duty-free access to 
its partners’ markets. By contrast, the E.U. has not offered significant new 
concessions to Mediterranean partner countries in terms of market access for 
their agricultural exports (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque 2002).
  The agreements largely eliminated the tariffs on industrial goods exported 
from MENA to the E.U., but the benefits were expected to be modest because 
the E.U. industrial tariffs were already low and because the manufactur-
ing sector in the MENA countries faced difficulties competing in European 
markets. Furthermore, the agreements opened MENA markets to imports of 
manufactured goods from the E.U. This may have had negative effects on 
the Mediterranean countries’ terms of trade and on employment in local 
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8 The E.U. Member States (then 15, today 27) and Mediterranean countries (12 then, 10 after 
Cyprus and Malta joined the E.U.) agreed on the Barcelona Declaration, which laid the founda-
tions of a new regional relationship. See <http://www.euromedinfo.eu/site.151.content.en
.html>. This section is based on Beuchelt (2005), unless otherwise indicated.industries that are unable to compete with E.U. imports. Finally, reducing 
import tariffs in the MENA region meant the loss of tariff revenue from the 
E.U., which during 1994–96 was, as a share of fiscal revenue, 19.2 percent in 
Algeria, 8 percent in Egypt, 12 percent in Jordan, 29 percent in Lebanon, 10 
percent in Morocco, and nearly 16 percent in Tunisia (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque 
2002; McQueen 2002). The expected benefits were more likely to come from 
efficiency gains resulting from eliminating the distortions caused by import 
barriers. In other words, the countries will gain if the losses to producers and 
the government are outweighed by the gains to consumers, who face lower 
prices. Most observers agree, however, that the EMP would be even more ben-
eficial to partner countries if it included agricultural trade liberalization.
  One way to overcome the slow progress in agricultural trade liberalization 
(in part due to the influence of southern European producers who benefit 
from tariff protection) is to take advantage of seasonal market opportunities 
for Mediterranean partner countries that do not compete with E.U. produc-
tion. In a study for the Forum Euro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Economiques 
Research, Muaz (2004) identified five horticultural crops (green beans, grapes, 
melons, strawberries, and dates) that could be produced and exported by the 
Mediterranean partners without competing with E.U. production seasons and 
could enjoy a comparative advantage. The author predicted that the partner 
countries could fulfill unsatisfied E.U. demand for these crops during the 
winter months. The study estimated that the gains to the five countries from 
expanded grape exports could reach US$227 million, while expanded straw-
berry exports could generate benefits of US$167 million. The export of dates 
would have the most positive impact on employment, generating 98,000 jobs in 
five countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza.
  In the long run, benefits from the EMAAs may also come from the domestic 
economic reforms they encouraged. Free trade areas have the potential to 
stimulate modernization and efficiency in the region. With services account-
ing for around 60 percent of GDP, the MENA countries in the EMP stand to 
make substantial gains from the gradual opening of the services sector and 
by attracting new investments. These predictions are tested empirically in a 
study by Thomas et al. (2008) that estimates the contribution of liberaliza-
tion of services, trade facilitation, and domestic increased investments on 
gains from FTAs for the E.U., the United States, and the Maghreb region. 
The results from a CGE analysis show that when these complementary poli-
cies are included, efficiency gains offset terms-of-trade loses in all cases: in 
particular, Morocco and Tunisia show real income gains of 2 and 5 percent, 
respectively.
  In an effort to revitalize the EMP, the E.U. has extended the relation-
ships existing under the AAs. In particular, ministers have agreed on a Trade 
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the roadmap for agriculture trade, launched in 2005, provided for an increase 
in the liberalization of agricultural trade, including processed agricultural 
products and fishery products. The five year program retains the possibility of 
excluding a limited number of sensitive products given the possible negative 
impact on countries and sectors. It provides for progressive implementation 
and asymmetrical liberalization, recognizing the specific characteristics of 
each partner and development gap between the partner countries on the two 
sides of the Mediterranean. Finally, the liberalization process must also deal 
with NTBs to trade (European Commission 2006).
The U.S.–Middle East Free Trade Initiative
The U.S.–Middle East Free Trade Initiative was proposed in May 2003 by the 
United States to increase trade and investment between Middle Eastern 
nations and the United States and others in the world economy. For some 
countries, Algeria, Lebanon, and Yemen, the U.S. efforts have been a first 
step in expediting their accession to the WTO. As a second step, the United 
States may enter into Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, as have 
Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. Finally, the process may result in FTAs. 
To date, FTAs are in force with only Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. 
But these countries represent marginal U.S. trade partners. U.S. exports to 
the MENA region amount to less than 3 percent of total U.S. exports. Exports 
to the United States account for 12 percent of total exports for Egypt, 28 
percent for Jordan, and 10 percent for Morocco but only 2 percent for Tunisia 
(MAcMapHS4 database 2004). These agreements are too recent to assess their 
impact, but the results of Thomas et al. (2008) suggest that Maghreb coun-
tries, for example, are not expected to benefit as much from FTAs with the 
United States as from those with the E.U. because they face initially lower 
tariffs in the United States than in the E.U.
  Both the E.U. and the United States have launched initiatives specific to 
the poorest countries. Under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, the 
LDCs have duty-free access to E.U. markets for almost all goods, with three 
important exceptions: bananas, rice, and sugar.9 The African Growth and Oppor-
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9 The European Commission committed to end the tariff quota regime for bananas by January 1, 
2006. All nonpreferential suppliers would be subject to a MFN tariff, whereas bananas from the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (as well as bananas originating in the LDCs under 
the Everything But Arms Initiative) would continue to enter duty free. On January 1, 2006, with 
the change of the import regime, a reform of the banana Common Market Organization was 
launched. Honoring the agreement concluded in 2001 with the United States and taking into 
account the results of arbitrations within the WTO, the E.U. substituted a tariff-only regime for 
the previous system of import quotas by region of origin. A customs duty of C =176 per metric tontunity Act (AGOA) allows duty-free access to U.S. markets for countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa that meet certain criteria. Within the MENA region, only 
Djibouti and Yemen qualify under the EBA, while only Djibouti qualifies for 
preferences under the AGOA.
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area
Intraregional integration in MENA is very limited in spite of several attempts 
toward that end in the past 50 years (Zarrouk 1998; Khasawneh 2000). Some 
of the more active regional agreements involving MENA countries are shown 
in Figure 2.3. Among the various attempts at regional integration, the revived 
GAFTA (1997) seemed to offer some hope of success where others have 
failed.10 The program has more specific commitments and schedules than its 
earlier version and can be summarized in terms of the following main provi-
sions (Lebanon 2009):
•   gradual reduction in tariff rates, fees, and taxes with similar implications 
at an annual rate of 10 percent;
•   exemption of products that are forbidden to be traded for religious, envi-
ronmental, security, and health reasons from the Execution Program of 
GAFTA;
•   removal of all NTBs;
•   application of the “Agricultural Calendar” and agricultural exemptions 
(each state was allowed to use protectionist measures for at most 10 agri-
cultural products from the agreement during the harvest season, at most 
7 months per year, with a maximum of 45 months in total for all listed 
products); and
•   the possibility of exempting a number of industrial products from the Execu-
tion Program of GAFTA, subject to certain rules and conditions and based on 
a decision of the Social and Economic Council of the Arab League.
The full implementation of the free trade area, originally set for January 1, 
2007, was fully completed in 2005, at least on paper.
  GAFTA is the most comprehensive trade agreement in MENA with respect 
to markets and products: most Arab countries are either members or potential 
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now applies uniformly to banana imports, except for a volume of 0.77 million metric tons from 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States that can enter the E.U. duty free (Europa 
2006).
10 At present, 14 members of the Arab League are effective members of the free trade area 
and comply with total procedures of adhesion. These are Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emir-
ates. The other three include two LDCs, Sudan and Yemen, which have a transitional period for 
achieving 0 percent customs tariffs by 2010, and the West Bank and Gaza, which is exempt from 
tariff reductions (Lebanon 2009).future members, and the agreement includes the removal of tariffs and NTBs 
as well as provisions to liberalize agriculture, a step up from the EMAAs. Still, 
the agreement suffers from impediments that limit the expected economic 
benefits. The agreement does not cover service trade and investment or sani-
tary and phytosanitary standards and technical barriers to trade. Strict rules 
regarding origins require that over 40 percent of the value added to products 
be contributed by a GAFTA country, and countries must undergo a cumber-
some approval process to qualify. Finally, GAFTA does not seem to have a 
regulatory body that will enforce the commitments made by its members or 
settle disputes: countries may change (unilaterally or within the context of 
bilateral agreements) their agricultural calendars without notification, leaving 
other members to face the amended schedules at customs (Brunel 2008).
The Agadir Agreement
At the end of the 1990s, four Mediterranean Arab countries—Jordan, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia—concluded bilateral FTAs with each other. By 2004 these 
four countries had signed the Agadir Agreement, and implementation began 
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Figure 2.3  Regional agreement for MENA countries
Source:   Devised by the authors.
Notes:   AGADIR, Agadir Agreement (2004); AMU, Arab Maghreb Union (1989); COMESA, 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; GAFTA, Greater Arab Free Trade 
Area; GCC, Gulf Cooperation Council; MENA, Middle East and North Africa.
aIsrael is omitted from the MENA region.in March 2007. This agreement is seen as a first step toward the implementa-
tion of a larger Pan-Arab FTA and is open to other countries in the region that 
are in the EMP or have implemented GAFTA.
  Provisions of the agreement are as follows:
•   full exemption from the custom fees, charges, and other taxes of similar 
effect on the exchange of agricultural goods, processed agricultural goods, 
and industrial goods;
•   adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin, which authorize the 
cumulation of origins and the free circulation of goods within the Euro-
Mediterranean area through the adoption of a circulation certificate;
•   commitment to national treatment for the exchanged goods; and
•   treatment of the services trade in accordance with the obligations of the 
WTO member countries.
  So, in addition to the liberalization of goods along the lines followed in 
GAFTA, the agreement makes provisions for the trade liberalization of ser-
vices within the framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
Much as in GAFTA, NTBs are to be completely eliminated as soon as the 
agreement comes into effect, and exemptions are permitted to protect local
production from substantial damage, infant industries, or sectors under re-
organization. These exemptions are to be applied restrictively and for a lim-
ited period. On issues such as subsidies and antidumping measures, disequi-
libria in balances of payment, intellectual property rights, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, the agreement explicitly refers to the WTO regula-
tions. It also calls for the coordination of global and sectoral economic poli-
cies and a certain harmonization of the economic legislation and standards 
of the respective partners (Wippel 2005). The Agadir Agreement is expected 
to have limited trade effects given the lack of complementarity between 
the few current members, but it seems to build on provisions that are more 
compatible with the global environment than is GAFTA, and it may hold more 
promise once it is extended to the rest of the Arab countries.
Other Regional Agreements
Other regional agreements include those that led to the creation of the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The AMU was 
established in 1989 among all five Maghreb countries: Algeria, Libya, Maurita-
nia, Morocco, and Tunisia. The aim was to establish a customs union by 1995 
and an economic common market in 2000. Neither objective was achieved 
because the AMU was faced with two major obstacles: the requirement of 
unanimity for all decisions to be implemented and the eruption of political 
tensions between Algeria and Morocco over the western Sahara, which led to 
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generates only limited benefits to its members, and intraregional trade as a 
share of total trade has remained at its 1989 level, 1.3 percent (Brunel 2008).
  The GCC includes six oil-exporting Gulf countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It was created in 1981 
and over the next two decades adopted several resolutions relating to the 
GCC customs union, the common market, development integration, and the 
economic and monetary union. The common market was launched in 2008, 
and the establishment of a common currency is planned for 2010. All the 
GCC members are also members of GAFTA, but their agenda in GCC is much 
more ambitious, including the implementation of a Common Agricultural 
Policy of the GCC member states (GCC 2001). These countries are also in the 
high-income range of the MENA countries, with per capita GDPs greater than 
US$10,000 in constant 2000 dollars.
Summary
The eight non-oil-exporting MENA countries under consideration in this study 
share a number of challenges with respect to economic performance in gen-
eral and agriculture in particular.
  Seven of the eight countries are lower-middle-income countries according 
to the World Bank (Lebanon is classified as a middle-income country). The 
economic performance of many of the MENA countries has been relatively 
weak, with growth in real per capita GDP during the 1990s of 2.0 percent per
year. Their performance was barely better during 2000–06 (2.2 percent) in 
spite of the global economic recovery during those years. The economies 
of these countries have been adversely affected by various conflicts, includ-
ing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Iraq War, and more recently the 
Hezbollah–Israeli conflict in Lebanon. Other possible explanations for their 
slow economic growth include the business climates and relatively high trade 
barriers in many MENA countries. This slow economic growth means there has 
been little expansion in formal sector employment, resulting in persistent 
problems of unemployment, particularly among youth. Nonetheless, strong 
economic performance in Lebanon (until 2006) and Tunisia suggest that these 
problems are not insurmountable.
  The incidence of poverty is lower on average than in other developing 
regional groups but varies across countries: Djibouti and the West Bank and 
Gaza register the highest rates with respect to the US$1-per-day poverty line. 
The region is also more urbanized than the average developing country. In 
describing the agricultural trade patterns of the MENA countries, one notices 
some common patterns. Most of the MENA countries are semiarid, with lim-
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dependent on rainfall. Exceptions are Djibouti and Egypt, where virtually all 
crop production is irrigated. Agricultural exports represent a relatively small 
share of total exports, exceeding 10 percent only in Syria. All the MENA 
countries are net food importers. Wheat is a staple food and an important 
import for many of the MENA countries. It represents more than 15 percent 
of the agricultural imports of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Some countries in 
the region, Morocco and Tunisia, continue to apply relatively high levels of 
protection for farmers, while the region’s average level of protection in agri-
culture is comparable to that of other groups, including developed countries. 
The commodities that are the most protected in the region are wheat, sugar, 
dairy, and livestock products. Finally, the E.U. is the most important trading 
partner of most of the countries in the region.
  The MENA countries have signed a series of multilateral, regional, and 
bilateral trade agreements. The URAA imposes some commitments on mem-
ber countries, including the conversion of quantitative restrictions into tariffs 
or tariff rate quotas, the binding of tariff rates, the reduction of bound tariff 
rates by an average of 36 percent, and the reduction of trade-distorting 
measures of support to agriculture by 20 percent, on average. Developing 
countries have been given more modest targets for tariff rate reductions and 
more time to comply, while the LDCs are effectively exempted from most 
commitments under the URAA. The direct impact of these commitments on 
the MENA countries has been modest. Syria and the West Bank and Gaza are 
not WTO members, while Djibouti, a LDC, is exempt from most URAA com-
mitments. For the remaining MENA countries, the bound rates are often far 
above the applied tariff rates, particularly for agricultural products. Thus, 
commitments to reduce the bound rate have had little effect on the actual 
level of agricultural protection.
  The E.U. has signed EMAAs with five MENA countries as part of the EMP, 
and three others are in the process of ratification. These EMAAs commit both 
parties to phase out almost all tariffs on manufactured goods, though the 
MENA countries have a longer period during which to comply. Until recently, 
plans to incorporate agriculture had not been supported by firm targets or 
schedules for agricultural liberalization, but the agricultural roadmap initi-
ated in 2005 can be seen as providing renewed incentives from all concerned 
to accelerate and intensify the EMAA agenda.
  As part of the U.S.–Middle East Free Trade Initiative, the United States 
has signed bilateral FTAs with Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco and intermediate 
agreements with four other MENA countries. The effect of the U.S.-Jordan FTA 
will be small because Jordan’s level of protection is already low and because 
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the amount of U.S.-Jordan trade is small. The effect of the U.S.-Morocco FTA 
will be larger because Moroccan trade barriers are higher. Of particular impor-
tance, Morocco’s wheat tariffs will be phased out over 10 years.
  Djibouti is the only country in the region that qualifies for preferences 
under both the EBA and the AGOA.
  Among regional agreements, GAFTA and the Agadir Agreement seem to 
be the most promising. The former has a more extended coverage across 
markets and products, with special provisions to include agriculture in the 
liberalization process, but it needs to address such impediments to trade as 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical barriers to trade, and strict 
rules of origin. The latter includes provisions that are more compatible with 
the global environment but would gain from extending its four-country mem-
bership to the rest of the Arab countries.
  Under the U.S. AGOA, Sub-Saharan African countries that meet certain 
criteria in terms of human rights, reducing corruption, and combating terror-
ism will have free access to U.S. markets. Djibouti qualifies, but its exports 
to the United States are negligible.
  A number of bilateral and regional agreements within the MENA region 
have been signed, but their effectiveness has been limited by the structural 
similarities of the MENA economies and the granting of exceptions for sensi-
tive products. Nonetheless, a number of MENA countries, most notably Egypt 
and Tunisia, have reduced their tariff barriers unilaterally in recent years. 
In other words, trade liberalization does occur outside the context of global, 
regional, and bilateral trade agreements.CHAPTER 3
The Impact of Trade Liberalization
T
he effect of changes in trade policy on a given country can be divided 
into two components. First, the “terms-of-trade effect” refers to the 
gains or losses associated with changes in world prices as a result 
of the policy. Most countries are too small for their trade policy to have 
a noticeable effect on world prices, but global trade agreements can sig-
nificantly influence world prices. To the extent that most interventions in 
agriculture contribute to higher world production and lower imports, they 
depress world prices of agricultural commodities relative to a world without 
distortions. Eliminating the distortions could have adverse terms-of-trade 
effects for net-food-importing countries, including most of the MENA coun-
tries, while benefiting net exporters of agriculture. Second, the “efficiency 
effect” refers to gains or losses associated with removing distortions in the 
country’s own market. Unless there are significant externalities, a reduction in 
market distortions is generally expected to have positive efficiency effects. 
In other words, domestic market liberalization, to the extent that it reduces 
distortions in the economy, will generate more benefits than costs on bal-
ance, regardless of what trade partners do (Bouët 2008).
  This view of trade liberalization differs considerably from the perspective 
of trade negotiators, for whom the goal is often to maximize trade liberal-
ization in other countries while minimizing trade liberalization in their own 
countries. From this view, tariff reductions in one’s own country are un-
fortunate concessions that must be made to achieve tariff reduction in export 
markets. Because it attempts to maximize exports and minimize imports, 
this approach is essentially mercantilist. This perspective is often attributed 
to the greater political influence of producers, who compete with imports, 
as opposed to consumers, who would gain from lower prices. It also reflects 
concerns by governments regarding the uncertainty of the benefits and costs 
associated with trade liberalization and how they are distributed among the 
various economic actors in the economy. In particular, there is concern that 
the poorest may bear the cost of adjustment or not benefit as much from the 
new opportunities.
41  In this chapter we briefly examine the literature that has addressed 
these issues in the context of the liberalization options for MENA countries, 
with a focus on poverty. The chapter is divided into two sections. Reflect-
ing the study’s concentration on agriculture, the first section describes the 
global markets for five agricultural commodities (wheat, rice, sugar, cotton, 
and dairy products) that are more distorted by import barriers and produc-
tion subsidies and that are important for MENA countries. This information 
is important in understanding the direction and size of the terms-of-trade 
effect associated with trade liberalization. The second section provides a 
selective review of studies that evaluate the impact of trade liberalization 
on the MENA countries. These studies consider the impact of multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral trade liberalization as well as trade reform undertaken 
within the context of countries’ domestic policy agendas.
Global Agricultural Markets
In this section we review policies that distort the global markets for five 
agricultural commodities (wheat, rice, sugar, cotton, and dairy products), as 
well as estimates of the impact that global trade liberalization would have on 
the related prices. As mentioned earlier, this information sheds light on the 
direction and size of the terms-of-trade effects that global trade liberaliza-
tion would have on the MENA countries.1
Wheat
Wheat provides nearly one-fifth of the world’s calorie supply. More than 18 
percent of the global demand for wheat is met through international trade, 
mostly as exports from the OECD countries to developing countries. Although 
nearly 30 percent of wheat production was stored as a buffer against produc-
tion shortages in the early 2000s (Mitchell and Mielke 2004), more recent 
events stemming from the food crisis have brought the global stock level to 
its lowest in 25 years, 18 percent of wheat production.
  The major single-country exporters in descending order of importance are 
the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and Russia. These five coun-
tries account for nearly 60 percent of world wheat exports. The EU25 is a net 
exporter, accounting for 26 percent of world wheat exports and 22 percent 
of world wheat imports. Among net importing regions, MENA accounts for 22 
percent of world wheat imports. Algeria and Egypt are the world’s fourth 
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1 Trade flows and AVE rate calculations for the five commodities presented in this section are 
based on the MAcMap-HS6 database for 2004 unless otherwise indicated (CEPII 2008; Boumel-
lassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna 2009).and eighth largest importers, and although Syria contributes only 1 percent 
of world wheat exports, it is among the 10 largest suppliers.
  Since 2000, wheat exporters such as the E.U. and the United States have 
largely eliminated export subsidies under the URAA, but they continue to pro-
vide support to domestic production through programs that include marketing 
assistance loan payments, direct and countercyclical payments, crop insur-
ance, and surplus disposal programs for export assistance (Vocke, Allen, and 
Ali 2005). Still, the OECD countries’ support for wheat, as measured through
single commodity transfers (SCTs), has dropped dramatically, from 45 percent 
of gross farm receipts for wheat in 1986–88 to under 10 percent in 2004–06 
(OECD 2007).
  World protection for wheat is high on balance, with AVE rates for MFNs of 
34 and 15 percent, respectively.2 Japan has the highest AVE rate, 96 percent, 
among the OECD countries, and Morocco and Tunisia have the highest AVE 
rates, 58 and 50 percent, respectively, among the MENA countries. Among 
importing countries, bound tariffs can be even higher, especially when these 
result from tariff rate quotas: for example, in Morocco bound tariffs are 
198 percent out-of-quota and 144 percent in-quota. Several kinds of NTBs 
have also been imposed by governments, such as import licenses, quantity 
and quality restrictions, state trading requirements, and the imposition of 
bureaucratic red tape, to control wheat imports (Mitchell and Mielke 2004).
Rice
Rice is one of the most important foodgrains, accounting for 20 percent of 
caloric intake overall and 29 percent among low-income countries. However, 
only a small share of rice production (less than 7 percent) is traded interna-
tionally (Wailes 2004).
  The leading rice exporters in descending order of importance are Thai-
land, India, the U.S., Pakistan, and Vietnam. Together they account for 76 
percent of world rice exports. Nigeria, Iran, Japan, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and Senegal are the largest importers among net importing countries. 
Together they account for 23 percent of world rice imports. Imports to the 
MENA region are mostly directed to Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, and Iraq, which together account for 20 percent of world rice import. 
Egypt is the 10th-largest exporter of rice, contributing 2 percent of world 
exports.
  Unlike wheat and other commodities, for which most of the distortion in 
world markets is attributed to the policies of high-income countries, rice is 
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2 See details on the definition and computation of AVEs in Chapter 2.subjected to government support in both developed and developing coun-
tries. Among developing-country exporters, Thailand has a loan program 
that provided a 10 percent support price in 2002. India, the second-largest 
producer and consumer of rice in the world, has a large government procure-
ment and distribution system, as well as price supports and export subsidies. 
Vietnam has a largely market-driven rice sector, although state enterprises 
play an important role in processing and exporting rice. China has a govern-
ment procurement system that strongly supported the price of rice in the 
1990s. After accumulating large stocks in the late 1990s, China has reduced 
the level of its support and disposed of its stocks. The SCT for rice in OECD 
countries has come down only marginally, from 80 percent in 1986–88 to 70 
percent in 2004–06 (OECD 2007).
  Rice is one of the most protected agricultural commodities at the border, 
with average global AVE and MFN rates of 53 and 76 percent, respectively. Most 
of the major rice importers use various measures to limit rice imports. Indo-
nesia, the largest rice importer, uses a state trading enterprise, Badan Urusan 
Logistik, to support the domestic price, assisted by import tariffs of around 17 
percent. To comply with the URAA, Japan and the Republic of Korea no longer 
ban the importation of rice, but they maintain with Taiwan AVEs of 450, 436, 
and 391 percent, respectively. The E.U. recently switched from a variable levy 
to an import tariff, resulting in an AVE of 90 percent on average.
Sugar
The market for sugar is also one of the most distorted in the world. The aver-
age level of protection for sugar is over 50 percent, the second-highest level 
after rice.
  Brazil is by far the largest sugar exporter, supplying 20 percent of world 
exports. Russia and the United States are the main importers. The EU25 con-
tributes 27 percent of world export but is a net importer. Among the MENA 
countries, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco are the largest importers, and the 
region as a whole accounts for 10 percent of world imports.
  The OECD countries provide transfers to sugar farmers amounting to 45 
percent of the commodity gross farm receipts in 2004–06, only 5 percent less 
than in 1986–88 (OECD 2007). Much of this support was provided by the E.U., 
Japan, and the United States.
  The annual support for sugar producers (largely sugar beet growers) in the 
E.U. was estimated at US$2.4 billion in 2002. The E.U. also subsidized sugar 
exports, and the AVE tariff averaged 92 percent in 2004 (see Table 2.8). In 
2006 the E.U. reformed its sugar policy, reducing the difference between 
the in-quota tariffs and the out-of-quota tariffs, a policy that is expected to 
reduce the preferences of preferential exporters (the African, Caribbean, and 
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price by 36 percent, introduction of a voluntary buyout scheme for produc-
tion quotas, and a disallowance of exports of nonquota sugar in order to 
reduce domestic production and bring export subsidies within the WTO limits 
(Elbehri, Umstaetter, and Kelch 2008).
  Japan uses a specific tariff to limit sugar imports and protect its farmers. 
The support given to Japanese farmers is roughly US$400 million, and Japan 
maintains one of the highest AVEs, 190 percent.
  As of 2008, the United States continued to maintain a tariff rate quota of 
1.3 million tons, restricting imports enough to make domestic prices twice 
as high as the international price. Forty-two countries are given quotas to 
export sugar to the United States, but U.S. imports are only a fraction of what 
the United States would import without import restrictions. The AVE tariff for 
the United States averaged 54 percent in 2004 (see Table 2.8).
  Many developing countries also have high levels of protection for local 
farmers. China, India, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey all have 
high tariff barriers that protect domestic farmers from import competition. 
A few countries also maintain production quotas or consumer subsidies, but 
these measures are less common. Egypt and Morocco are two of the few 
countries that have programs to subsidize sugar for consumers. The MENA 
countries’ AVE tariffs range between 4 and 46 percent for semiprocessed 
sugar, below the global average. On the other hand, nonprocessed sugar is 
protected at a much higher rate, especially in Tunisia (see Table 2.8).
Cotton
Cotton prices slid from a peak in 2003 until 2005, but they have steadily 
rebounded since then, in spite of continued government support for cotton 
growers that has been estimated at around US$5 billion worldwide by the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC 2006). The long-term trend 
is affected by competition with synthetic fibers, which increased their share 
of the textile fiber market from 48 percent in 1995 to 55 percent in 1999. 
In addition, the global recession of 2001–02 depressed cotton prices further, 
because textile demand is more income elastic than is the demand for grains 
(Minot and Daniels 2005).
  Of the five largest exporters of cotton, two are net importers, China and 
Korea. The EU25 supplies 60 percent of world exports, followed by Japan 
and the United States, which contribute 11 and 4 percent of cotton exports, 
respectively. In the MENA region, Egypt is the largest producer and consumer 
but a net exporter.
  Eight countries offered direct income and price support to cotton growers. 
Between 2004/05 and 2005/06, assistance to production decreased in the 
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by 19 and 13 percent, respectively. On the other hand, it doubled in China, 
which became the largest provider of subsidies to local cotton growers in 
2005/06 (ICAC 2006).
  Compared to a global average of 8 percent, border protection measured 
by the AVE is highest in the MENA countries with the exception of Lebanon, 
ranging from 10 percent in Jordan to 33 percent in Tunisia.
Dairy Products
Dairy products are not, in general, widely traded: only 7 percent of global 
demand is met through international trade. Virtually all the trade in dairy 
products involves butter, cheese, and dried milk. Australia, the E.U., and New 
Zealand are the dominant exporters of dairy products, while Canada, Japan, 
and the United States are net importers of dairy products.
  Dairy markets are highly protected through a combination of import 
restrictions (such as tariff and tariff rate quotas), consumer subsidies, and, 
in the case of a few developed countries, income and price supports, export 
subsidies, and milk production quotas to limit supply. The SCT for milk in 
2004–06 is estimated as 28 percent of gross farm receipts for milk, less than 
half its 1986–88 level (OECD 2007).
  The average bound tariffs for dairy remain among the highest for all 
agricultural commodities (Blayney and Gehlhar 2005). The protection rates 
presented in Table 2.8 show AVEs of 11 percent for the E.U. and 37 percent 
for the United States relative to a global rate of 27 percent. Support for dairy 
producers makes up a large share of the aggregate domestic support in some 
countries: 84 percent in Canada, 55 percent in the United States, and 12 
percent in the E.U. Although export subsidies were reduced under the Agree-
ment on Agriculture, a third to a half of cheese, butter, and dry milk exports 
continue to be subsidized (Langley, Somwaru, and Normile 2006).
  The E.U. dairy program consists of a production quota for milk, import pro-
tection, an intervention program that supports the price of skim milk powder 
and butter, and export refunds that are used to market surplus dairy products. 
In addition, the E.U. subsidizes the consumption of the butter used in pastries 
and ice cream and that of skim milk for calf feed (Bailey 2005). The combina-
tion of border and domestic policies has resulted in a producer support esti-
mate of 51 percent (Turner 2005).
  Japan maintains a complex network of policies that provide high protec-
tion for domestic milk production, including supply quotas, environmental 
subsidies, and a variety of programs that support farm and market infra-
structure, extension services, and milk consumption and benefit producers of 
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in 2003 for milk represented 77 percent of the value of production, an indica-
tion that more than two-thirds of the value of Japanese milk production relies 
on government interventions either through barriers to imports or through 
subsidies to farmers (Obara, Dyck, and Stout 2005).
  The United States created the Milk Income Loss Contract Program to pro-
vide targeted countercyclical payments to small dairy farms. In addition, the 
United States uses foreign donation programs and casein production subsidies 
to reduce excessive stocks of surplus skim milk powder (Bailey 2005). The 
producer support estimate for the U.S. dairy sector is 45 percent, signifi-
cantly lower than the estimate for Japan and somewhat lower than that for 
the E.U. (Turner 2005).
  Canada’s dairy policy is a complex web of interrelated policies, programs, 
and people nested in a number of private and public institutions under the 
federal-provincial supply management marketing scheme; it results in a pro-
ducer support estimate of around 60 percent (Stanbury 2002).
Expected Effects of Trade Liberalization on World Prices
Although studies on the effects of trade liberalization on commodity prices 
are abundant, they present a broad range of results that have to do with the 
types of models used, the level of liberalization simulated, and the sectoral 
and geographical aggregation of the studies. We first present the results from 
Bouët (2008), which estimates changes in world prices for agricultural com-
modities using MIRAGE, a multisector, multiregion CGE model. The inclusion 
of all five commodities in the model provides a consistent base to which we 
can compare other findings.
  The study reports price changes from a stylized full trade liberalization 
simulation that consists of eliminating import tariffs as well as production 
and export subsidies.3 Although the model uses earlier versions of the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and MAcMap–HS6 databases for 2001, a pre-
liminary experiment was conducted to bring the equivalent tariffs to 2005, 
the base year for the study.4 The results represent percentage changes from 
a baseline without liberalization in 2015. It is estimated that world prices 
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3 For a summary of the basic technical specifications of the Modeling International Relationships 
in Applied General Equilibrium model, see Chapter 7.
4 In particular, tariffs are adjusted to take into account such changes as the last implementation 
of the Uruguay Round, the elimination of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, enlargement of the E.U., 
implementation of the EBA initiative and the AGOA, and, finally, the accession of China to the 
WTO (Bouët 2008).would increase by over 2 percent for sugar, 3 percent for rice, and nearly
5 percent for dairy products.5 Plant-based fibers (including cotton) and wheat 
would experience the largest increases, 7 and 11 percent, respectively. Smaller 
increases are expected if more recent versions of the databases are used, 
reflecting a more open world in 2004 than in 2001.
  Other studies have also shown that the removal of all distortions (full lib-
eralization) would lead to increases in wheat prices ranging from 4.8 percent 
(FAPRI 2002) to 18.1 percent (USDA 2001). The contribution of domestic sup-
port to changes in world prices from trade liberalization is illustrated in FAPRI 
(2002), which shows that the increase in wheat prices would be 7.6 percent 
higher under a tariff-removal-only scenario than under a full liberalization 
scenario, implying that the removal of domestic support policies such as set-
aside programs in the E.U. and the United States would result in a substantial 
increase in production and exports (7.9 percent compared to 5 percent under 
the tariff-removal-only scenario), dampening the price effect. But USDA 
(2001) shows that the increase in wheat prices of 12 percent resulting from 
the elimination of OECD domestic policies, mostly reflecting market price 
support, would be larger than the price increase of 3.4 percent resulting from 
the elimination of tariffs.
  The results of small increase in rice prices seen in Bouët (2008) are similar 
to the results found in Tokarick (2005) but much smaller than the USDA (2001) 
estimates of 10 percent. Wailes (2004), using a partial equilibrium model on a 
highly disaggregated sector by type of rice, estimates that full trade liberal-
ization would increase the price of long-grain rice by 2 percent, on average, 
and that of medium- and short-grain rice by a full 90 percent.
  Much as in the case of wheat, removal of domestic support policies for 
sugar and cotton would have a greater impact on price increases than just 
the removal of border restrictions. The removal of trade restrictions alone for 
sugar would result in a smaller price increase, 27 percent, than if liberaliza-
tion included the removal of all production support: the world price would 
then rise to 48 percent compared to the base scenario (El-Obeid and Beghin 
2005). Removing import restrictions on textiles and clothing would indepen-
dently raise cotton prices by 2 percent (CIE 2001), while removing U.S. cotton 
subsidies was estimated to have resulted in increasing the world price by 20 
percent in 2001/02, and removing all cotton subsidies worldwide would have 
raised the world price by over 50 percent (ICAC 2002).
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5 It should be noted that the price of a commodity in MIRAGE reflects a weighted average of 
export prices across countries and therefore is highly dependent on the geographic decomposi-
tion selected for a particular study. In the case of rice, the inclusion of high-tariff countries, 
such as Japan and Korea, as single countries instead of as part of a larger region may reverse 
the direction of world price changes in rice.  Estimates of the price changes in dairy products are larger in Langley, 
Somwaru, and Normile (2006) than those reported in Bouët (2008). The authors 
use a partial equilibrium, multiple-commodity, multiple-region model of 
agricultural trade to simulate the elimination of four policy instruments: (1) 
production quotas, tariffs, and tariff rate quotas; (2) domestic price supports 
and producer payments; (3) export subsidies; and (4) subsidies for consumers. 
According to this model, full trade liberalization in the dairy sector would 
result in a lower volume of dairy products but higher world prices. The price 
increases would range from 13 percent for nonfat dry milk to 66 percent for 
butter.
The Effect of Higher Agricultural Prices on the MENA Countries
The description of the effects of global trade liberalization on agricultural 
prices in the previous sections indicates that the agricultural prices of 
the most distorted commodities will rise between 2 percent and 20 per-
cent, with a fair amount of variation across estimates depending on the 
commodity, the type of model used (general equilibrium versus partial 
equilibrium), the type of liberalization simulated, and the assumptions 
built into the model. In this section we examine the potential effect of 
higher agricultural prices on the eight selected MENA countries and the 
region as a whole. More specifically, we calculate the welfare cost of a 15 
percent increase in agricultural prices by multiplying the value of the net 
agricultural imports of each country (or the region) by 0.15. The results 
are expressed in terms of both absolute value and a percentage of GDP. 
This calculation yields the additional cost to the country to maintain its 
current pattern of production and consumption. These estimates should be 
considered an upper limit of the impact of higher agricultural prices for 
the following reasons:
•   The analysis does not take into consideration the fact that farmers and 
consumers would respond to the higher price by producing more and con-
suming less of these products, thus reducing the negative welfare impact 
(or increasing the positive welfare impact) of the higher price.
•   The analysis assumes a 15 percent increase in agricultural prices, but most 
studies show smaller increases in the prices of the main commodities, such 
as wheat, rice, cotton, sugar, and dairy.
•   The markets for the main agricultural commodities are more heavily pro-
tected that those for minor crops, so the weighted average of the change 
in all agricultural prices as a result of trade liberalization is likely to be 
even lower.
•   The analysis does not take into account issues of transmission of price 
shocks to local producers.
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trade liberalization outside the MENA region without taking into account the 
efficiency gains that may result from domestic trade liberalization.
The analysis, shown in Table 3.1, indicates that some MENA countries and the 
region as a whole were clearly net importers of agricultural commodities over 
the period 2004–06, with net imports ranging from less than 1 percent of GDP 
in the case of Syria and Tunisia to nearly 24 percent in the case of Djibouti.
  The last two columns of Table 3.1 show the cost of a uniform 15 percent 
increase in agricultural prices. Not surprisingly, all the countries would have 
experienced terms-of-trade losses, although the losses would have been 
under 1 percent of GDP for most countries and the region. The largest losses 
would have been borne by the poorest countries: Djibouti, more than 3 per-
cent, and the West Bank and Gaza, almost 2 percent. The dollar cost would 
have ranged from US$3 million in Syria to US$364 million in Egypt. The total 
loss across all eight countries would have been US$922 million, or 0.4 percent 
of GDP. The losses for the MENA region as a whole would have been much 
larger, both in absolute terms (US$4.4 billion) and relative to the size of the 
regional GDP (0.7 percent). This is because the other MENA countries, most 
of which are oil exporters, rely to an even greater degree on agricultural 
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Table 3.1  Impact of higher agricultural prices on MENA countries, 2004–06
       Net  Net
   Agricultural  Agricultural  agricultural  agricultural
   imports  exports  imports  imports
    (millions  (millions   (millions  (% of   (millions  (% of 
Country  GDP  of US$)  of US$)  of US$)  GDP)  of US$)  GDP)
Djibouti 715  197  28  169  23.6  25  3.5
Egypt 92,005  3,617  1,190  2,427  2.6  364  0.4
Jordan 12,708  1,430  637  794  6.2  119  0.9
Lebanon 21,903  1,393 281  1,112  5.1  167  0.8
Morocco 60,250  2,214  1,213  1,000  1.7  150  0.2
Syria 28,695  1,388  1,368  20  0.1  3  0.0
Tunisia 29,037  1,200  1,063  137  0.5  21  0.1
West Bank 
  and Gaza  3,894  537  53  485  12.4  73  1.9
Eight countries  249,207  11,976  5,833  6,144  2.5  922  0.4
All MENA  645,103  48,449  19,121  29,328  4.5  4,399  0.7
Sources:   Authors’ calculation based on data from World Bank (2008b) for GDP, FAO (2009a) for agricultural 
imports and exports.
Notes:   GDP, gross domestic product; MENA, Middle East and North Africa.
Cost of a 15% 
increase in 
agricultural 
pricesimports. On the other hand, because oil and food prices often move together 
(as they did during the 2007–08 commodity boom), the major oil exporters are 
generally less vulnerable to food price shocks than the eight MENA countries 
under consideration.
The Effects of Trade Liberalization on the MENA Countries: 
A Review of the Literature
Numerous studies have tried to quantify the expected benefits of trade lib-
eralization on poverty using such empirical models as spatial and nonspatial 
partial equilibrium models, gravity equations, and single- and multicountry 
CGE models (Bouët 2008). In particular, CGE models have become a standard 
tool of empirical economic analysis, especially when measuring the econo-
mywide effects of policy changes and identifying the gainers and losers from 
trade liberalization (Devarajan and Robinson 2002). Although most CGE analy-
ses show aggregate benefits from trade liberalization, the size and sectoral 
details of these results vary widely. Bouët (2008) identifies the factors behind 
these differences:
•   The geographic scope of the liberalization. The liberalization may be 
multilateral (global reforms in the context of WTO negotiations), regional, 
bilateral (between two countries), or unilateral (reforms carried out by a 
single country in isolation).
•   The sectoral scope of the liberalization. The liberalization may be limited 
to the agricultural or industrial sector, or it may encompass all sectors.
•   The type of liberalization. The study may simulate reductions in tariffs, 
cuts in export subsidies, lower domestic price supports, reduced input 
subsidies, or other reforms.
•   The base year. Generally, the earlier the base year, the higher the base 
level of protection and domestic support, implying that the effects of full 
liberalization will be larger.
•   The extent of reform. Some studies simulate partial liberalization that 
corresponds to the possible outcomes of trade negotiations, while others 
simulate full trade liberalization.
•   Whether or not the model includes dynamic effects. Some models only 
count the one-time static impact of trade liberalization, while other 
models attempt to capture its dynamic effects on investment and eco-
nomic  growth. Models that include dynamic gains usually show much 
larger effects.
•   The assumptions in the model. All trade models are based on a large num-
ber of assumptions about the economy, including the operation of labor 
markets, investment, the trade balance, and the degree of factor mobil-
ity, all of which may affect the results.
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international prices for goods subjected to protectionist policies and subsidies. 
This is because the elimination of import tariffs increases import demand,
while the elimination of domestic subsidies reduces supply. Because agricultural 
products are subject to higher rates of protection and (in developed countries) 
large domestic support programs, trade liberalization is expected to increase
world agricultural prices. This is particularly true for the products for which 
the markets are more distorted, such as wheat, rice, sugar, cotton, and dairy 
products. Higher agricultural prices may worsen the terms of trade of net im-
porters of agricultural products (most MENA countries) while benefiting net 
exporters of agricultural products (for example, Syria in its export of wheat).
  The effect of trade liberalization on domestic producer prices depends on 
changes in international prices as well as changes in the level of agricultural 
protection within a country. As countries dismantle agricultural trade barri-
ers, imports of formerly protected commodities will expand, pushing down 
domestic agricultural prices. Thus, multilateral and unilateral trade liberal-
ization generally have opposite effects on domestic agricultural prices.
  How will changes in agricultural prices affect household income and pov-
erty? The short-run effect on households will largely depend on the direction 
of change in agricultural prices and wages, on the structure of household 
incomes, and on the composition of household spending. In the long run, 
factors of production are mobile, so the effect on households will depend on 
changes in factor prices (such as wages and returns on land) and household 
factor endowments. Economic theory suggests that removing large distortions 
in the economy will increase aggregate output, but it does not tell us how 
farm income or poverty will be affected. The relationship between trade 
liberalization and poverty alleviation is complex and can be addressed only 
through empirical research, as evidenced in Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 
(2004), which identifies four paths between trade liberalization and poverty: 
economic growth and stability, the behavior of households and markets, 
wages and employment, and the government. In spite of their limitations, 
we find that CGE models dominate in studies that have attempted to capture 
some of these links to poverty, in particular through economic growth, the 
behavior of agricultural markets, and returns to productive factors. When 
available, household surveys have complemented macroeconomic effects to 
trace their impact on household welfare and poverty indicators. In the follow-
ing subsections we provide a selective review of such studies insofar as they 
address trade liberalization in the MENA countries.
Global Trade Liberalization
Bouët (2008) reviews the findings of 18 studies of global trade liberalization, 
including studies produced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the World 
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aggregate benefits of full trade liberalization represented by an increase in world 
welfare, but the magnitude varies from US$31 billion, or 0.13 percent (Diao, 
Somwaru, and Roe 2001), to US$1.2 trillion, or 3 percent (Dessus, Fukasaku, and 
Safadi 1999). All five studies that estimate the impact of liberalization on poverty 
show that the poverty headcount would decrease, but the findings range from 72 
million (Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005) to 440 million (Cline 
2004). Only one study shows the impact on world agricultural prices, estimating 
an increase of 12 percent (Diao, Somwaru, and Roe 2001). So in spite of the large 
differences in magnitude, there are some common findings across these studies:
•   Full trade liberalization would be beneficial in terms of global income as 
well as reducing global poverty, but some countries, such as Mexico and 
Malaysia, may be potential losers.
•   Most of the benefits of full trade liberalization would come from liberalizing 
the agricultural sector, precisely because it tends to be the most protected: 
liberalizing the agricultural sector would contribute between 57 and 69 per-
cent of the total income or welfare gains from trade liberalization (Hoek-
man, Mattoo, and English 2002; Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe 2003; Cline 
2004; World Bank 2004).
•   A large majority of the global benefits of trade liberalization would come 
from reducing tariffs and other import barriers rather than from reducing 
producer subsidies. This is not surprising given that import barriers are 
almost universal across countries, while producer subsidies are concen-
trated in a few (albeit large) economies: the E.U., Japan, and the United 
States. Results from five studies estimate that tariff cuts would contribute 
between 91 and 99 percent of the welfare gains.
•   The benefits to developing countries would be larger as a percentage of 
the incomes of these countries than would be the corresponding benefits to 
developed countries. All studies show that there would be positive gains to 
developing countries, but they would range from 8 percent of global welfare 
gains (Diao, Somwaru, and Roe 2001) to 67 percent (World Bank 2004).
•   The benefits to each country or region would derive largely from liberaliza-
tion carried out within the country or region rather than from opening up the 
borders of trading partners. In other words, “What you get is what you do.”
  Most of these studies are based on models that include from 12 to 40 
countries and regions, so there are usually results for a region that corresponds 
roughly to the MENA region. Among the 17 studies reviewed, only one shows 
that there would be losses from global trade liberalization for the MENA coun-
tries on balance, but the magnitude would not exceed 0.1 percent (Anderson, 
Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005). This is in spite of the terms-of-trade 
losses associated with their status as net food importers.
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tries are found in Bouët, Mevel, and Orden (2006). The authors use the global 
CGE model MIRAGE to compare different partial liberalization scenarios of
the Doha Round to a full trade liberalization scenario.6 The study covers 41 
regions (including Morocco, Tunisia, and the rest of the MENA region) and
18 sectors, including agricultural sectors (including wheat, rice, sugar, meat, 
dairy products, and cotton) and manufacturing (textiles and wearing apparel). 
These sectors are of particular importance to the MENA countries and also 
represent highly protected commodities (see Chapter 2). Among middle-
income countries, Tunisia would gain the most from the partial liberalization 
scenario, and the gains would be larger the more ambitious the scenario 
resulting from strong efficiency gains that offset the negative terms-of-trade 
effect. Full trade liberalization would be better for Tunisia than the less 
ambitious scenario but not as good as the most ambitious. Morocco would 
benefit more from partial trade liberalization, where the terms-of-trade 
losses are offset by efficiency gains, than from full trade liberalization, where 
they are not.
  Full trade liberalization implies larger increases in world agricultural 
prices, and of course the complete erosion of preferences, than in the ambi-
tious partial liberalization scenario. Current beneficiaries of trade prefer-
ences, such as the North African countries in MENA, and agricultural net 
importers may incur less gain in efficiency but also smaller losses in the terms 
of trade under partial liberalization than under full trade liberalization. For 
a net agricultural exporter like Turkey, better market access will unambigu-
ously generate more gains.
  Tokarick (2005) uses a partial equilibrium model of 10 agricultural com-
modities to simulate the effect of trade liberalization. In this model, full 
trade liberalization would raise world agricultural prices by 2–23 percent. By 
applying these price increases to agricultural trade patterns, Tokarick esti-
mates the increase in agricultural import costs for each developing country. 
The cost of agricultural imports would increase US$4 million–US$10 million for 
most MENA countries. The exception is Djibouti, for which agricultural import 
costs would decline because of higher prices for its exports.
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6 The Doha Round scenarios are partial liberalization scenarios and call for the elimination of 
export subsidies; in addition, the more ambitious scenario includes a 20 percent cut in domes-
tic supports, sharper reductions in agricultural tariffs, caps on agricultural tariffs, and fewer 
exemptions (for sensitive and special products). The study uses the dynamic version of the 
MIRAGE model and runs the experiment over a 15-year period, from 2005 to 2020. A detailed 
presentation of the model and the corresponding assumptions is included in Bouët, Mevel, and 
Orden (2006).  In a separate analysis, Tokarick (2005) compares the effects of trade lib-
eralization in developed countries only, in developing countries only, and in 
all countries using an 18-region global CGE model. The MENA region would 
gain more from a developing-country-only scenario—US$10.4 billion, or 1.4 
percent of GDP—than from a global trade liberalization scenario (US$9 billion, 
or 1.2 percent of GDP), largely because of eliminating internal distortions. 
The region would lose US$1.9 billion (0.3 percent of GDP) from a developed-
country-only trade liberalization scenario. In this last case, the higher agricul-
tural prices would hurt the region because it is a net importer of agricultural 
goods, and there would be no offsetting efficiency gains from domestic trade 
liberalization.
  A study by Anderson (2003) found similar results. Using a CGE model with 
18 regions, the author found that liberalizing agriculture would contribute 
the larger share (65 percent) of the global benefits from trade liberalization. 
The author also showed that developing countries would capture, on balance, 
a larger share of the gains from trade liberalization in developing countries 
than from liberalization in developed countries. These results confirm that a 
country or region is more likely to benefit from trade liberalization the stron-
ger its participation in the trade liberalization. Results for MENA show that 
the region would lose from all trade liberalization scenarios, but the losses 
would be larger in a developed-countries-only trade liberalization scenario 
than in a developing-countries-only scenario. In the developed-countries 
scenarios, the terms-of-trade losses due to agriculture liberalization would 
be large and would be only partially offset by terms-of-trade gains from the 
liberalization of manufacturing.
  What would be the impact of trade liberalization on the poor, particularly 
the rural poor? Trade theory suggests that, under certain conditions, trade lib-
eralization should equalize the return to labor across countries because exports 
of labor-intensive goods from low-wage economies to high-wage economies 
increase wages in the former and reduce wages in the latter. In practice, the 
impact of liberalization is more complicated because of variations in protection 
across sectors, preferential agreements, and the imperfect mobility of factors. 
In particular, if trade liberalization reduces protection on a labor-intensive sec-
tor such as agriculture, agricultural labor demand could decline.
  Few of the global trade models are designed to simulate the impact of lib-
eralization on different types of households, but some of them disaggregate 
the labor market into skilled and unskilled categories, the latter of which 
contributes wage income to the poor.
  Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005) showed that unskilled 
wages would increase by 4.1 percent for the MENA region, and Bayar et al. 
(2000) found that trade liberalization in manufactured goods would induce 
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all-sector trade liberalization would increase unskilled wage rates by 1.4 per-
cent. When unskilled labor is further differentiated between agricultural and 
nonagricultural labor, it was found that liberalization would lead to different 
impacts: Bouët (2008) showed that full trade liberalization would increase 
real income in the MENA region as a whole by 0.9 percent but would have 
negative effects of –2.3 percent on agriculture unskilled real wages, while 
unskilled real nonagricultural wages would increase by 1 percent and skilled 
real wages would increase by 1.3 percent. Bouët, Mevel, and Orden (2006) 
showed that partial trade liberalization scenarios would be more beneficial to 
unskilled agricultural labor in Morocco and the MENA region on balance than 
would full trade liberalization.
  These findings suggest that although there is some variation in the esti-
mates, most studies suggest that global trade liberalization would increase 
unskilled wage rates in MENA, but the gains may not be distributed equally 
between rural and urban areas.
Regional Trade Liberalization
With the multilateral trade negotiations at a standstill, regional trade agree-
ments have proliferated, leading to a debate over whether they act as a 
“stumbling block” or a “building block” to multilateral integration. The pref-
erential nature of regional trade agreements implies that such agreements 
may lead to trade diversion from nonpreferential partners to preferential 
ones and consequently lead to welfare loss. Another debate has been whether 
developing countries would benefit more from integration with developed 
countries (North–South trade) or from regional integration with “similar” 
countries (South–South trade). These issues are relevant to the MENA coun-
tries, which have entered into various trade agreements with the E.U., the 
United States, and other countries within the region.
  Bouët (2006) investigates the consequences of trade strategies for south-
ern Mediterranean (SM) countries (illustrated by a geographical decomposi-
tion that includes Morocco, Tunisia, the rest of the Middle East, and the 
rest of North Africa). The macroeconomic impacts of a South–South regional 
agreement that eliminates all tariff barriers among these four regions and 
Turkey are compared with the impacts of a North–South agreement whereby 
SM countries negotiate separately a free trade agreement with the E.U. in a 
“hub-and-spokes” structure.
  The main beneficiaries from a South–South liberalization scenario would 
be Turkey and Tunisia, where welfare would increase by 0.8 and 0.7 percent, 
respectively. The rest of North Africa, excluding Morocco and Tunisia, would 
gain, on average, by nearly 2 percent. Morocco and the rest of the Middle 
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the production of dairy and other food products in Morocco and Tunisia would 
increase slightly and Tunisia would increase its production of rice and other 
grains, but wheat production would suffer in both Morocco and Tunisia. A 
South–South agreement would increase Moroccan exports by 2.5 percent, but 
in Tunisia exports would increase by 8 percent. The agreement implies that 
there would be trade diversion for Morocco: imports of rice, wheat, fruits 
and vegetables, and meat from Europe would be partially replaced by imports 
from countries in the region.
 A  North–South agreement would have a larger impact on exports, which 
would increase by more than 40 percent in Morocco and Tunisia. The welfare 
effects would also be larger, but although they would lead to gains of 1.3 
percent in Tunisia, Morocco and the rest of North Africa would show a small 
decline in welfare of less than 1 percent. When these regional agreements 
are compared to multilateral full trade liberalization, the results indicate 
that the latter strategy would provide a more efficient outcome for south 
Mediterranean countries. All four regions would experience welfare gains, 
ranging from 0.4 percent in the rest of the Middle East to 2.3 percent in 
Tunisia. This would allow for a large reduction in domestic distortions and 
stimulate GDP growth, especially in Morocco, Tunisia, and the other coun-
tries of the southern Mediterranean zone. The efficiency gains would offset 
the deterioration in the terms of trade linked to an augmentation of world 
agricultural prices, which would be detrimental to most of these countries.
  To test whether regional trade agreements represent desirable steps 
toward multilateral liberalization, Bouët (2006) built an index of structural 
congruence that measures the similarity of sectoral changes between two 
alternative scenarios. His results show that a South–South agreement would 
not move the economies toward a multilateral trade liberalization structure. 
For some sectors, it would direct the economies in the opposite direction. 
On the other hand, integration with the E.U. would be a better “first step” 
toward integration into the global economy.
  The superiority of the North–South trade alternative finds evidence in 
Dennis (2006a) in the context of GAFTA.7 The author compared the benefits 
from two integration scenarios: GAFTA and a combination of GAFTA-E.U. The 
MENA region includes Morocco, Tunisia, the rest of North Africa, and the rest 
of the Middle East. In the GAFTA simulation, all tariffs between the four MENA 
zones were set to zero. In the GAFTA-E.U. simulation, all tariffs between 
MENA zones were set to zero, all industrial tariffs between MENA zones and 
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7 For details of the GAFTA agreement, see Chapter 2.the E.U. were set to zero, and all agricultural tariffs between MENA zones 
and the E.U. were reduced by 50 percent. The MENA region would benefit 
twice as much from the GAFTA-E.U. than from GAFTA alone, but the gains 
would be small, 0.2 and 0.1 percent of GDP, respectively. Dennis (2006a) 
argued that intra-MENA trade is hampered by burdensome customs pro-
cedures, poor infrastructure, and regulations that impede efficient trans-
portation services. Examples include regulations favoring national airlines, 
restrictions on private transportation companies, restrictions on foreign 
truck drivers, regulations prohibiting backhaul freight, and various fees and 
taxes. For example, Hoekman and Konan (2005) estimated that the removal 
of NTBs would lead to an increase in welfare more than twice as large as that 
resulting from tariff liberalization. In an earlier study on Egypt, Konan and 
Maskus (1997) found that the elimination of regulatory barriers and red-tape 
measures would result in larger welfare gains from an FTA. Dennis (2006a) 
simulated the role of trade facilitation in the context of GAFTA and E.U.-
GAFTA trade agreements, finding that the welfare benefits would increase 
four- or fivefold if trade facilitation were included.
  The studies just summarized point to the negative impact of these trade 
agreements on unskilled wage rates. Bouët (2006) found that the South–South 
scenario would lead to negative but small changes in unskilled wage rates in 
agriculture in Morocco and Tunisia, but the rest of North Africa would see an 
increase of nearly 2 percent. The North–South scenario would benefit unskilled 
wage rates only in Tunisia but would lead to negative changes in Morocco and 
the rest of the MENA region. In another study, Hoekman and Konan (2005) 
found that GAFTA would increase wage rates in Egypt by 0.7 percent, consid-
erably less than the wage rate increase associated with an E.U. partnership 
agreement (1.3 percent) and from global liberalization (1.98 percent).
Bilateral Trade Liberalization
The impact of the bilateral trade liberalization of MENA countries with the 
E.U. has been extensively researched in the context of the EMAAs. As in 
the global context, the variety of studies has led to results that have been 
dependent on the specificities of the models, the agreements, and the coun-
tries beneficiary to these agreements. These features are summarized in a 
comprehensive and critical survey of the literature, Kuiper (2004), which 
examines the ways in which 11 selected studies have modeled the EMAAs. The 
survey points to some of the limitations of the CGE models used in address-
ing the issues pertinent to the MENA region, among others—for example, the 
issues of unemployment, reliance on remittances, and the role of the state in 
production. Realizing these limitations, we review the evidence on selected 
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on the potential impact of such agreements on welfare and trade.
  We summarize the findings of a few studies reviewed in Augier and Gasi-
orek (2001) in the context of the EMAAs. The results for Egypt obtained by 
Konan and Maskus (1997, 2000) are interesting because they highlight the 
role of agriculture and complementary policies in the effects of trade lib-
eralization. For example, Cockburn, Decaluwé, and Costi (1998) generated 
welfare gains for Egypt ranging from 0.2 and 0.89 percent of GDP from trade 
liberalization with the E.U., but when tariff reductions were extended to 
agriculture and services and accompanied by changes such as market access 
and improved harmonization of standards, the welfare gains increased to 
13–21 percent of GDP (Hoekman and Konan 1998). These large effects are 
also attributed to the inclusion in the latter model of dynamic effects that 
account for increases in investment and productivity growth.
  From their review Augier and Gasiorek (2001) concluded that in most of 
these studies, the static welfare gains that would result from FTAs between 
southern Mediterranean countries and the E.U. are usually found to be very 
small. One reason is that these agreements would result in a large asymmet-
ric reduction in tariffs on the part of the southern Mediterranean countries 
that grant the E.U. better access to their markets, while the southern Medi-
terranean countries already have access to the E.U. The study of Augier and 
Gasiorek (2001) generated much larger results using a CGE model to simulate 
a full elimination of tariffs by southern Mediterranean economies on imports 
from the E.U. (leaving external tariffs on imports from the rest of the world 
unchanged, with the exception of Turkey, which would adopt the E.U.’s com-
mon external tariffs). They found that Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia would 
experience welfare gains of 6 percent, 13 percent, and 18 percent, respec-
tively. In all three countries, the trade creation effects would be much larger 
than the trade diversion effects. The cheaper and more abundant imports 
would generate these gains, though all sectors in these economies would 
experience a decline in production.
  There was also evidence that Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia would experi-
ence augmented gains if other changes were realized, such as improved pro-
ductivity through the pro-competitive effect of trade and greater integration 
with the E.U. markets resulting from a harmonization of standards and regu-
lations. Under these conditions, the welfare effects would reach 18 percent, 
24 percent, and 33 percent for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, respectively. It 
seems that allowing changes in the exchange rate would reduce the welfare 
gains for Morocco and Tunisia but improve the gains for Egypt. Finally, in 
agreement with Bouët (2006), Augier and Gasiorek (2001) found that multi-
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(intra–southern Mediterranean) trade liberalization would generate positive 
but small welfare gains.
  FTAs with the E.U. were also analyzed within the context of a single 
country model by Chemingui and Dessus (2001), who examined the impact of 
various options of trade liberalization for Tunisia. The model of the Tunisian 
economy includes 57 sectors and five types of labor. The model is dynamic 
and tests five liberalization scenarios, two that eliminate unitarily barriers 
to trade by Tunisia, one that reduces E.U. preferential and maximum tariffs 
with regard to Tunisia exports, and one that combines all three scenarios. 
The authors found that unilateral liberalization of the agricultural sector 
would not necessarily improve the income of rural households (they actually 
showed decreases in welfare of 1.1 and 3.2 percent), results that the authors 
attribute to the limited capacity of the Tunisian agriculture for reallocation 
and adjustment due to its dependence on tree crops. On the other hand, 
access to E.U. markets without any reduction in Tunisian import barriers (the 
third scenario) would result in higher returns to farm families (2.7 percent) 
and agricultural workers.
  Chaherli (2002) conducted an extensive review of 17 studies of trade lib-
eralization in the MENA region that were carried out between 1997 and 2001. 
The level of the impact (measured by welfare gains as a share of GDP) tends
to be higher from multilateral trade liberalization scenarios than from bi-
lateral scenarios (mostly illustrated by the implementation of FTAs between 
MENA countries and the E.U.). Consistent with the results found by Augier 
and Gasiorek (2001), other studies emphasize the superiority of multilateral 
trade liberalization over bilateral or regional liberalization. Thus, Egypt regis-
ters welfare gains of 4 percent of GDP from multilateral trade liberalization, 
while the implementation of its FTA with the E.U. adds less than 0.5 percent 
(Bayar 2001). Similar results have been found for Jordan (Hosoe 2001) and 
Morocco (Rutherford, Rutström, and Tarr 1997).
  Only a few studies reviewed by Chaherli (2002) focus on changes in pro-
duction. As a result of lower tariffs in agriculture, the production of import-
substituting products such as field crops and livestock will tend to suffer, 
while export-oriented sectors such as fruits and vegetables will gain from the 
increase in market access. For example, Lorca and Vicens (2000) estimated 
that expanding the FTAs with the E.U. to agricultural products may stimulate 
an increase in exports of 53 percent in fruits and 20 percent in vegetables in 
Morocco, a 28 percent increase in fruits and vegetables in Egypt, and an 80 
percent increase in olive oil exports in Tunisia. In Egypt and Morocco, sugar 
is another winner in that production will increase by 16 and 13 percent, 
respectively.
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the elimination by the E.U. of import tariffs on fruits and vegetables from the 
MENA region. This model projects a substantial increase in exports of fruits 
and vegetables from MENA to the E.U., along with lower consumer prices in 
the E.U. Morocco and Turkey will gain the most, while European horticultural 
producers such as France and Spain will lose.
  Finally, Radwan and Reiffers (2003) presented results from a CGE analysis 
of agricultural trade liberalization scenarios in the context of the EMAAs. The 
study focused on Turkey and four MENA countries, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, and considered three alternative scenarios simulated over a five-
year period, as follows:
•   unilateral liberalization by the E.U.,
•   reciprocal bilateral liberalization between the E.U. and partner countries 
(with or without progress in multilateral liberalization in agriculture), and
•   asymmetrical bilateral liberalization whereby the E.U. liberalizes but the 
Mediterranean partner countries do not liberalize on all products and lib-
eralize at a slower pace.
  The results from the first scenario (unilateral liberalization by the E.U.) 
show positive but modest growth in production, exports, and employment. 
Only exportable products (essentially fruits and vegetables) will gain from 
this scenario, but for poor farmers and traditional agriculture, the situation 
does not change and may even become worse now that they will have to 
compete for resources and subsidies (such as water) with favored exports.
  The second scenario tested the effects of a reciprocal bilateral liber-
alization between the E.U. and Mediterranean partner countries with and 
without agriculture liberalization in a multilateral context (under either the 
European Commission or the U.S. proposal).8 Domestic trade liberalization 
would reduce the local prices for formerly protected agricultural commodi-
ties. On the other hand, multilateral liberalization of agricultural trade would 
result in higher international prices: for example, a 10.5 percent increase 
for wheat, 19.7 percent for maize, and nearly 7 percent for sugar.9 The net 
effect would be a decrease in domestic prices but by a smaller magnitude 
than would occur without the multilateral liberalization of agriculture. The 
results would be particularly large for processed food preparations contain-
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E.U. proposed to decrease import tariffs by 36 percent, exports subsidies by 45 percent, and 
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years, the protection affecting trade to 5 percent of the total value of domestic production.
9 The U.S. proposal yields slightly higher results.ing fruits; these would sustain a price decrease of more than 40 percent, while 
the prices of sugar would fall by 14 percent and those of wheat by nearly 7 
percent (Radwan and Reiffers 2003, 20). The net effect of this scenario sug-
gests that tariff dismantling by Mediterranean partner countries has a larger 
effect than the removal of protection by OECD countries. The negative effects 
of a net price decrease on rural producers and therefore rural income will be 
greater than the positive effects on urban consumers and exporters, biasing the 
distribution of gains from liberalization against the more vulnerable population 
group. Radwan and Reiffers (2003) concluded that the liberalization should be 
reciprocal but gradual, starting with the reduction of domestic support by the 
E.U., followed by tariff reduction by Mediterranean partner countries.
  The third scenario reproduces the second scenario, but, by taking into 
account the varying capacities to bear the changes among countries in the 
region, it introduces an asymmetrical implementation process whereby the 
E.U. would liberalize while Mediterranean partner countries would liberalize 
partially and at a slower rate. It also provides for structural instruments similar 
to those used by the Fonds Européens d’Orientation et de Garantie Agricole,10 
which remove price supports, include support for agricultural modernization, 
upgrade infrastructure and institutions, and support diversification in rural 
activities. If the implementation of these structural tools is successful, it could 
reduce (if not eliminate) the list of losers among the Mediterranean partner 
countries. The main difficulties will be to avoid rent-seeking behavior among 
farmers in Mediterranean partner countries and to target the support toward 
the sectors in rural areas that have been the most affected by the liberaliza-
tion process. This last scenario seems to simulate the recent developments in 
the EMAAs under the Europeans Neighborhood Policy and the adoption of new 
action plans forging an E.U. agricultural roadmap with regard to their Mediter-
ranean partners (see Chapter 2 for a brief summary of the EMAAs).
Unilateral Trade Liberalization
Several of the studies on bilateral trade liberalization we have reviewed have 
also considered the impact of unilateral trade liberalization. For example, 
in Tunisia unilateral trade reforms were found to be detrimental to rural 
households (Chemingui and Dessus 2001). These studies are usually based on 
country CGEs and can sometimes provide more information on the distribu-
tional effects of liberalization.
  Feraboli and Trimborn (2008) used a dynamic CGE model of Jordan aug-
mented by heterogeneous households from a household survey to examine the 
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and Guarantee Funds) have been established within the overall E.U. budget to finance the com-
mon agricultural policy.effect of the E.U.-Jordan Association Agreement. The agreement provides for 
the gradual reduction of import duties on imports of E.U. industrial and agri-
cultural products into Jordan over a period of 12 years according to a tariff 
reduction schedule that started in 2002 (the year of implementation) and will
end in 2012. Reduction in agriculture tariffs will not start until 2006 and 
will proceed at a much slower rate than that for nonagricultural tariffs (Feraboli 
and Trimborn 2008, Table 1). As tariffs are reduced, government revenue will 
be reduced, which will lead in the short run to a reduction of total govern-
ment transfers to households, made endogenous in the model, although the 
share each household will receive is fixed. The reduction in tariffs will affect 
the aggregate economy through decreases in the prices of imported goods 
(investment and consumption goods), the creation of higher incentives for 
investment, faster capital accumulation, and increases in output in the long 
run. So in the long run, the drop in government transfers to households will 
be partially offset by the expansion of the tax base. What the net effect will 
be on household income composed of labor, capital, and transfers is ambigu-
ous because trade liberalization affects each source of income differently 
and each household group relies differently on the various kinds of income. In 
this study it appears that the net effect on welfare will be positive for most 
household groups and slightly higher for the poorest one. The highest income 
group, though, will be worse off. If the value-added tax is increased by 10 
percent, the effect of trade liberalization will still be positive for households 
but the increase will be smaller. Although transfers will remain even higher 
than in the benchmark year, household welfare will be lower relative to the 
previous simulation due to a reduction in aggregate income (through lower 
investment). It has been found that trade liberalization will increase the gap 
in income, especially in the long run. Although low-income households will 
overcompensate for losses in transfers by an increase in labor income, rich 
households’ capital income will increase much more in the long run due to an 
increase in investment incentives.
  Lofgren (1999) analyzed the short-run equilibrium effects of alternative 
scenarios of reduced protection for agriculture and industry in Morocco. 
Because the agricultural sector represents the major income source for the 
poor rural population, it is also the most strongly protected in the country. The 
results show that lowering agricultural protection would generate aggregate 
welfare gains, though a significant part of the disadvantaged rural population 
would lose out substantially. The tariff cut would boost agricultural imports 
and reduce the demand, prices, and factor returns in domestic agriculture. 
The welfare changes for any household group primarily depend on the com-
bined effects of changes in the prices of factors the group controls and the 
commodities it consumes. The incomes and resources of agricultural labor 
would decline significantly, especially in rainfed areas, because these depend 
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sector initially. Agricultural wages would decline 14 percent if agricultural 
labor could not switch to nonagricultural activities. The authors assume that 
if labor could move among sectors, agricultural wages would decline by only 
6 percent. Upgrading the skill level of the rural labor force by assuming some 
productivity increase would result in higher unskilled wage rates, thus ben-
efiting the poor.
  Lofgren, El-Said, and Robinson (1999) used a dynamically recursive gen-
eral equilibrium model for Morocco to examine options for unilateral trade 
liberalization that would go beyond the terms of the EMAA. The results from 
unilateral trade liberalization scenarios beyond the implementation of the 
EMAA indicate that tariff unification (tariffs ranging between 3 and 98 per-
cent set at 29 percent across sectors) would have small aggregate effects, 
while the removal of NTBs would have positive aggregate effects but favor 
skilled labor and capital. On average, real household income per capita 
would expand but in favor of urban households and nonpoor households in 
rural areas. Combining trade liberalization with at least one complementary 
domestic policy would result in a win-win outcome whereby the welfare of 
all household groups would increase much more rapidly than if status quo 
policies were followed.11
  A third study of Morocco combined a CGE model with household survey 
data to obtain a detailed picture of the distributional effect of unilateral 
trade liberalization. Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) measured the short-term 
welfare impacts of the price changes attributed to removing the country’s 
protection on cereals (they estimated cereal protection at 100 percent during 
1997–98).12 The price changes were estimated from a CGE model simulating 
various levels of tariff reduction (10, 30, 50, and 100 percent) for cereals 
and the removal of the government intervention in subsidizing cereal prices 
among consumers. Prices in cereals would decrease by nearly 27 percent for 
consumers and by around 24 percent for producers. Producer prices for fresh 
vegetables would also decrease, by less than 10 percent, while the prices of 
other agricultural products (fruits, dairy products and eggs, meat, and sugar) 
would decrease at the lower levels of tariff reductions on imported cereals 
but increase at the higher levels. In aggregate, the results show that there 
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coming from the unskilled labor of rural households.
12 The MFN tariff on cereals reported in WTO (2003) is 20.6 percent (simple average) with a 
range of 2.5–53.5 percent.would be a small but negative impact on mean household consumption and a 
small increase in inequality, as in the case of Jordan in the study by Feraboli 
and Trimborn (2008). Heterogeneity in consumption behavior and in income 
sources has diverse impacts on households. For example, rural households 
have twice the budget share for cereals as urban households; also, the share 
of income from production accounts for a quarter of consumption in urban 
areas (the rest is labor earnings, transfers, and savings), while the share is 87 
percent in rural areas, and about one-third of this is from cereals.
  The household survey also shows that, at the national level, 16 percent of 
households are net producers of cereals, while in rural areas the proportion 
is 36 percent. The majority of the rural poor produce cereals for home con-
sumption, and over one-third of the poorest quintile tend to produce more 
than they consume. These households will be worse off from a fall in cereal 
prices. At the national level, production losses outweigh consumption gains 
and the poverty rate increases overall, but the impact is felt entirely in rural 
areas, where losses to net producers of cereals outweigh the gains to net 
consumers among the poor (Ravallion and Lokshin 2004).
  In a recent study of labor markets in Morocco and Tunisia, Dennis (2006b) 
argued that the ability of MENA countries to respond to trade liberalization 
is impeded by regulations that make factor markets inflexible. He cites the 
legal constraints on dismissing workers, the high level of legally mandated 
severance pay, the restrictions on the use of temporary labor, the high 
minimum capital requirements for starting a new business, and lengthy bank-
ruptcy procedures. He found that Morocco and Tunisia have the least flex-
ible labor markets among the 11 developing countries studied. To examine 
this issue Dennis used a CGE model to simulate the impact of a unilateral 50 
percent reduction in import barriers in Morocco and Tunisia with high and 
low factor market flexibility. Factor market flexibility is simulated by making 
capital mobile and by doubling the elasticity of substitution between fac-
tors of production. Dennis found that flexible factor markets would increase 
the welfare gains from unilateral trade liberalization by a factor of three in 
Morocco and by a factor of six in Tunisia.
Summary
Most studies of global trade liberalization indicate that reducing agricultural 
subsidies and removing import barriers will increase world agricultural prices. 
The prices of agricultural commodities for which the markets are distorted 
(including wheat, rice, sugar, and dairy) would rise between 2 and 20 per-
cent, with higher estimates in the case of sugar.
  Almost all the MENA countries are net agricultural importers, so there is 
clearly some basis for concern that these countries will lose as a result of 
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global trade liberalization. Our analysis confirms that the terms-of-trade 
effect of a 15 percent increase in all world agricultural prices for the MENA 
countries would be, on balance, US$4.3 billion, or 0.7 percent of the regional 
GDP. The actual impact of trade liberalization, however, is likely to be more 
positive for three reasons. First, this analysis does not take into account the 
response by producers and consumers. Second, it assumes that the price 
increase will be the same for all commodities. For example, Egypt could gain 
from global liberalization if the price of cotton (which it exports) increases 
more than the price of wheat (which it imports). And third, the analysis 
estimates the terms-of-trade effect of trade liberalization, but it does not 
include the efficiency gains associated with reducing distortions in domestic 
agricultural markets. Most studies of trade liberalization suggest that the 
efficiency effects will be larger than the terms-of-trade effects.
  Several dozen studies have been undertaken to examine the macro-
economic impact of various types of trade liberalization in MENA. Most of 
these studies use CGE models to simulate the effect of alternative trade poli-
cies. The results of these studies are summarized as follows:
•   Multilateral trade liberalization will generally result in net gains to coun-
tries in the region; real GDP will expand by 1–3 percent.
•   The benefits of trade liberalization to a given country will depend largely 
on the degree of domestic liberalization carried out by the country. The 
effects from unilateral reforms will be larger for a specific country than 
those resulting from changes in trade policy in other countries. This con-
firms this well-known concept in studies of trade liberalization: what you 
do determines what you get.
•   The benefits of multilateral trade liberalization will generally be greater 
than the benefits of bilateral trade liberalization with the E.U. or the United 
States and greater than the benefits of regional trade agreements within 
MENA.
•   Trade liberalization in the MENA region will usually result in lower produc-
tion and more imports of wheat but in higher production and more exports 
of fruits and vegetables.
•   Complementary policies such as improved productivity and harmonization 
of standards may greatly improve the gains from trade liberalization in 
regional and bilateral agreements.
  The distributional effects of trade liberalization are dependent on a vari-
ety of complex factors. Although, on balance, there is evidence that trade 
liberalization will benefit the poor, at the country level it remains an empiri-
cal matter.CHAPTER 4
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Egypt
Background
W
ith 74 million people, Egypt is the most populous country in the 
MENA region. The per capita GDP of Egypt in 2006 was US$1,724 
(measured in constant 2000 dollars), which makes it a lower-middle-
income country in the World Bank classification system. Real per capita GDP 
growth averaged 2.9 percent in the 1980s, 2.4 percent in the 1990s, and 2.5 
percent in 2000–06 (World Bank 2008b).
  Although the contribution from the agricultural sector has declined in 
recent decades, the sector still plays an important role in the Egyptian econ-
omy. It accounts for about 14 percent of GDP, down from around 20 percent 
in the early 1980s. Agriculture also accounts for about 30 percent of total 
employment and 3 percent of exports. Domestic agriculture contributes to 
the overall food needs of the country and provides domestic industry with raw 
materials.
  In the 1970s, Egypt’s agricultural policy was characterized by heavy govern-
ment intervention in production, trade, and prices. Most crops were subject 
to compulsory sales to state enterprises at fixed prices. The agricultural sec-
tor was highly taxed relative to other sectors of the economy. These policies 
had an adverse effect on agricultural development and food security. Start-
ing in 1987, the government of President Hosni Mubarak launched a series of 
agricultural policy reforms to liberalize markets (Ender 2000).
  As a result of broader economic reforms in the 1990s, the private sector 
emerged with a more important role in the economy. At the same time, the 
economy remained inward looking, because high tariff rates and an overval-
ued currency made the domestic market more attractive for Egyptian business 
(El-Laithy, Lokshin, and Banerji 2003). Egypt’s large merchandise trade deficit 
is sustained by foreign aid, revenue from tourism, and remittances from Egyp-
tians working overseas, particularly in Europe and the Gulf countries.
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Agricultural Production
The Nile River Valley has been cultivated for at least 8,000 years, and it 
continues to be the focus of almost all agriculture in Egypt. About 90 percent 
of the agricultural area is concentrated in the Nile Delta, and most of the 
remainder falls within a few kilometers of the Nile and along the Mediterra-
nean. Egypt is unusual in the MENA region in that 100 percent of its crop pro-
duction is irrigated.1 As a result, crop yields in Egypt are relatively stable and 
are not subject to weather-related shocks as in most countries in the region. 
About 97 percent of the area of Egypt is uncultivated due to the extremely 
limited rainfall (World Bank 2008b).
  The amount of arable land per capita is just 0.04 hectares, one of the low-
est figures in the world. However, the combination of warm weather, fertile 
soil, and irrigation allows Egyptian farmers to achieve high yields and practice 
multiple cropping. Also, Egypt has a relatively large number of tractors (3.9 
per 100 hectare of cropland), most of which are used on a rental basis. Fertil-
izer use is the highest among the MENA countries, at over 700 kilograms per 
hectare of arable land.
  In 1960 Egypt was self-sufficient in all basic food commodities with the 
exception of wheat, for which the country supplied 70 percent of it own needs. 
The self-sufficiency ratio declined dramatically for most products during the 
1970s and 1980s due to a combination of rapid population growth and rising 
foreign currency inflows from exports (including cotton and textile products), 
remittances, and foreign aid. The rising dependence on imported food is a 
major concern among policymakers and has resulted in various attempts to 
restrict food imports and stimulate domestic production.
  Because of irrigation, farmers can produce two or three harvests per year. 
In the summer growing season, the main crops are maize, rice, and cotton, 
while in the winter wheat, berseem (Egyptian clover), and broad beans are 
grown. The nili (autumn) season is used for growing potatoes and vegetables. 
Grains account for almost half (47 percent) of the cultivated area, of which 
wheat is the most important, followed by maize and rice. Berseem, used for 
animal fodder, accounts for 17 percent of the planted area, while vegetables 
represent 12 percent and fruit 8 percent (Siam 2005).
  Domestic resource cost analysis indicates that Egypt has a strong compar-
ative advantage in the production of cotton, wheat, and fruits and vegetables 
and is moderately competitive in several less water-intensive crops such as 
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available.maize, beans, and potatoes. It has a comparative disadvantage in producing 
water-intensive crops such as rice and sugarcane (Madcour and Abou Zeid 
1996).
Agricultural Trade Patterns
Egypt’s total imports were US$29 billion in 2004–06, of which agricultural 
imports represented US$4 billion, or one-eighth of the total. As in many coun-
tries in the region, wheat is the most important agricultural import (see Table 
2.4). Over 2004–06, Egypt imported an average of US$873 million in wheat per 
year, making it the largest wheat importer in the world. Wheat is a politically 
sensitive commodity, because bread is the main staple food. Wheat produc-
tion and marketing were strictly controlled until market reforms in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Agricultural input and output markets have been liberalized to 
some degree, but the government maintains subsidies on some types of bread 
and attempts to boost domestic production by restricting imports of wheat 
and flour. Egyptian wheat production is able to cover about 55–60 percent 
of domestic requirements. The second largest agricultural import is maize. 
Maize demand is rising due to its use as animal feed.
 In  2004–06, Egypt’s average total export revenue was almost US$27 bil-
lion per year (World Bank 2008b),2 about US$2 billion of which was earned 
from petroleum oil exports.3 Agricultural exports were US$1.2 billion, about 
4 percent of the total and 11 percent of the merchandise exports. Fruits and 
vegetables are the most important category of agricultural exports, account-
ing for 31 percent of the total. In this category the main exports are potatoes, 
oranges, onions, and tomatoes, exported mainly to the E.U. Rice and cotton 
each represent 22–24 percent of agricultural exports. Egyptian cotton has 
long fibers and is considered some of the best in the world, fetching high 
prices on international markets. The average annual value of cotton exports 
was US$265 million in 2004–06, although cotton revenue has been quite vola-
tile. Cotton is also used in Egypt’s textile sector, which produces cloth and 
garments for domestic use and for export (see Table 2.5).
Agricultural and Trade Policy
Agricultural Policy
Agricultural policy in Egypt has been characterized by heavy intervention by 
the government in setting prices, granting marketing monopolies to state 
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2 This figure refers to exports of goods and services. Excluding services (including tourism and 
revenue from the Suez Canal), merchandise exports were only US$15 billion.
3 ITC (2008).enterprises, subsidizing agricultural inputs, and restricting imports. Before 
1987, most field crops were subject to compulsory purchase by state enter-
prises at fixed prices. The state restricted the allocation of land among crops 
through crop area controls. Likewise, input distribution was largely controlled 
by the government. The exchange rate was overvalued, and imports were 
tightly controlled.
  Under the pressure of the growing fiscal burden and rising debt, Egypt 
began a process of structural adjustment in the 1980s. In 1987 the compulsory 
purchase of all crops was eliminated except in rice, cotton, and sugarcane. 
For wheat, maize, and other crops, the government switched from compul-
sory purchase to voluntary purchase at government-set floor prices. In 1990 
there was a massive devaluation of the exchange rate, moving it toward a 
market rate. In 1991 rice marketing was liberalized and input subsidies were 
reduced significantly. Input subsidies were phased out over 1991–93. Crop 
area controls were largely eliminated in this period as well. In 1994–95 cot-
ton marketing and ginning were liberalized, allowing private enterprises to 
compete with state enterprises (Siam 2005).
  Although significant progress has been made in liberalizing agricultural 
markets, particularly between 1987 and 1996, the Egyptian government con-
tinues to intervene in a few areas. First, electricity and irrigation water 
are still heavily subsidized. Second, the General Authority for Supply Com-
modities continues to plays an important role in the importation of food. For 
example, in 2004 it imported 5.4 million metric tons of wheat and 277,000 
metric tons of cooking oil, as well as significant quantities of tea, lentils, and 
beans. Although it does not have a monopoly on imports, it accounts for a 
large share of all wheat imports. Third, the government maintains a large and 
complex system to subsidize bread, sugar, and cooking oil. The cost of these 
subsidies was brought down to around 2 billion Egyptian pounds (LE 2 billion) 
in 2002, but expansion of the program raised the cost to LE 8 billion in 2004.4 
Wheat imports by the General Authority for Supply Commodities are sold to 
millers to make baladi bread, which is price controlled, while private-sector 
imports are used to make unsubsidized bread and other wheat products (WTO 
2005a).
Trade Policy
Like many of its neighbors, Egypt followed a policy of import-substitution 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. In response to a debt crisis in 1982, 
it became one of the first MENA countries to begin to follow a more outward-
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4 In June 2004, the exchange rate was LE 6.20 per US$1.00, so LE 8 billion was equivalent to 
US$1.3 billion.oriented trade policy. The trade reforms of 1986 simplified a range of import 
taxes and reduced the NTBs. Generally, manufacturing benefits from the 
highest protection except for cotton ginning, which has negative protection. 
Agriculture has relatively low protection, with some important exceptions. 
In 1998 the government replaced import bans with high tariffs on clothing, 
poultry parts, meats, fruits, vegetables, and consumer appliances.
  The multiple exchange rates of the 1980s were unified into one exchange 
rate in 1991 (Reefat 1999). In 2003 the Egyptian pound was allowed to float. 
In 2004 Egypt reduced the number of tariff bands, eliminated some import 
fees, and cut tariff rates, resulting in a decline in the average tariffs from 21 
percent in 2000 to 9 percent. The tariff rates applied in 2005 are shown in 
Table 4.1. Although the average tariff for beverages and spirits is very high 
and some of the tariff rates for traditional export commodities are high, the 
average rate for grains, oilseeds, fats, and oils (which account for two thirds 
of agricultural imports) is under 10 percent.
  According to the World Bank, the simple average tariff rate is low by 
world standards, lower than the rates in 60 percent of the countries in the 
world. Furthermore, Egypt’s progress in trade liberalization over 2000–04 was 
among the strongest in the world (World Bank 2005). Egypt enjoyed a windfall 
from the high oil prices during the Iraq war and again during the commodity 
price boom of 2007–08, partly through oil export revenue and partly due to 
increased traffic through the Suez Canal.
Trade Agreements
Part of Egypt’s liberalization has been unilateral, and part has been related 
to various trade agreements. Egypt signed an EMAA with the E.U. in 2001. 
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Table 4.1  Tariff rates in and value of imports in Egypt, 2005
      Value of  
  Simple average  Range of  imports in 2003 
Sector  tariff rate (%)  tariff rates (%)  (millions of US$)
Grains 3.3  2–5 1,136.7
Oilseeds, fats, oils, etc.  6.4  0–32 421.9
Fruits and vegetables  15.9  2–40 212.7
Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, etc.  35.4  2–3,000 212.0
Live animals and animal products  18.4  5–32 218.4
Dairy products  11.5  2–32 123.8
Cut flowers and plants  4.0  2–32 9.4
Beverages and spirits  1,028.8  12–3,000 1.9
Tobacco 22.0  22  188.6
Other agricultural products  4.1  0–32 154.3
Source:   WTO (2005a).Egypt is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and 
GAFTA. Egypt also signed the Agadir Declaration, which established a free 
trade area among Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.
The GATT/WTO
Based on the Uruguay Round, Egypt presented base tariff rates for over 600 
agricultural tariff lines and offered to bind all agricultural tariffs. For most 
products, the bindings were in the range of 5–80 percent, and there was a 
commitment to reduce them progressively. Egypt did not declare any agricul-
tural support measures, so it is bound by the 10 percent de minimis restric-
tion under which product-specific support may not exceed 10 percent of the 
value of that commodity and non-product-specific support may not exceed 10 
percent of the value of agricultural production.
The Egypt-E.U. EMAA
Egypt’s EMAA with the E.U. came into force in 2004. The agreement seeks to 
establish a free trade area for industrial products over a 12-year period. The 
restricted access to the E.U. agricultural market has been the most important 
barrier to the expansion of Egypt’s agricultural exports. The last version of 
the agreement includes an enlargement of quotas and longer seasonal win-
dows for some Egyptian exports.
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Egypt became a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa in 1998. The organization includes 20 countries in eastern and southern 
Africa that are working to reduce trade barriers. A subgroup of 9 countries 
formed a free trade area and were planning to phase out internal tariffs 
between 1992 and 2000. Two more countries joined the FTA in 2004, but 
Egypt is not a member of the FTA. A customs union with common external 
tariffs was to be established by 2003 (Siam 2002), but disagreements over the 
levels of external tariffs prevented this from occurring.
GAFTA
Egypt became a member of GAFTA in 1998. According to this agreement, tariffs 
were to be gradually phased out over the 10-year period following the signing 
of the agreement. Some topics are still subject to negotiation among the 14 
member Arab countries, including an agricultural agenda and rules of origin.
Other Bilateral FTAs
There are several bilateral FTAs between Egypt and other countries in the 
region. The Egypt-Tunisia Free Trade Agreement was initiated in 1998. It pro-
vides an exemption on customs duties for specific products from both countries. 
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commodities for five years. The Egypt-Turkey Free Trade Agreement was also 
signed in 1998. It was intended to boost trade, investment ties, and cooperation 
by using Turkey as a gateway for Egyptian products into the E.U. market. In turn, 
Egypt serves as a gateway for Turkish commodities in the Middle East and Africa. 
An FTA has been created on a bilateral basis between Egypt and Jordan.
  Although one might think that the large number of FTAs implies relatively 
open trade policies, some have expressed concern about the proliferation 
of regional and bilateral agreements. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme notes that “there are difficulties in administering different rules 
of origin and diverse customs treatments related to various agreements. 
Adapting to different standards, laws and regulations may lead to delays in 
implementation” (UNDP 2005a, 96). The report proposes pursuing multilateral 
trade liberalization through the WTO and simultaneously working on trade 
facilitation through means such as streamlining customs procedures.
Poverty and Household Budget Patterns
This section describes the living conditions and sources of income of Egyp-
tian households, with particular emphasis on small-scale farmers. The main 
source of data is the Egypt Integrated Household Survey carried out by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute in 1997–98. Analysis of the sur-
vey suggests that 62 percent of the households are in Lower Egypt, while the 
remainder are in Upper Egypt (Table 4.2). Lower Egypt’s landscape is domi-
nated by the Nile Delta at Alexandria. The delta region is well watered and 
crisscrossed by channels and canals. Upper Egypt is a narrow strip of land that 
extends from the cataract boundaries of Aswan to the area south of Cairo. 
Historically, the land in Upper Egypt was more isolated from activities in the 
north. Nationally, 54 percent of the population resides in urban areas. Lower 
Egypt is more urbanized, while Upper Egypt is more rural.
  We define a farm household as a household relying on crop or livestock 
production. Only about one-third of the households in Lower Egypt are engaged 
in farming compared to more than half in Upper Egypt. More than three-
fourths of farmers reside in rural areas; the remainder are in urban areas. 
Farm households represent about 70 percent of rural households and 18 per-
cent of urban households. In terms of welfare, more than 60 percent of the 
poorest households are rural, and two-thirds of the poorest households are 
classified as farm households.
Poverty
Our study used per capita consumption expenditures to measure family well-
being and poverty. As shown in Table 4.3, the national average consumption 
expenditure per capita in 1997/98 was LE 1,782 (US$517 at the 1998 exchange 
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capita expenditures are essentially equal in Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt. 
This is consistent with calculations of the Human Development Index that 
show the gap between Upper and Lower Egypt narrowing over time (UNDP 
2005a). Between urban and rural areas the contrast is much sharper. The 
average per capita expenditure is only LE 1,368 annually among rural house-
holds but almost 60 percent higher (LE 2,137) among urban households. The 
results also suggest that female-headed households have per capita consump-
tion rates 12 percent higher than those of male-headed households.
  Among farm households, those producing only livestock tend to be better 
off than those producing crops. Within crop-producing households, those pro-
ducing sugarcane are the poorest group, with per capita expenditures averag-
ing LE 1,042. Farm households growing rice are the wealthiest, followed by 
households producing wheat and fruits and vegetables.
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Table 4.2  Distribution of households based on occupation 
and location in Egypt, 1998
 Location
  (percentage of all
 Egyptian  households)
Household group  National (%)  Urban  Rural
Total population  100.0  53.8  46.2
  Nonfarmers  57.8  44.2  13.6
  Farmers  42.2  9.6  32.6
Lower Egypt  62.3  37.3  25.0
  Nonfarmers  40.0  32.0  8.0
  Farmers  22.3  5.3  17.0
Upper Egypt  37.7  16.5  21.2
  Nonfarmers  17.8  12.2  5.6
  Farmers  19.9  4.3  15.6
Poorest tercile  33.4  12.1  21.4
  Nonfarmers  16.1  9.3  6.8
  Farmers  17.3  2.8  14.6
Middle tercile  33.3  17.7  15.7
  Nonfarmers  18.6  14.4  4.2
  Farmers  14.7  3.3  11.5
Richest tercile  33.3  24.0  9.2
  Nonfarmers  23.1  20.5  2.6
  Farmers  10.2  3.6  6.5
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Note:   Lower Egypt includes the following northern governorates: Alexan-
dria, Behera, Cairo, Dakhalia, Damietta, El-Menuf, Gharbia, Ismaila, 
Kalyubia, Kuer, Sharbia, and Suez. Upper Egypt includes the follow-
ing southern governorates: Assiut, Aswan BeniSuef, Fayoum, Giza, 
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Table 4.3  Expenditure and household size of different types of 
households in Egypt, 1998
 Household  Per  capita  Household
 expenditure  expenditure  size
Household group  (LE/year)  (LE/year)  (number)
National 8,874  1,782  5.7
Region
  Lower Egypt  8,607  1,794  5.4
  Upper Egypt  9,318  1,764  6.2
Location
  Urban  9,409  2,137  4.9
  Rural  8,249  1,368  6.6
Household status
  Farmer  9,368  1,485  6.9
  Nonfarmer  8,515  1,998  4.8
Gender of head of household
  Man  9,264  1,751  6.0
  Woman  6,664  1,962  4.2
Farm type
  Producing livestock only  8,210  1,541  5.9
  Producing crops
    Cotton  11,653  1,419  8.9
    Wheat  11,425  1,480  8.4
    Rice  11,861  1,517  8.8
    Fruits and vegetables  12,743  1,465  9.5
    Sugarcane  7,533  1,042  7.4
    Other crops  10,746  1,419  8.1
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Note:   LE, Egyptian £.
  In the approach using the costs of basic needs, the poverty line represents 
the level of per capita expenditure at which the members of a household may 
be expected to meet their basic caloric needs, as well as their minimum non-
food requirements. About 27 million people in Egypt, representing 42 percent 
of the population, were living below the poverty line in 1999–2000. Although 
poverty statistics are difficult to compare over time, it appears that poverty 
increased in the 1980s and early 1990s but declined in the second half of the 
1990s (Table 4.4).
  Based on the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey, we calculated 
the poverty rate using the poverty line developed by Datt, Jolliffe, and Sharma 
(1998) according to a method similar to the approach used in World Bank 
(2002a). This analysis found that the poverty rate in Egypt was 38 percent in 
1997/98, as shown in Table 4.5. This was comparable to but slightly below the 
42 percent reported for 1999/2000 using the upper poverty line. The poverty 
rate is higher in rural areas than in urban areas (41 percent compared to 36 76  CHAPTER 4
Table 4.5  Incidence of poverty for different types of 
households in Egypt, 1998 (percent)
Household group  National  Urban  Rural
National 38.1  35.8  40.9
Strata
  Metropolitan  41.5  41.5  —
  Lower urban  38.1  38.1  —
  Lower rural  38.8  —  38.8
  Upper urban  25.9  25.9  —
  Upper rural  43.3  —  43.2
Household status
  Farmer  39.4  39.5  39.4
  Nonfarmer  37.2  35.0  44.4
Gender of head of household
  Male  38.0  35.9  40.5
  Female  38.9  35.4  42.8
Farm type
  Producing livestock only  43.2  39.7  44.9
  Producing crops
    Cotton  31.7  38.1  31.1
    Wheat  29.8  31.0  29.7
    Rice  33.5  27.4  33.9
    Fruits and vegetables  27.4  33.3  26.5
    Sugarcane  62.5  —  62.5
    Other crops  35.0  38.6  34.6
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Note:  —, no households in this category.
Table 4.4  Incidence of poverty and number of poor 
people in Egypt, 1981/82–1999/2000
  Share of population   Number of
Year  that was poor (%)  poor people (millions)
  1981/82  30.2  12.9
  1990/91  39.1  20.7
  1995/96  48.2  28.3
  1999/2000  42.0  26.9
Source:   World Bank (2002a).
Note:   These poverty figures correspond to the upper poverty line in the 
World Bank report. The lower poverty line is the expenditure that 
typically allows a household to meet basic caloric needs but does 
not include any allowance for nonfood expenditure.percent). The poverty rate is highest in rural areas of Upper Egypt, followed by 
the rates in metropolitan areas; it is lowest in urban areas of Upper Egypt.
  Farm households show a slightly higher incidence of poverty than nonfarm 
households, although in rural areas, where most farmers are located, the pro-
portion of households in poverty is higher among nonfarmers. In rural areas, 
nonfarmers probably include landless agricultural laborers. Among different 
types of farmers, sugarcane growers show the highest incidence of poverty 
(62 percent), while fruit and vegetable growers show the lowest (27 percent). 
Farmers producing livestock show the second-highest poverty rate, despite the 
relatively high average consumption expenditures of this group. This suggests 
a highly skewed distribution, with many poor small-scale livestock producers 
and a few large-scale commercial livestock producers.
  In rural areas, female-headed households tend to be slightly poorer than 
male-headed households, while in urban areas the difference in poverty rates 
is negligible. Overall, the proportion of female-headed households is about 15 
percent according to the Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Sources of Income
Although household consumption expenditures are considered the most accu-
rate basis for assessing well-being and poverty, the Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey also provides information on household income and its sources. 
The total income of each household is divided among six sources: crop pro-
duction, livestock production, wages, nonfarm business income, transfers, 
and other income. We include the value of home-consumed agricultural pro-
duction in our calculation of income.
  According to the Egypt Integrated Household Survey, almost three-fourths 
of Egyptian households earn wages as one source of income, implying that 
wages are the most widespread single source.5 The proportion of all house-
holds with livestock income is 37 percent. About one-fifth of the population 
participates in crop production, and 29 percent receive transfers. As expected, 
the percentage of rural households with crop and livestock income is much 
higher than the percentage of urban households with income from these 
sources. Surprisingly, though, the share of rural households with wage income 
and nonfarm business income is almost as high as the corresponding share in 
urban areas (Table 4.6).
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5 Often the levels of household incomes reported in household surveys are less than the 
reported consumption expenditures. This is the case in the Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 
as shown in Tables 4.14 and 4.18. Income estimates are generally considered less accurate due 
to hesitancy among households to reveal this information and income fluctuations over time.  Table 4.7 shows the composition of income for different types of house-
holds in Egypt. At the national level, crop production contributes 11 percent 
of household income on average. Although livestock production is carried out 
by nearly 40 percent of households, a large number of these households raise 
only poultry, so the contribution of livestock production to average household 
income is relatively small, less than 6 percent. Nonfarm business income rep-
resents 15 percent of the total. Almost half of these nonfarm businesses are 
in the retail, hotel, and restaurant sectors, followed by manufacturing and 
services. Transfers contribute less than 4 percent of income, although they 
are received by nearly 20 percent of households.
  Although rural areas in developing countries are generally dependent on 
agriculture, the data for Egypt indicate that the rural nonfarm economy is 
quite important there. Wages account for 40 percent of the income of rural 
households, compared to 56 percent among urban households. When we break 
down the wages into agricultural and nonagricultural activities, most of the
wages are earned from nonagricultural activities. Nonagricultural wages repre-
sent 94 percent of wage income in urban areas and 70 percent in rural areas. 
Crop and livestock income provide 25 percent and 12 percent of rural house-
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Table 4.6  Percentage of households involved in 
income activities in Egypt, by region, 1998
Income category  Nationwide  Urban  Rural
Crop production  19.3  3.4  37.7
  Wheat  11.9  1.9  23.5
  Rice  5.4  0.7  10.9
  Cotton  4.2  0.6  8.4
  Fruits and vegetables  0.3  0.1  0.6
  Other cereals  3.4  0.6  6.7
  Pulses  0.2  0.1  0.4
  Tubers  0.2  0  0.5
  Oilseeds  0.3  0.1  0.6
  Spices  0.1  0  0.1
  Sugarcane  1.3  0  2.7
  Other cash crops  1.2  0.2  2.5
  Clover  14.1  2.3  28.0
Livestock production  36.6  15.5  61.2
  Cattle  13.9  1.0  12.9
  Goats, sheep  7.7  1.2  6.5
  Chickens  32.9  7.6  25.3
Wage income  73.9  75.7  71.8
Nonfarm business income  14.8  16.8  12.6
Transfers 29.4  30.2  28.4
Other income  39.0  42.2  35.2
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN EGYPT  79   
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shold incomes, respectively. Even among farm households, farm income (crops 
and livestock) account for less than 40 percent of income. Thus, overall, the 
nonfarm sector contributes almost two-thirds of rural household income. 
These findings are comparable with those recorded in other studies in the 
region. For example, nonfarm income represents the single most important 
source of income in rural areas of Jordan, accounting for about 51 percent of 
total household income (Adams 2001).
  Table 4.7 also shows the composition of income for farm households grow-
ing different types of crops, especially wheat, rice, cotton, fruits and veg-
etables, and sugarcane. It is important to recall that these are not exclusive 
categories: many farmers fall into more than one category. Furthermore, it is 
not necessary that farmers growing a particular crop receive a large share of 
their income from that crop. Cotton and sugarcane farmers are the most spe-
cialized in crop production, earning more than 60 percent of their income from 
crops. Sugarcane farmers are fairly dependent on that crop (from which they 
receive 32 percent of their income), while wheat accounts for only 7 percent of 
the income of wheat farmers. Fruit and vegetable farmers have a higher share 
of their income from wages and from nonfarm businesses than do growers of 
other crops. Perhaps the risk and expense of horticultural production exclude 
households that do not have significant nonfarm income sources.
  Table 4.8 shows the sources of income from rural households based on 
expenditure tercile and farm size. Wages play a significant role as a source 
of income in all terciles, but their contribution is greater among the poor (47 
percent) than among the middle and upper terciles (less than 39 percent). 
Similarly, wheat is much more important to poor and middle-tercile house-
holds (13 percent) than to upper-tercile households (3 percent). This is not 
surprising given the position of wheat as the main staple food. In contrast, 
rice, cotton, livestock, and “other income” are more important sources of 
income for households in the upper terciles. Fruit and vegetable income is 
more important to the poorest and richest terciles compared to the middle 
tercile. This may reflect differences between commercial production and 
backyard horticultural production for households’ own consumption.
  Looking at the right-hand side of Table 4.8, we see that landless house-
holds are the poorest; their per capita income of LE 700 is 13 percent lower 
than the average rural income. Not surprisingly, large-scale farms benefit 
from the land they own, earning a per capita income that is more than 70 
percent above the rural average. However, it is interesting to note that 
medium-sized farms have per capita incomes that are slightly lower than the 
incomes of small-scale farms.
  As expected, households with no land or small farms earn the highest 
share of their income from wages and nonfarm businesses. Small farms also 
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.earn a relatively large share of their incomes from rice production (28 percent 
compared to 21 percent and 17 percent for medium and large farms, respec-
tively) and from “other crops.” Large-scale farms earn a relatively large share 
of their incomes from wheat and cotton and from crops in general. Livestock 
and fruit and vegetable income seem to be more important among medium-
sized farms. These results highlight the fact that small farmers should not be 
considered synonymous with poor rural households, particularly in a country 
where agroecological potential and cropping intensity vary widely.
Household Consumption Patterns
Table 4.9 reports average household consumption expenditures and patterns 
for different types of households. At the national level, the per capita consump-
tion expenditure is LE 1,783 per year.6 Household decisions on the allocation 
of resources to food spending and other needs have widespread implications 
for well-being. The food share in total household budgets at the national 
level is 57 percent. Urban and nonfarm households spend lower proportions of 
their total expenditures on food consumption (about 53 percent), while rural 
and farm households spend a larger share on food (62–64 percent). The results 
are consistent with the international patterns, whereby low-income house-
holds spend a larger share of their budgets on food while richer households 
spend a larger portion on nonfood items. Food, clothing, and footwear appear 
to be necessities in the sense that their budget shares decline as income 
rises, while education, health, recreation, and other things are luxuries in 
the sense that their budget shares rise with income.
  It is interesting to note that the food consumption patterns are not closely 
related to the crops grown. For example, wheat farmers do not consume 
more wheat products, and rice farmers consume no more rice than other 
farmers. This is a sign of the relatively commercial orientation of Egyptian 
farmers and relatively low transaction costs, presumably due to the high 
population density in settled areas. It is further supported by the fact that 
almost all farmers are either net buyers or net sellers; few produce only for 
their own consumption without buying or selling.
The Impact of Commodity Price Changes on Poverty
To understand the effects on household incomes and poverty on agricultural 
price changes, we simulated the effect for several crops that are important in 
6 The estimated consumption expenditure in the Egypt Integrated Household Survey is greater than 
the estimated net income. This is a common pattern in household survey data and is probably 
caused by underreporting of income. In the analysis that follows, we assume that the composition 
of income is accurate, implying similar levels of underreporting for different types of income.
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AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN EGYPT  83   Egypt. We focused on wheat, rice, cotton, fruits and vegetables, and sugarcane 
because they are the most important tradable agricultural commodities in the 
country. First we computed the consumption expenditure of each household 
and the percentage of these households in poverty. Next we simulated the 
effect on households’ incomes resulting from an increase in producer prices 
and consumer prices, taking each household’s production and consumption of 
each crop into account. Adding the change in income to initial consumption 
expenditures (under the assumption that all the change is spent on consump-
tion), we computed a new per capita consumption expenditure level for each 
household and recomputed the average income and poverty measures for 
different types of households.7 We used the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty 
measures, as follows:
•   the headcount index (incidence), which is the proportion of people below 
the poverty line;
•   the poverty gap index (intensity), which is the average shortfall of the 
income of the poor from the poverty line, averaged over the whole popula-
tion; and
•   the severity index, which addresses the inequality of incomes among the 
poor.
The short-run simulation holds production and consumption quantities fixed at 
their initial levels, while the long-run simulation allows producers and consum-
ers to respond to price changes based on plausible price elasticities. The simu-
lation method is described in more detail in the appendix to this chapter.
Wheat
Egypt’s wheat sector has been partially liberalized since 1987. Devaluation 
has brought local prices closer to international wheat prices. Under the 
Agricultural Reform Programme, wheat area restrictions, quotas, and fixed 
procurement prices have been removed. Egypt continues to encourage the 
expansion of acreage and the use of newly developed high-yielding wheat 
varieties. Within the past two decades, wheat production has tripled. Despite 
these efforts to increase local wheat production, Egypt continues to import 
wheat. International wheat prices are volatile and are affected by changes in 
the cost of ocean freight, while domestic prices are subject to stabilization 
measures. Household characteristics with respect to wheat production, con-
sumption, and net sales are shown in Table 4.10. Almost all Egyptian house-
holds (97 percent) consume wheat products, and 12 percent grow wheat. 
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7 Note that this method does not take into account the fact that price changes could induce a 
farmer to start growing a new crop or stop growing an old one.Even among rural households, fewer than one-quarter of the households grow 
wheat. Nationally, 89 percent are net buyers, while only 8 percent are net 
sellers, but about two-thirds of wheat farmers are net sellers.
  Nationally, the annual expenditure of wheat-producing households aver-
ages LE 11,104 per household.8 The simulation results indicated that a price 
increase of 10 percent will raise the average net earnings of wheat-producing 
households by LE 66 in the short run and LE 68 in the long run. The reason 
these figures are so small is that, on average, wheat accounts for only 7 
percent of the income of wheat farmers (see Table 4.7). Furthermore, many 
wheat farmers buy wheat products, so the net gain from higher prices is 
reduced. One-third of the wheat farmers are actually net buyers of wheat; 
these deficit wheat farmers lose when rice prices increase.
  As shown in Table 4.11, the poverty rate among wheat growers is 30 per-
cent. A 40 percent increase in the wheat price will have negligible effects on 
the poverty rate among wheat farmers in the short run because wheat does 
not represent a major source of income for many of them and because some 
of them purchase wheat products. In the long run, wheat farmers will expand 
their output and substitute away from wheat consumption, so their gains will 
be greater. A 40 percent price increase will bring down the poverty rate from 
30 percent to 27 percent in the long run. Increases in wheat prices will have 
small and nonlinear effects on the depth and severity of poverty among wheat 
farmers.
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Table 4.10  Percentage of households in Egypt that were producers and 
consumers of wheat, 1998
 National  Urban  Rural
Household activity  average  households  households
Percentage of households that
  Produced wheat  12.0  2.0  23.5
  Consumed wheat products  97.2  97.9  96.4
  Were net buyers of wheat  88.6  96.3  79.7
  Were net sellers of wheat  8.2  1.6  15.9
  Were self-sufficient  3.2  2.1  4.4
Percentage of wheat farmers who
  Were net buyers of wheat  31.3  19.5  32.5
  Were net sellers of wheat  68.7  80.5  67.5
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
8 Average household consumption expenditures may differ slightly from those shown in Table 4.8 
due to the removal of households with incomplete data for the simulations.Rice
Rice is a preferred foodgrain among many Egyptians, and a large segment of 
the population in Egypt consumes rice. Rice production occurs mostly along 
the lower Nile, in about 10 percent of the agricultural area of Egypt. Egypt 
has recently been a net rice exporter. In 2005, rice production was 6.3 million 
metric tons, while domestic consumption was only 3.5 million metric tons. 
According to the Egypt Integrated Household Survey, more than 90 percent 
of households consume rice nationally, but only 5 percent grow rice (Table 
4.12). Among rice farmers, almost 90 percent are net sellers.
  The percentage of rural households that grow rice and are poor is some-
what higher than the corresponding figure among wheat growers, as shown 
in Table 4.13. A 10 percent increase in rice prices will lead to an average 
income increase of LE 272 in the short run and LE 277 in the long run. The 
gains among rice growers of a 10 percent price increase will be much greater 
than the gains among wheat growers because rice accounts for a larger share 
of rice growers’ income and because a smaller share of rice growers are net 
buyers (only 10 percent).
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Table 4.11  Estimated effects of increased wheat prices on 
poverty among wheat growers in Egypt
Category  Short run  Long run
Base expenditure (LE/household/year)  11,104  11,104
Change in income following a 10% wheat price rise   66  82
    (LE/household/year) 
Incidence of poverty (P0)
  Base  0.30  0.30
  10% increase in wheat price  0.30  0.30
  20% increase in wheat price  0.30  0.29
  30% increase in wheat price  0.30  0.28
  40% increase in wheat price  0.30  0.27
Depth of poverty (P1)
  Base  0.075  0.075
  10% increase in wheat price  0.073  0.072
  20% increase in wheat price  0.074  0.069
  30% increase in wheat price  0.075  0.066
  40% increase in wheat price  0.076  0.074
Severity of poverty (P2)
  Base  0.028  0.028
  10% increase in wheat price  0.027  0.026
  20% increase in wheat price  0.027  0.025
  30% increase in wheat price  0.028  0.024
  40% increase in wheat price  0.028  0.023
Source:   Simulation results based on data from the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey.
Note:   LE, Egyptian £.AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN EGYPT  87   
Table 4.12  Percentage of households in Egypt that were 
producers and consumers of rice, 1998
 National  Urban  Rural
Household activity  average  households  households
Percentage of households that
  Produced rice  5.4  0.7  10.9
  Consumed rice products  90.8  93.6  87.6
  Were net buyers of rice  84.9  92.2  76.5
  Were net sellers of rice  4.9  0.4  13.5
  Were self-sufficient  10.2  7.4  10.0
Percentage of rice farmers who
  Were net buyers of rice  10.2  37.7  8.2
  Were net sellers of rice  89.8  62.3  91.8
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Table 4.13  Estimated effects of increased rice prices on 
poverty among rice growers in Egypt
Category  Short run  Long run
Base expenditure (LE/household/year)  11,861  11,861
Change in income following a 10% rice price increase   272  277
    (LE/household/year) 
Incidence of poverty (P0)
  Base  0.34  0.34
  10% increase in rice price  0.32  0.32
  20% increase in rice price  0.30  0.30
  30% increase in rice price  0.29  0.29
  40% increase in rice price  0.28  0.27
Depth of poverty (P1)
  Base  0.078  0.078
  10% increase in rice price  0.072  0.072
  20% increase in rice price  0.067  0.067
  30% increase in rice price  0.062  0.061
  40% increase in rice price  0.058  0.056
Severity of poverty (P2)
  Base  0.029  0.029
  10% increase in rice price  0.026  0.026
  20% increase in rice price  0.024  0.023
  30% increase in rice price  0.021  0.021
  40% increase in rice price  0.019  0.018
Source:   Simulation results based on data from the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey.
Note:   LE, Egyptian £.  A 40 percent price increase will reduce the poverty rate among rice-
producing households from 34 percent to 28 percent in the short run and to 
27 percent in the long run. Higher rice prices will also reduce the depth and 
severity of poverty among rice growers.
Cotton
Cotton is one of the main agricultural exports of Egypt (along with fruits and 
vegetables). The crop is also important in terms of employment; among farm-
ers, 10 percent produce cotton, and it is estimated that cotton production 
employs up to 1 million farm workers. Moreover, Egypt’s exports of textiles 
and clothing products amounted to US$516 million in 2003, while its imports 
were US$279 million.
  Table 4.14 shows the effect of cotton price increases of 10 percent to 40 
percent on different measures of poverty among cotton growers. In the base 
scenario, 32 percent of cotton farmers are living below the poverty line, slightly 
higher than the rate among wheat farmers and slightly below the rate among 
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Table 4.14  Estimated effects of increased cotton prices on 
poverty among cotton growers in Egypt
Category  Short run  Long run
Base expenditure (LE/household/year)  11,653  11,653
Change in income caused by a 10% cotton price rise 
    (LE/household/year)  306  310
Incidence of poverty (P0)
  Base  0.32  0.32
  10% increase in cotton price  0.30  0.30
  20% increase in cotton price  0.27  0.27
  30% increase in cotton price  0.26  0.26
  40% increase in cotton price  0.26  0.25
Depth of poverty (P1)
  Base  0.091  0.091
  10% increase in cotton price  0.085  0.084
  20% increase in cotton price  0.079  0.079
  30% increase in cotton price  0.074  0.073
  40% increase in cotton price  0.069  0.068
Severity of poverty (P2)
  Base  0.039  0.039
  10% increase in cotton price  0.036  0.036
  20% increase in cotton price  0.034  0.033
  30% increase in cotton price  0.031  0.031
  40% increase in cotton price  0.029  0.028
Source:   Simulation results based on data from the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey.
Note:   LE, Egyptian £.rice farmers. According to the simulation analysis, a 10 percent increase in the 
cotton price will raise the average household income among cotton growers 
by LE 306 in the short run and LE 310 in the long run.
  A 40 percent increase in cotton prices will bring the poverty rate down to 
26 percent in the short run and 25 percent in the long run. This represents 
about a 16 percent reduction in the poverty level among cotton farmers. 
There will be even larger relative falls in the depth and intensity of poverty 
among cotton growers.
Fruits and Vegetables
During two decades (1982–2002), the total production of vegetables increased 
from 8.6 million to 16.2 million tons, an annual growth rate of 3.9 percent. 
The growth rate for fruits was almost 5 percent annually. In terms of area 
shares, fruit and vegetable production represented about 20 percent of the 
cropped area in 2000/01, while cereals occupied 47 percent of the area.
  Table 4.15 indicates that more than 95 percent of households consume 
fruits and vegetables. Expenditures on fruits and vegetables account for 6 per-
cent of total consumption and over 10 percent of food consumption expendi-
tures nationally, according to the Egypt Integrated Household Survey. About 
3 percent of all Egyptian households grow fruits and vegetables, while the 
figure is 6 percent among rural households. Almost two-thirds of horticultural 
growers are net sellers of fruits and vegetables, while more than one-third 
are net buyers.
  According to Table 4.16, the annual average household consumption 
expenditures of these households are LE 12,743. The incidence of poverty 
among fruit and vegetable growers is 29 percent, somewhat lower than the 
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN EGYPT  89   
Table 4.15  Percentage of households in Egypt that were producers and 
consumers of fruits and vegetables, 1998
 National  Urban  Rural
Household activity  average  households  households
Percentage of households that
  Produced fruits and vegetables  3.0  0.7  5.8
  Consumed fruits and vegetables  96.8  97.6  95.9
  Were net buyers of fruits and vegetables  94.9  96.9  92.5
  Were net sellers of fruits and vegetables  1.9  0.6  3.5
  Were self-sufficient  3.2  2.5  4.0
Percentage of fruit and vegetable farmers who
  Were net buyers of fruits and vegetables  35.2  10.6  38.5
  Were net sellers of fruits and vegetables  63.6  89.4  60.1
Source:   1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.figures related to other crops considered here. The results of the simulation 
analysis indicate that a 10 percent increase in fruit and vegetable prices 
will increase the net income of growers by LE 164 in the short run and LE 
167 in the long run. A price increase of 40 percent will reduce the poverty 
rate among fruit and vegetable producers from 29 to 24 percent in both the 
short- and the long-run scenarios. This price increase will reduce the depth 
and intensity of poverty by 20–30 percent of the original values.
Sugarcane
The total production of sugar increased from 649,000 metric tons in 1982 to 
1.4 million metric tons in 2000, reflecting an annual growth of 4.4 percent. 
The government continues to promote both cane and beet sugar production. 
However, given the extreme competition for Egypt’s limited land and water 
resources, the area under sugarcane cultivation is not expected to increase. 
The new sugar policy is aimed at promoting beet sugar production by estab-
lishing three new sugar beet milling facilities.
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Table 4.16  Estimated effects of increased fruit and vegetable 
prices on poverty among fruit and vegetable growers in Egypt
Category  Short run  Long run
Base expenditure (LE/household/year)  12,743  12,743
Change in income caused by a 10% price rise for   164  167
    fruits and vegetables (LE/household/year) 
Incidence of poverty (P0)
  Base  0.29  0.29
  10% increase in prices  0.26  0.26
  20% increase in prices  0.25  0.25
  30% increase in prices  0.24  0.24
  40% increase in prices  0.24  0.24
Depth of poverty (P1)
  Base  0.085  0.085
  10% increase in prices  0.081  0.081
  20% increase in prices  0.076  0.076
  30% increase in prices  0.073  0.072
  40% increase in prices  0.069  0.068
Severity of poverty (P2)
  Base  0.038  0.038
  10% increase in prices  0.035  0.035
  20% increase in prices  0.032  0.032
  30% increase in prices  0.029  0.029
  40% increase in prices  0.027  0.026
Source:   Simulation results based on data from the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey.
Note:   LE, Egyptian £.  Egypt is a major importer of sugar. Roughly one-third of the sugar to meet 
consumption needs is imported; the remainder comes from domestic produc-
tion. Egypt continues to subsidize sugar consumption under the rationing 
system, albeit at a decreasing rate. As a long-term plan, the government is 
making efforts to cut the cost of the sugar program by reducing the amount 
of sugar available through the ration system.
  Although the proportion of households that grows sugarcane is barely 1 
percent, all households that produce a sugar crop are net sellers (Table 4.17). 
The local effect could be larger, however, because sugarcane growers are con-
centrated in the rural part of Upper Egypt. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
sugarcane farmers tend to be more specialized than growers of other crops, 
earning almost one-third of their incomes from sugarcane. Sugarcane-producing 
households have per capita incomes significantly below the national average, 
and their poverty rate is 63 percent, far above the rural average of 41 percent.
  As shown in Table 4.18, the incidence of poverty among sugarcane growers 
is 63 percent, far higher than the rate among growers of other major crops. 
A 10 percent increase in the producer price of sugarcane will raise the net 
average incomes of sugarcane growers by LE 461 in the short run and LE 468 in 
the long run. A 40 percent increase in sugarcane prices will result in a marked 
drop in poverty among sugarcane growers, from 63 percent to 43 percent. 
Overall, the long-run simulation results indicate that there will be a slightly 
greater poverty reduction than do the results of the short-run simulation. The 
depth and severity of poverty among sugarcane-producing households will also 
decline with higher prices. The reason for the strong relationship between 
sugarcane prices and the poverty rate among sugarcane growers is that these 
households derive a large share of their incomes from this crop.
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Table 4.17  Percentage of households in Egypt that were producers of 
sugarcane and consumers of sugar, 1998
 National  Urban  Rural
Household activity  average  households  households
Percentage of households that
  Produced a sugar crop  1.3  0.0  2.7
  Consumed sugar  91.7  91.7  96.4
  Were net buyers of sugar  90.0  91.1  88.7
  Were net sellers of sugar  1.3  0.0  2.7
  Were self-sufficient  8.7  8.9  8.6
Percentage of sugar crop farmers who
  Were net buyers of sugar  0  —  0
  Were net sellers of sugar  100  —  100
Source:   1997/98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Note:   —, data not available.Table 4.18  Estimated effects of increased sugarcane prices on 
poverty among sugarcane growers in Egypt
Category  Short run  Long run
Base expenditure (LE/household/year)  7,533  7,533
Change in income caused by a 10% sugarcane price   461  468
    rise (LE/household/year) 
Incidence of poverty (P0)
  Base  0.63  0.63
  10% increase in sugarcane price  0.55  0.53
  20% increase in sugarcane price  0.53  0.53
  30% increase in sugarcane price  0.48  0.45
  40% increase in sugarcane price  0.43  0.43
Depth of poverty (P1)
  Base  0.145  0.145
  10% increase in sugarcane price  0.119  0.118
  20% increase in sugarcane price  0.095  0.093
  30% increase in sugarcane price  0.073  0.070
  40% increase in sugarcane price  0.055  0.051
Severity of poverty (P2)
  Base  0.044  0.044
  10% increase in sugarcane price  0.031  0.031
  20% increase in sugarcane price  0.022  0.021
  30% increase in sugarcane price  0.015  0.014
  40% increase in sugarcane price  0.010  0.009
Source:   Simulation results based on data from the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey.
Note:   LE, Egyptian £.
The Impact of Crop Price Increases on Overall Poverty
Until this point we have estimated the impact of raising the price of each 
individual crop on the growers of that crop. In this section we estimate the 
impact of raising the price of each crop on the rural, urban, and overall 
population, including both growers and nongrowers. In the interest of brevity 
and because the overall effects are small, we focus on the impact on the inci-
dence of poverty and on the simulation of 40 percent increases in the price of 
each crop. The results of these simulations are shown in Table 4.19.
  According to our analysis, a 40 percent increase in the price of wheat will 
increase poverty slightly in the short run and decrease it slightly in the long 
run. This implies that a significant number of net buying wheat growers will 
respond to the higher prices by expanding their output and becoming surplus 
growers. Interestingly, similar patterns will hold in both rural and urban areas. 
This reflects the high population density in the Nile Valley, resulting in wheat 
farmers’ living in settlements large enough to be considered urban. It is sur-
prising that higher wheat prices would (slightly) reduce poverty in the long 
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help explain this result: (1) net sellers are poorer than net buyers, (2) the 
gains to the average net seller will be larger than the losses to the average 
net buyer, and (3) some net buyers will become net sellers in response to the 
higher wheat prices.
  The effect of rice price increases on the poverty rate in Egypt will be quite 
small. A 40 percent increase in rice prices will raise the urban poverty rate 
by 1 percentage point. It will have this effect because urban rice consumers 
will be adversely affected by the higher price, but the effect will be small 
because rice represents just 2.4 percent of the budgets of urban households. 
Rice farmers will gain, but not by enough to noticeably affect the rural pov-
erty rate. This is because, as discussed earlier, rice farmers account for just 
11 percent of the rural population. The negative effect on urban households 
will be sufficiently large to raise the national poverty rate by 1 percentage 
point.
  A 40 percent increase in cotton prices will reduce the rural poverty rate 
by 1 percentage point but will have no noticeable effect on the urban or 
national poverty rate. Again, the small effect is explained by the fact that 
cotton growers represent only 4.2 percent of all households nationally.
  A 40 percent increase in fruit and vegetable prices will cause the urban 
poverty rate to rise 1 percentage point (recall that fruits and vegetables 
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Table 4.19  Estimated effects of increased commodities prices on poverty 
in Egypt
  Poverty rate (%)
 Urban  Rural  National
    Short- Long-    Short- Long-    Short- Long-
Simulation  Base term term Base term term Base term term
40% increase in wheat price  36  37  35  41  43  40  38  39  37
40% increase in rice price  36  37  37  41  41  41  38  39  39
40% increase in cotton price  36  36  36  41  40  40  38  38  38
40% increase in fruit and 
  vegetable price  36  37  37  41  42  42  38  39  39
40% increase in sugar price  36  36  36  41  40  40  38  38  38
40% increase in prices of 
  wheat, rice, cotton, 
  fruits and vegetables, 
  and sugar  36  38  n.c.  41  42  n.c.  38  40  n.c.
Source:   Simulation results based on data from the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey.
Note:   The long-term effect of increasing all five prices is not calculated (n.c.) because of un-
certainty regarding the cross-price elasticities of supply.account for 6 percent of urban budgets). Interestingly, the higher fruit and 
vegetable prices will also cause rural poverty rates to rise slightly, suggesting 
that the rural poor are more likely to be net buyers of horticultural produce 
than net sellers. At the national level, the poverty rate will increase about 1 
percentage point.
  A 40 percent increase in sugarcane prices will reduce rural poverty by 1 
percentage point but have no measurable effect on urban poverty. Because 
sugar-producing households are such a small part of the national population, 
the effect of higher sugar prices on overall poverty will be negligible.
  Finally we estimate the effect of a simultaneous 40 percent increase in 
the prices of wheat, rice, cotton, fruits and vegetables, and sugar. In the 
short run, the incidence of poverty will increase by 2 percentage points in 
urban areas and 1 percentage point in rural areas. At the national level, pov-
erty will rise by 2 percentage points. The rise in urban poverty is expected, 
but it is somewhat surprising that rural poverty will also increase, albeit by a 
very small margin. The implication is that many of the poor are net buyers of 
agricultural commodities in Egypt. The importance of wages in rural income 
is undoubtedly an important factor in explaining this result.
Summary
In the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural policy in Egypt intervened heavily in 
production, marketing, and trade. A policy of import-substitution industrializa-
tion meant that the agricultural sector was heavily taxed through low official 
prices and compulsory sales. At the same time, some commodities were pro-
tected by import restrictions. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, Egypt gradually 
liberalized its agricultural markets and reduced its level of import protection. 
Wheat markets remained distorted by a combination of import controls, fixed 
producer prices, consumer subsidies on certain types of bread, and govern-
ment control over the channels leading to subsidized bread. In 2004 a series 
of significant tariff reductions was implemented, leading the World Bank 
to declare that Egypt had made more progress in trade liberalization than 
almost any other country. Even so, the degree of protection there is higher 
than in 40 percent of the countries of the world.
  Full global trade liberalization would increase the prices of agricultural 
commodities by 5–15 percent. This would probably negatively affect the 
Egyptian economy because it is a net agricultural importer, though the exact 
effect would depend on the price changes for each commodity. Egypt would 
gain from higher rice and cotton prices but lose from higher wheat and maize 
prices. Domestic trade reform would reduce the domestic prices of imported 
commodities such as wheat, thus partially offsetting the adverse effect of 
global trade liberalization, as well as providing efficiency gains.
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tian households based on the 1997–98 Egypt Integrated Household Survey and 
estimate the effects of changes in the prices of five agricultural commodities 
on incomes and poverty rates among Egyptian households. Such price changes 
might arise from changes in world market prices or from changes in border or 
subsidy policies within Egypt.
  Overall, our results show that price changes can have a significant effect 
on poverty among the producers of specific crops, but these price changes 
will not have a large impact on overall rates of poverty. We simulated the 
effect of a 40 percent increase in the price of each commodity, which repre-
sents the upper limit of the effect of global trade liberalization, as follows:9
•   For wheat, a 40 percent increase in the price will lower national poverty 
by 1 percentage point.
•   For rice and horticultural produce, a 40 percent increase in the prices will 
raise national poverty by 1 percentage point.
•   For cotton and sugar, a 40 percent increase in the prices will have a neg-
ligible effect (less than 0.5 percent) on national poverty.
•   A 40 percent increase in the prices of all five product categories will result 
in higher poverty in urban and rural areas, though the increase will be just 
1–2 percentage points.
  One implication of this analysis is that agricultural trade policy is a 
relatively ineffective policy instrument for assisting poor rural households. 
Another interesting result is that, although wheat is the most politically sensi-
tive agricultural commodity in Egypt, the effect of wheat protection on pov-
erty is small even among wheat farmers themselves. This is because wheat 
farmers are not particularly poor (they are somewhat better off than the 
average rural household), because their incomes are fairly diversified (wheat 
accounts for only 8.5 percent of their incomes), and because many other 
households in urban and rural areas are net buyers. For example, almost 80 
percent of rural households are net buyers of wheat. Although policy deci-
sions take into account a wide range of factors not considered here, this 
analysis should at least weaken the poverty alleviation argument for a wheat 
protection policy.
  Finally, the analysis suggests that some of the poorest households in Egypt 
are those that are involved in farming but do not own land. These households 
include agricultural laborers and tenants who cultivate land owned by others. 
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9 At the same time, this simulation represents an underestimate of the impact of the global 
price crisis of 2007–08.Agricultural trade policy can influence the well-being of these households 
only indirectly through the labor market.
  This analysis is based on household survey data from 1997–98, more than 
10 years ago. It is worth asking how this analysis might be affected if we used 
more recent household survey data. The share of the population in urban areas 
increased from 36 percent in the survey to 43 percent in 2006. This suggests 
that the share of farm households in the population has declined, in which case 
the actual effect of higher food prices is somewhat more negative than has 
been indicated by the analysis presented here. At the same time, per capita 
income has grown about 30 percent since the survey was carried out.10 Because 
the share of income allocated to food declines as income rises (particularly for 
staple foods such as wheat), this implies that the adverse impact of higher food 
prices will actually be smaller than indicated by our analysis. Because these 
two effects offset each other, we believe that repeating this analysis with more 
recent household survey data would yield very similar results.
Appendix 4A: Methods for Estimating the Impact of Trade 
Liberalization on Egypt
Data
In our analysis we used the Egypt Integrated Household Survey carried out 
by the International Food Policy Research Institute in coordination with the 
Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and the Ministry of 
Trade and Supply. The nationally representative survey provides information 
on income and expenditures, as well as on many household characteristics, 
including housing, landownership, education, employment, health and nutri-
tion, access to facilities, migration, and credit and savings. The sample con-
sisted of 2,500 households in 20 urban and rural governorates; the fieldwork 
took place during the first half of 1997. For this particular analysis, a sub-
sample of 2,452 households has been used because the data on the rest of the 
households in the full sample are incomplete or missing. With this representa-
tive sample it is possible to examine the average characteristics of the poor 
at the national level and also through several dichotomous breakdowns, such 
as by urban-rural residence or residence in Upper or Lower Egypt.
Questionnaire and Sample Design
The questionnaire was divided into male and female components to reduce 
the time required to fill in the questionnaire. In the typical case, the male 
96  CHAPTER 4
10 As shown in Table 1.1, per capita GDP grew 2.4 percent per year over 2000–06. Eleven years 
of growth at this rate yields an overall increase of 30 percent.questionnaire was administered by a male interviewer to the male head of 
household (who, it is assumed, knows the most about nonfood household 
expenses); similarly, the female questionnaire was administered by a female 
interviewer to (most typically) the wife of the head of the household (who, it 
is assumed, knows more about household eating habits and food expenses). 
The male questionnaire contains most of the sections that deal with sources 
of income and large expenses, while the female questionnaire contains the 
sections focusing on information and expenditures related to tending to the 
household, including eating patterns, health care, and smaller, more frequent 
expenses.
  The questionnaire was administered to 2,500 households from 20 gover-
norates using a two-stage, stratified selection process. The sample frame 
used for the selection process was supplied by the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and was based on the 1986 Egypt cen-
sus and a 1993 listing of households in selected primary sampling units. This 
sample frame is used by CAPMAS as a master sample for most of its survey work. 
It consists of 492 sampling units, 296 of which are urban, while 196 are rural.
Income Calculation
Income was calculated as the sum of net revenues from the following sources: 
crop production, livestock production, wages, nonfarm enterprises, transfers, 
and other income. The net income from each crop was calculated as the 
value of production minus the cost of production. It covers all commodities, 
including by-products and home consumption. Crop production expenses (for 
seeds, fertilizer, chemical insecticides, labor, utilities, storage, transporta-
tion, equipment rental, and other items) were deducted to derive net crop 
income. Payments to landlords were also excluded from income. Livestock 
income included income for all types of animals and by-products. Livestock pro-
duction expenses (for feeds, veterinary services, and labor) were deducted 
to derive net livestock income. Meat home consumption was also included as 
part of income. Because of uncertainty about how to calculate wage rates 
accurately among family members, no value was imputed for the family labor 
involved in crop and livestock production.
  Net revenues from nonfarm enterprises were based on gross revenues 
minus the operating costs over the past 12 months. Wage income was cal-
culated as the sum of annual earnings in wages for the main job; cash and 
in-kind wages were also examined for each household member. Transfers 
were derived as the net value of cash and in-kind transfers received and sent. 
Other income covered rents (cash and in-kind) received through ownership of 
assets such as housing, land, and equipment, along with interest, dividends, 
and pensions.
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN EGYPT  97   Methods
We used the data from the Egypt Integrated Household Survey to estimate the 
short- and long-run impact of changes in agricultural prices. In the absence 
of reliable estimates of the impact of multilateral and unilateral trade lib-
eralization on agricultural prices in Egypt, we simulated the impact of four 
price increases (10, 20, 30, and 40 percent) for each commodity of interest. 
Most analyses of the impact of multilateral trade liberalization suggest that 
agricultural prices would rise 5–20 percent, well within the range of price 
increases considered here. We simulated the impact of changes in the price 
of wheat, rice, sugar, cotton, and fruits and vegetables. The global markets 
for wheat, rice, sugar, and cotton are among the most distorted, so we would 
expect trade liberalization to have the largest effect on the world prices of 
these commodities. In addition, these four commodities are important in the 
agricultural economy of Egypt as sources of income (wheat, rice, and cotton) 
and as components of the diet (wheat, rice, and sugar). The global markets 
for fruits and vegetables are not highly distorted, but fruit and vegetable 
exports from Egypt (and other countries in the region) to the E.U. are con-
strained by strict quality and food safety standards, as well as by seasonal 
restrictions to prevent competition with European growers. For this reason, 
we also simulated the impact on Egyptian households of improved market 
access to European fruit and vegetable markets, represented by increases in 
the prices for fruits and vegetables in Egypt.
  In this analysis we simulated both the short-run and the long-run impacts 
of higher agricultural prices on each household in the Egypt Integrated House-
hold Survey. The short-run impact refers to the effect on household welfare 
before households have had an opportunity to respond to the higher prices by 
producing more or consuming less. The change in per capita income of house-
hold i after the price change in one commodity, say wheat, can be calculated 
as follows:
 1  Δ yi = ——— [(QpiΔP) – (QciΔP)], (1)
  Hi
where Δyi is the change in per capita income of household i after the price 
increase, Hi is the number of members in household i, Qpi is the production
of the commodity by household i,  ΔP is the increase in the price of the
commodity, and Qci is the quantity of wheat consumed by household i. In 
graphic terms, this expression is the rectangular approximation of producer 
surplus plus consumer surplus. If a household does not grow wheat, Qpi = 0, 
and the direct effect of higher wheat prices will be negative; the magnitude 
will depend on the importance of wheat products in the household budget. 
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wheat production compared to the value of wheat consumption.
  In the long run, farmers and consumers will respond to the higher prices 
by growing more and consuming less of the commodity, say wheat. The long-
run effect can be estimated as follows:
 1  1  Qpi 1  Qci
 Δ yi = ——— [(QpiΔP) + (—— (ΔP)2εS ———) – (QciΔP) – (—— (ΔP)2εD ——— )], (2)
  Hi 2  P 2  P
where εS is the supply elasticity of the commodity and εD is the price elastic-
ity of demand for the commodity. In graphic terms, this expression is the 
trapezoidal approximation of the producer surplus plus the consumer surplus. 
The two terms with elasticities are positive regardless of whether the price 
change is positive or negative, implying that the long-term welfare effect of 
a price change is more positive (or less negative) than the short-term effect. 
In the absence of estimated supply and demand elasticities for the four com-
modities, we use 0.3 for the supply elasticities and –0.3 for the price elastici-
ties of demand.
  Because the welfare impact is calculated for each household in the Egypt 
Integrated Household Survey sample based on the income and consumption 
patterns of each household, we can estimate the change in the poverty 
measures caused by the change in prices. This microsimulation approach also 
allows us to estimate the change in income for any subgroup of households 
that is defined by income, farm size, or another variable. In this analysis we 
used the class of poverty measures identified by Foster, Greer, and Thor-
becke (1984), defined as follows:
 1  μ – yi  P α = —— Σ[—————— ]
α
, (3)
  N  i  μ
where Pα is the poverty measure, N is the number of households, μ is the 
poverty line, and yi is the income or expenditure of poor household i (the 
summation occurs only on poor households). When α = 0, the poverty measure 
P0 is the incidence of poverty, that is, the proportion of households whose 
incomes are below the poverty line. When α = 1, the poverty measure P1 
indicates the depth of poverty, taking into account the degree of poverty, 
as well as the percentage of households that are poor. If α = 2, the measure 
P2 indicates the severity of poverty, incorporating information on the degree 
of inequality among poor households as well as the depth of poverty and the 
number of poor households.
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Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Tunisia
T
unisia is a small country (10 million inhabitants) endowed with few 
natural resources. In spite of these constraints, the country has diver-
sified its economy through important investments in the agricultural, 
mining, energy, tourism, and manufacturing sectors. Growth in tourism and 
increased trade have been key elements in the economy’s steady growth, 
although tourism has slowed since the September 11, 2001, attack.
  Per capita GDP grew at a healthy rate (2.9 percent) over the 1990s, reach-
ing over US$2,500 in 2002. This has given Tunisia the third-highest income in 
the MENA region, behind Turkey and Lebanon. About two-thirds of the popu-
lation lives in urban areas.
  Tunisia maintains relatively high tariff barriers. According to the World 
Bank (2005), Tunisia’s simple average tariff rate puts it among the top 1 per-
cent of countries in trade restrictions. There has been some trade liberaliza-
tion, however: the average tariff rate came down from 29 percent in 2000 to 
about 25 percent in 2004. This progress is about average compared to that in 
other countries over the same period.
  Meanwhile, Tunisia has a relatively favorable investment climate. The 
World Bank (2005) rates the investment climate in Tunisia better than that of 
79 percent of the countries in the world. Furthermore, the reforms since 2000 
indicate a degree of progress in the investment climate that is better than 
that in almost three-quarters of the world’s countries. In particular, Tunisia 
has streamlined its procedures for opening and registering new businesses 
and for closing businesses. Tunisia, along with Morocco, has the highest ratio 
of foreign direct investment to GDP, over 3 percent.
Agriculture and Food
The Tunisian economy has undergone significant structural changes, includ-
ing industrialization, the growth of the service sector, and the development 
of tourism. Nonetheless, the agricultural sector remains economically and 
socially important for its contribution to food security, employment, regional 
balance, and social cohesion. The contribution of agriculture and the fisher-
100ies sector has remained in the range of 11–14 percent of GDP since the mid-
1990s. The value added in the food processing sector has remained at around 
3 percent of GDP. Together, these sectors account for about 15 percent of 
GDP (Table 5.1).
  Based on the gross value of output, livestock is the largest component of 
the agricultural sector in Tunisia, representing 36 percent of the total (Table 
5.2). This is followed by fruits and vegetables, which together account for 
about 33 percent of the total. Agricultural production in Tunisia remains vul-
nerable to drought, however, as indicated by the annual variation in the value 
of output. The value of grain and fruit output has been particularly volatile.
  According to a 2004/05 agricultural survey, wheat accounts for 23 per-
cent of the planted area in Tunisia, barley 13 percent, olive trees 32 percent, 
fruit and nut trees 17 percent, forage crops 9 percent, and vegetables 4 
percent. Agriculture in the north is dominated by grains and horticulture, in 
the center by olive production, and in the south by fruit, nuts, and olives. 
Table 5.3 shows the cropping pattern by farm size. The share of cultivated 
area allocated to grains ranges from 32 percent among farms with less than 
5 ha to 45 percent among farms with more than 100 ha, reflecting the fact 
that grains are less labor-intensive than other crops. Hard wheat (used for 
couscous and pasta) represents roughly half the grain area across farm size 
categories, while soft wheat is more important on large farms and barley is 
more important on small farms. Large farms devote a larger share of their 
cropland to hard wheat, soft wheat, and forage crops, while small farmers 
allocate a larger share to barley, vegetables, and tree crops, most of which 
are olive trees (MARH 2006).
  Tunisian exports were US$9.4 billion in 2002. One source of growth in exports 
has been textiles and apparel, which earned US$2.9 billion in 2002. Tunisia 
enjoyed preferential access to European markets as a result of the quota sys-
tem under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. However, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
expired in January 2005, so Tunisian exporters will now compete more directly 
with exporters from Asia, particularly China, India, and Pakistan.
  As discussed in Chapter 3, Tunisian agricultural exports in 2002 were 
about US$500 million, or about 5 percent of total exports. The largest agri-
cultural export over 2000–02 was olive oil, although the value of olive oil 
exports fluctuated considerably over this period. Other important agricultural 
exports include dates, wheat flour, tomato paste, and pasta, reflecting the 
importance of the food processing sector.
  Tunisian imports were worth about US$10 billion in 2002, while agricul-
tural imports were at US$1.2 billion, or 12 percent of the total. As in many 
other MENA countries, wheat is the most important agricultural import. Wheat 
imports account for 60–80 percent of domestic consumption, depending on 
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.the weather and the size of the wheat harvest. Other major agricultural 
imports are maize, barley, soybean cake, cooking oil, and sugar. As in most 
other MENA countries, in Tunisia the value of agricultural imports exceeds the 
value of agricultural exports.
Agricultural and Trade Policy
The implementation of a structural adjustment program for the agricultural 
sector between 1986 and 1996 began the liberalization of Tunisian agricul-
ture, the improvement in the competitiveness of agro-food industries, and 
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Table 5.2  Composition of the Tunisian agricultural sector, 1995–2001
               2001 
               share 
Sector 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  (%)
Overall  2,291 2,986 3,167 3,285 3,684 3,761 3,862 100.0
  Grains  162  650  275  429  460  285  364  9.4
  Fruits  593  647  1,116  810  951  1,119  804  20.8
  Vegetables  389  444  442  515  599  600  462  12.0
  Livestock  898  964  1,091  1,182  1,317  1,379  1,390  36.0
  Fisheries  184  202  241  248  249  273  278  7.2
Sources:   Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture and Central Bank of Tunisia.
Note:   TND, Tunisian dinars.
Value of agricultural production
(millions of TND at nominal prices)
Table 5.3  Share of crop area allocated to different crop categories in 
Tunisia, by farm size (hectares), 2006
 0 –5 5–10 10–20 20–50 50–100  >100 
Crop  ha ha ha ha ha ha  Overall
Grains  31.8 32.8 33.7 37.1 41.3 45.1 36.5
    Hard  wheat 16.9 18.0 18.5 19.3 23.5 22.6 19.3
    Soft  wheat  0.6 1.0 1.0 2.2 3.7  11.3 3.7
    Barley  14.0 13.4 13.8 15.2 14.0 10.4 13.1
    Other  grains  0.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.4
Pulses  1.8 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.6 2.1 1.8
Forages  7.2 6.8 7  7.6 9.6  13.5 8.7
Vegetables  5.5 5.6 3.5 2.4 2.2 1.2 3.7
Industrial  crops  0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5
Tree  crops  53.2 52.4 53.6 51.2 44.4 37.5 48.9
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:   MARH (2006).their adaptation to the qualitative and sanitary requirements of international 
markets. With the exception of activities related to wheat, agricultural pro-
duction activities have been substantially liberalized. Agricultural input sub-
sidies and interest rate subsidies have been practically eliminated. Although 
irrigation water is still subsidized, fees continue to be adjusted. Agricultural 
marketing boards have lost some of their monopoly powers.
Agricultural and Food Policy
Concerning domestic support, Tunisia declared to the WTO a current total 
aggregate measurement of support of zero for the year 2002 relative to a maxi-
mum commitment of 61 million Tunisian dinars (TND 61 million, or US$5.5 mil-
lion) on the following products: durum and soft wheat, barley, milk, olive oil, 
and sugar beets. The support declared for 2002 was de minimis. It consisted of 
fixed producer buying prices for wheat and intervention prices for other prod-
ucts. Tunisia reported that a similar amount was spent on green box measures 
exempt from the reduction commitment; these mostly went toward water and 
soil conservation and forestation programs.
  In addition, Tunisia has declared an additional TND 8.3 million (US$750,000) 
as an irrigation subsidy. In fact, farmers in publicly irrigated areas still pay for 
water at below the real cost. Additionally, farmers and agro-food enterprises 
are entitled to special electricity and diesel tariffs. Tunisia also subsidizes 
exports of agricultural products. These subsidies consist of payments intended 
to reduce the cost of processing and air freight.
Agricultural Pricing Policy
The agricultural and fisheries sector has been subjected to two forms of price 
control: controls on producer prices and controls on prices for agricultural 
inputs. Since 1986, Tunisia has been conducting a program of structural adjust-
ment aimed at reforming the agricultural sector by shifting prices closer to 
those on world markets and reducing producer subsidies. Although subsidies 
on inputs have been removed totally (except for those on water), support for 
agricultural production through investment subsidies remain at a high level 
for some activities (see the next subsection).
  Concerning the control of producer prices, prices for all products are freely 
determined except those for grain and milk, which continue to benefit from 
guaranteed public prices. Instead of supporting farm prices, Tunisian agri-
cultural pricing policy has had the effect of holding farm prices down. When 
domestic production is limited for a given product, mainly for vegetables and 
meats, prices tend to rise. Public authorities implement a set of maximum 
prices on wholesale or retail markets without any compensation to farmers. 
However, when prices are at low levels due to the abundance of local produc-
104  CHAPTER 5tion, no instrument of support for farmers is applied. This policy, intended to 
control inflation, has heavily affected farm incomes during the past few years. 
Small farmers producing vegetables are the most affected by the policy.
Taxation
In addition to tariffs, supplementary taxes are levied on the consumption of a 
whole range of food products, in particular maize and soybean cake, preserved 
food, fruits and vegetables, and fish. The taxes are earmarked for the Fund 
for the Development of Competitiveness in the Agriculture and Fishing Sectors. 
These taxes are applied to locally produced goods, as well as to imports.
  The tax code is used to encourage agricultural development. More specifi-
cally, the investment incentives code includes the following provisions:
•   deduction of amounts invested from taxable profits,
•   exemption from customs duties and the suspension of the value-added tax 
and consumption tax due on imports of capital goods for which there are 
no locally manufactured equivalents,
•   the suspension of the value-added tax on locally manufactured capital goods, 
and
•   the exemption of investments from income tax for 10 years.
  Financial benefits include an (investment) subsidy of 7 percent of the cost 
of the investment (maximum TND 300,000, or US$33,500) and another subsidy 
of 1 percent of the total cost of investment, with a ceiling of TND 5,000, as 
the state’s contribution to project design costs. In 2002, Tunisia spent TND 
91 million (US$8.2 million) through its development programs to encourage 
investment in agriculture by subsidizing the cost of private investment in 
selected activities.
Consumer Food Subsidies
The consumer price for each product for which the producer price is subject 
to administrative control is also controlled. This is particularly true for grains 
and milk. By means of the General Compensation Fund (Caisse Générale de 
Compensation), the Tunisian government has subsidized the consumption of 
basic foodstuffs since 1970. The subsidies have been applied uniformly to 
whoever chooses to buy subsidized products in whatever quantity. The sub-
sidies of the fund have been introduced to satisfy a somewhat contradictory 
host of objectives: (1) stabilization of fluctuating prices for basic products, 
(2) preservation of the purchasing power of underprivileged households, and 
(3) the redistribution of incomes in favor of low-income groups.
  Since 2000, the products covered by the subsidies of the fund are grains 
and products derived from them, vegetable oil, and milk. Although the size of 
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represent about 2 percent of government expenditures (Table 5.4).
  The cereal subsector accounts for the most politically sensitive, complex, 
and costly part of the system of subsidies. Subsidies are injected at three 
levels in the marketing channel: the collection of local production, importa-
tion, and flour milling. The Grain Board (Office des Céréales) manages the 
payment of subsidies in the cereal subsector for the General Compensation 
Fund. The Grain Board has a monopoly on the importation of grains and on 
the collection of locally produced cereals by farmers. Together with the Grain 
Board, two technically private, well-regulated cooperatives work in the name 
of the Grain Board according to the same mechanism. The National Edible 
Oils Board (Office National de Huiles) controls the importation and refining 
of vegetable oil and the subsidies for it. The consumption price of vegetable 
oil is set below cost, and the board is refunded the difference through the 
General Compensation Fund. Presently, the milk subsector represents only 
a small share of the consumption subsidies. This has been the result of the 
development of local production and improvements in the productivity of 
private industry.
Trade Policy
Tunisian authorities use tariffs and NTBs to protect domestic production from 
outside competition. These began to be modified in 1995 with the implemen-
tation of the URAA, but the two instruments are still widely used in Tunisia.
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Table 5.4  Structure and importance of food subsidies in Tunisia, 
1999–2004
Category  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Composition of food subsidies (%)
    Grains  64.2  73.9 80.5 72.5  64.4 70.7
    Oil  29.3  20.4 15.1 23.7  32.6 26.7
    Milk  5.5  5.7 4.4 3.8  3.0 2.5
  Sugar  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Food subsidies/government   2.1  2.0  2.1  1.8  1.7  1.9
    expenditures (%) 
Food  subsidies/GDP  (%)  0.8  0.8 0.8 0.7  0.6 0.7
Subsidies/person  (TND/year)  21.1  19.5 21.0 18.1  17.3 19.4
Source:   Authors’ calculations using data from the Central Bank of Tunisia (2005) and the INS 
(2005).
Notes:   TND, Tunisian dinars. The exchange rate was TND 1.21 per US$1.00 in 1999, TND 1.34 
per US$1.00 in 2000, TND 1.50 per US$1.00 in 2001, TND 1.38 per US$1.00 in 2002, TND 
1.36 per US$1.00 in 2003, and TND 1.25 per US$1.00 in 2004 according to the June 30 
rates at www.oanda.com.  Tunisian customs duties are still among the highest in the world. In fact, 
in 2002 nondiscriminatory duties rose to 34.5 percent, on average, against an 
average rate of 12.8 percent among middle-income countries in the same year. 
The agricultural and food processing sectors continue to be highly protected. 
Because the partnership agreement with the E.U. has bearing only on non-
agricultural and manufactured food products, agricultural trade continues to 
be governed by the commitments that Tunisia has made within the multilat-
eral framework of the WTO. Quantitative restrictions have been converted to 
customs duties, but, as in many member states, bound tariff rates have been 
fixed at very high levels. Although on the eve of the signing of the GATT in 
Marrakech in 1994 nominal protection rose to an average rate of 39 percent and 
46 percent, respectively, for the agricultural and food processing sectors, the 
respective rates rose to 136 percent and 88 percent in 1997. They have been 
reduced through the years in conformity with the agreement on agriculture but 
still remain at very high levels, 89 percent on average for agricultural products 
and 72 percent for agro-industry products (Table 5.5).
  For agricultural and food processing products, the tariffs vary greatly. 
Customs duties and other import taxes are generally high for fruit, forest 
cultivation products, tobacco, meat, dairy products, products derived from 
the processing of cereals, canned foods, and beverages. They are not so 
high for cereals, livestock, oils, and sugar, four categories that, together, 
account for 60 percent of agricultural imports. Nevertheless, Tunisia pre-
served preferential customs duties as part of its proposals for the GATT 
agreements in 1994, which are applied to certain products within the limits 
of quotas set by public authorities. Preferential rates are much lower than 
the bound tariffs (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.5  Nominal protection by major economic activity in Tunisia, 
1995–2003 (percent)
         2002    2003   
  1995  2000  2001  2002  rest of  2003  rest of
Sector E.U.  E.U.  E.U.  E.U.  world  E.U.  world
Agriculture and fishing  39  126  100  98  98  89  89
Manufacturing  43 39 36  33 45 29  42
Other  sectors  11  11 3 3 9  1 3
Total  34 42 36  35 43 31  39
Total, except agriculture 
  and food processing  30  21  16  15  24  12  22
Source:   Chemingui and Lahouel (2006).
Note:   E.U., European Union.  Import operations at preferential tariffs are generally granted to state 
enterprises. Accordingly, wheat, maize, and barley are imported under tariff 
quotas exclusively by the Grain Board, vegetable oil by the National Edible 
Oils Board, and tea and coffee by the Tunisian Trade Board. Special authori-
zation is required to import products subject to tariff quotas. This license is 
issued by the Ministry of Trade. Private operators are rarely able to import 
within the framework of the preferential quotas.
  Effective protection has decreased over time but remains high. It increased 
during the first years of the dismantling of tariffs on European manufactured 
products because of the dismantling sequence, which began with inputs and 
finished products that do not compete with local production. This situation 
has been redressed with the entry of the fourth list of competing products in 
the dismantling phase of customs duties (Table 5.7). Concerning agricultural 
and agro-industrial products, effective protection has followed a declining 
tendency, albeit very limited. In fact, effective protection in this sector 
decreased from 162 percent in 2000 to 108 percent in 2003.
  The monopolies on the importation of certain food and agricultural prod-
ucts by state enterprises (the Grain Board, the Tunisian Trade Board, and the 
National Edible Oils Board) continues to represent the main tool for protec-
tion of the agricultural and food sector in Tunisia. These monopolies cover an 
important share of Tunisian imports. The Tunisian Trade Board maintains the 
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Table 5.6  Tariff rates in and out of quotas, 2005, and use of tariff quotas in 
Tunisia, 2001–04
 Average  Average  Tariff 
 in-quota  out-of-quota  quota
  tariff rate  tariff rate  commitments
Product (%)  (%)  (tons)  2001  2002  2003  2004
Durum wheat  17  73  300,000  100  100  0  0
Soft wheat  17  73  600,000  100  100  85  100
Barley 17  73  200,000  100  100  100  100
Beans 25  60  1,300  0  0  0  0
Sugar 15  42  100,000  100  100  100  228
Shelled almonds  43  60  1,335  70  100  0  0
Tomato concentrate  43  100  155  0  0  0  100
Milk powder  17  76  20,000  10  19  35  43
Butter 35  100  4,000  60  88  48  49
Cheese 27  139  1,500  100  100  100  100
Calves and bullocks  27  82  3,000  0  0  0  97
Bovine meat  27  88  8,000  0  0  0  100
Sheep and goat meat  27  125  380  0  0  0  100
Source:   WTO (2005b).
Note:   The quota use rate refers to the level of imports as a percentage of the quota.
Quota use rate (%)monopoly on importing products considered basic, such as sugar, coffee, tea, 
black pepper, cocoa beans, rice, kidney beans, and dry yeast, as well as some 
fresh and dry fruits and vegetables and tinned foods. For other agricultural 
and food products that might otherwise be freely imported, obtaining autho-
rization (rather than simply a license) makes importation almost impossible. 
Without offering any justification, the Tunisian administration often rejects 
import requests.
  Technical barriers also represent an indirect tool for the protection of 
domestic production. In general, technical barriers aim at verifying the con-
formity of imported products with sanitary and food safety norms. Technical 
control has been consolidated since the accession of Tunisia to the WTO in 
1995. Although it was applied to only around a quarter of the customs catego-
ries in 1994 (37 percent of the value of imports), the percentage of customs 
categories subject to this control rose to more than 30 percent in 2001 (43 
percent of the import value). Most of this increase involved the control of 
consumption goods through certification, but systematic control remains very 
important, applying to almost 14 percent of the imports in terms of customs 
value. It is this kind of control that mostly causes deadline and efficiency 
problems. The sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical standards are legitimate 
under WTO rules and are practiced in most countries, but often technical 
control is used for protectionist ends in Tunisia.
  Customs clearance is another obstacle to importation, particularly for 
imports destined for the local market. Imports of agro-food products that are 
exclusively destined for the domestic market still suffer from long clearance 
delays, estimated at three weeks on average, compared to only a few days in 
other countries.
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Table 5.7  Effective protection in Tunisia, by major economic activity, 1995, 
2000–03 (percent)
       2002    2003
  1995 2000 2001 2002  rest  of  2003  rest  of
Sector  E.U. E.U. E.U. E.U.  world  E.U.  world
Agriculture and fishing  45  162  123  120  118  110  108
Manufacturing  85  68 60 57 92 49 87
Other  sectors  12  15 3 4  11 1 1
Total  41  63 50 49 60 44 54
Total except agriculture   34  30  20  19  34  16  29
  and food processing 
Source:   Institute of Quantitative Studies (2003).
Note:   E.U., European Union.  The tariff equivalent of NTBs provides an indicator of the scale of this 
type of protection. In order to assess this for the main agricultural products 
imported into Tunisia in 1992, Chemingui and Dessus (2001) used the price 
gap approach, which involves comparing local prices and border prices. Of 19 
agricultural and food products studied, 6 were subjected to significant levels 
of NTBs. Sugar had the highest nontariff protection, with a tariff equivalent 
of 28 percent, followed by hard wheat (20 percent). The other protected 
products were barley, soft wheat, vegetable produce, and canned goods.
Trade Agreements
Tunisia is currently involved in many regional trade agreements in addition to 
its commitments under the WTO. Overall, Tunisia has concluded trade agree-
ments with about 60 countries; some of these agreements provide for pref-
erential arrangements. Since its last trade policy reform was implemented in 
1994, Tunisia has signed the WTO agreement, a bilateral agreement with the 
E.U., bilateral agreements with the members of the Arab League, and agree-
ments with Turkey and the European Free Trade Association. All of these 
agreements are classified as FTAs. In what follows we describe the content 
of these trade agreements regarding agricultural products.
The WTO
Tunisia acceded to the GATT in 1990 and has been a member of the WTO since 
March 1995. The commitments of Tunisia emerging from the Uruguay Round 
involve binding 4,005 tariff lines in the agricultural and industrial sectors or 66 
percent tariff lines under the Harmonized System. In the agricultural sector, 
the commitments made by Tunisia involve binding 1,503 tariff lines (25 per-
cent of the total) at rates that vary between 25 and 250 percent, along with 
a commitment to reduce these rates by 24 percent over 10 years (1995–2004). 
The commitments of Tunisia also involve insuring the opening up of tariff quo-
tas for the importation of agricultural and food processing products at lower 
customs duty rates. Furthermore, Tunisia committed to reducing the level of 
its domestic support for agriculture by 13.3 percent over 1995–2005.
The EMP Agreement
The E.U. is Tunisia’s main trading partner: 76 percent of Tunisia’s trade goes 
to or comes from the E.U. Imports of European agricultural and food products 
account for a little under half of all imports of products in these two catego-
ries. The European market takes up about 70 percent of Tunisia’s agricultural 
trade and food exports.
  Tunisia is one of the most important exporters of several products, includ-
ing olive oil, dates, citrus fruit, seafood, and various organic fruits and veg-
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in exports of melons, table grapes, table olives, and, potentially, tomatoes 
and strawberries. At the same time, Tunisia is a net importer of other agricul-
tural products, mainly wheat, sugar, and vegetable oils. For these products, 
the E.U. is a leading exporter country. Both the imports and exports of agri-
cultural products by Tunisia are sensitive to the common agricultural policy 
of the E.U. In fact, import prices for agricultural products are significantly 
determined by the level of European subsidies on exports under the common 
agricultural policy; likewise, exports of Tunisian agricultural products are 
subject to the protection instruments implemented through this policy.
  Trade relations between Tunisia and the E.U. in agricultural and food 
products are governed by the EMP Agreement signed in 1995. This provides for 
the establishment of a free trade area following a 12-year transitional period. 
The foundation of the partnership agreement is the principle of reciprocity. 
It provides for the removal of tariffs on all products, with the exception of 
agricultural products. Agricultural products are excluded from the agreement 
and are subject to specific arrangements. In fact, trade in agricultural and food 
products remains affected by barriers to entry in both markets. In the case of 
the E.U. market, the Common Agricultural Policy has introduced many barriers 
to the importation of Tunisian agricultural and food products.
  Although agriculture was excluded from the 1995 agreement, the agree-
ment provided for the E.U. and Tunisia to review the trade regime for agri-
culture in 2000. In December 2000 the E.U. and Tunisia agreed on measures 
to liberalize trade in agricultural products beginning in January 2001. As an 
illustration, Tunisia has obtained better access to the E.U. market for olive 
oil (an increase in the annual quota and a duty set to zero), cut flowers, 
tomato concentrate, new potatoes, and oranges, for which an increase in the 
free duty quota has been agreed. The E.U. has obtained improved access for 
vegetable oils and wheat with the application of the preferential tariffs.
  In accordance with Protocol 3 of the association agreement, Tunisia applies 
preferential tariff quotas to several agro-food products originating in the E.U. 
With respect to meat, dairy products, cereals, and sugar, which are also cov-
ered by WTO tariff quotas, exports from the E.U. may draw either on the WTO 
quota or on the preferential quota. However, E.U. exports under preferential 
tariff quotas are zero-rated; moreover, these quotas also cover other agricul-
tural products such as eggs, poultry, potatoes, hazelnuts, maize (corn), meal, 
malt, starch, certain flours, fats, oils, glucose, and dog and cat food.
  For Tunisian agricultural exports to the European market, a new regime 
of trade implemented on March 8, 2001, ratified the association agreement 
between the parties through the modification of the agricultural protocols 
annexed to the 1995 association agreement. In this respect, export quotas, 
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are indicated in the first draft (protocol) of the agreement. For olive oil, the 
agreement clauses specified (1) the institutionalization of the quota regime 
and permanent integration of these products into the association agreement 
and (2) an increase in the quota from 50,000 metric tons as of January 1, 
2001, to 56,000 metric tons on January 1, 2005, with a complete exemption 
from customs duties.
  Protocol 2, which concerns fishing products, stipulates that fishing prod-
ucts from Tunisia may be admitted to the E.U. with no quantitative limit and 
totally exempt from customs duties. Furthermore, the two parties agreed to 
examine in 2005 the possibility of granting each other mutual concessions in 
order to liberalize their trade in agricultural and fishing products. These nego-
tiations are still in progress, and no agreement has been reached to date.
  It is important to note that the agricultural sector in Tunisia is affected 
by the general scarcity of water and arable land, occasional drought, and 
natural resource degradation, all of which limit the ability of Tunisian farm-
ers to take advantage of further concessions by the E.U. (Olive oil, however, 
is one product for which E.U. concessions could generate immediate benefits 
for Tunisian farmers.) Furthermore, the integration of agricultural products 
into the FTA cannot be separated from the issue of the support paid by the 
E.U. to its farmers. Without a substantial reform of the common agricultural 
policy, most agricultural activities in Tunisia will not be able to overcome the 
European competition, particularly in products that are highly subsidized in 
Europe.
GAFTA
The executive program of the Convention on the Facilitation and Develop-
ment of Inter-Arab Trade entered into force in January 1998; it is currently 
being applied by 17 of the 22 members of the League of Arab States. GAFTA 
is a new Arab League initiative that aims to revive previously unsuccess-
ful attempts at regional integration. According to the agreement, all Arab 
products moving among the members will be afforded the status of national 
goods in accordance with the principle of gradual liberalization through an 
annual reduction of 10 percent of the customs duties and taxes that have 
equivalent tariff effects. Initially, goods were scheduled to be traded duty 
free among the members by 2007, but at its 69th meeting, in Cairo, the 
Economic and Social Council decided to accelerate the establishment of 
GAFTA, setting 2005 instead of 2007 as the deadline for the launch. In 2004 
it was planned that all the Arab countries that had joined GAFTA would 
reduce their customs duties on bilateral trade by 80 percent and completely 
eliminate all tariffs by 2005.
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opportunity to suspend tariff reductions on some products during peak har-
vest seasons. In this regard, each member is allowed to submit a list of 10 
products for suspension, with a total exemption of all these products for 45 
months.
The FTA with the European Free Trade Association
The member states of the European Free Trade Association—Iceland, Lich-
tenstein, Norway, and Switzerland—signed an FTA with Tunisia in Geneva on 
December 17, 2004. Negotiations on the European Free Trade Association–
Tunisia Free Trade Agreement were launched in Tunis in October 1996 and 
were concluded in 2004 after six rounds of negotiations. The agreement cov-
ers trade in industrial goods, as well as processed agricultural products.
  The agreement takes into consideration the different levels of economic 
development of the members of the European Free Trade Association on the 
one hand and Tunisia on the other by providing for asymmetric tariff reduc-
tion. The states of the association will eliminate duties and other restrictions 
for covered products upon entry into force of the agreement, while Tunisia 
will gradually abolish its duties during a transition period. The agreement 
contains rules of origin on the model of the Euro-Mediterranean accumula-
tion system. Trade in basic agricultural products is covered by arrangements 
concluded bilaterally between each association state and Tunisia.
The FTA with Turkey
The association agreement establishing a free trade area between Tunisia 
and Turkey was signed on November 25, 2004. The agreement covers provi-
sions on preferential trade, state monopolies, competition and state aid, 
intellectual property rights, public procurement, and economic and technical 
cooperation. With this agreement Tunisia and Turkey aimed at strengthen-
ing their cooperation, removing trade barriers, including agricultural trade, 
establishing appropriate conditions for competition, and promoting bilateral 
investments. A free trade area will be created within nine years following the 
entry into force of the agreement.
  Protocol II of the agreement establishes a preferential trade regime that 
will be applied to agricultural trade. Concessions are exchanged for a given 
number of agricultural, fishing, and processed agricultural products on the 
basis of tariff quotas. This agreement entered into effect in June 2005.
Poverty
Tunisia has made significant progress in reducing poverty (Figure 5.1). The 
incidence of poverty (defined using the national poverty line) was cut from 
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erty rate stagnated between 1990 and 1995 (8.1 percent)1 but resumed its 
decline between 1995 and 2000, when its incidence reached the lowest level 
(4.1 percent). At the same time, the population growth rate declined and 
life expectancy increased markedly, regional disparities were reduced, and 
improvements were achieved in education, access to health care, and basic 
infrastructure. The distribution of income improved until 1990, as the Gini 
coefficient fell from 0.434 in 1985 to 0.401 in 1990. It was estimated at 0.417 
in 1995 and 0.409 in 2000. Average per capita expenditures for the lowest 
deciles of the population moved closer to mean expenditures for the country 
as a whole. In absolute terms, the number of the poor increased from 600,000 
in 1990 to 690,000 in 1995 and fell to 400,000 in 2000 (World Bank 2003a). 
Given that the distribution of consumption is quite steep near the poverty 
line, many households are vulnerable to sliding back into poverty.
  Regarding the characteristics of the poor in Tunisia, poverty remains pri-
marily a rural phenomenon. In 2000, the incidence of rural poverty was 8.3 
percent compared to 0.8 percent in metropolitan areas and 2.3 percent in 
other urban areas (Table 5.8). Rural areas, with less than 40 percent of the 
total population, accounted for 74 percent of the poor in 2000 compared to 
76 percent in 1990 (World Bank 2003a).
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1 Using a new World Bank and Institut National de la Statistique poverty line (World Bank 
2003a).
Figure 5.1  The evolution of poverty reduction in Tunisia, 1990–2000
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Source:   World Bank (2003a).  There is a strong association between poverty and lack of schooling in 
both rural and urban areas. Over 60 percent of poor household heads have 
no formal education compared to about 40 percent of nonpoor household 
heads. Poor rural households engaged in production activities typically have 
access to land, but their land holdings are small (averaging 2 hectares), are 
rarely irrigated, and often exhibit low productivity, especially in rainfed 
areas.
  The urban poor are mostly wage earners in low-skill occupations. Accord-
ing to data from the Institut National de la Statistique (INS 2002), between 
1990 and 1995 the incidence of poverty increased in the agricultural, fishing, 
and construction sectors and fell in tourism and commercial activities. In 
2000, the poorest households were still concentrated in the construction and 
agricultural sectors.
The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Poverty
This section presents the results of a microsimulation analysis of the impact 
of trade liberalization on Tunisian households.2 First we briefly describe the 
methods used to generate the estimates (a more detailed description is found 
in the appendix to this chapter). Then we describe the results of the simula-
tions of four different types of trade liberalization. The impact is assessed 
in terms of macroeconomic variables, sectoral production, imports, exports, 
and the incidence of poverty in urban and rural areas.
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN TUNISIA  115   
Table 5.8  Poverty lines and poverty incidence in 
Tunisia, 1990, 1995, and 2000
    Lower poverty lines  Poverty
Population group  Year  (core poverty) (TND)  incidence (%)
Metropolitan 1990  236  2.8
 1995  306  1.8
Other urban  1990  210  3.5
 1995  272  4.2
 2000  318  2.3
Rural 1990  194  14.8
 1995  252  15.8
 2000  294  8.3
Source:   World Bank (2003a).
Note:  TND, Tunisian dinars.
2 The model used here has been developed through a study funded by the Poverty and Economic 
Policy Research Network (see Chemingui and Thabet 2006).Methods
This analysis involves using a CGE model to simulate the effects of four types 
of trade liberalization on the Tunisian economy and households. The CGE
model is built on a social accounting matrix (SAM) calibrated to describe the
Tunisian economy in 1996. It is a standard neoclassical CGE model, with im-
perfect substitution in consumption between imported and domestic goods 
and imperfect substitution in production between exports and production for 
the domestic market. Production combines raw materials and factors of pro-
duction in fixed proportions, while the use of different factors varies accord-
ing to relative factor prices. There are five categories of labor:
•   farmers,
•   unskilled agricultural wage earners,
•   skilled agricultural wage earners,
•   unskilled nonagricultural workers, and
•   skilled nonagricultural workers.
Other factors are land, physical capital, and natural resources. The model 
covers 17 commodities and 17 activities, of which 14 are related to agriculture 
and food processing. It assumes perfect mobility of physical capital among 
the different sectors. The model also assumes an exogenous real trade bal-
ance, fiscal deficit, and fiscal expenditure. Increases in import demand are 
offset by depreciation of the exchange rate, which stimulates exports and 
maintains the trade balance. Reductions in import tariff revenue are offset 
by increases in the value-added tax (VAT).
  What distinguishes this model is that it includes a fully integrated micro-
simulation model. In order to estimate the distributional impact of trade 
policy, data from 397 households are integrated into the CGE model. These 
397 households are a representative sample from the 1995 Tunisian house-
hold expenditure survey. The survey contains detailed expenditure data but 
not income data. Thus, it was necessary to generate estimated income data 
based on survey information on the main economic activity of each member 
of the household. The household survey data, the SAM, and the CGE model 
are described in more detail in the appendix to this chapter.
  It is important to note that this is a static model in that it does not take 
into account the effect of trade liberalization on investment or on the rate of 
adoption of new technology. To the extent that trade liberalization encour-
ages investment or accelerates the adoption of technology, as some studies 
suggest, the model will understate the welfare benefits of liberalization.
Results
We analyze the impact of four alternative types of trade liberalization. Each 
scenario provides empirical estimations of the potential trade liberalization 
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at the same time. The four simulations are as follows:
1.   elimination of tariffs on imports of industrial products entering Tunisia 
from the E.U. as specified in the partnership agreement signed between 
the two partners,
2.   elimination of tariffs on Tunisian imports of industrial and agricultural 
products from the E.U.,
3.   elimination of tariffs on Tunisian imports of industrial and agricultural 
products from the E.U. and the rest of the world, and
4.   elimination of tariffs on imports of industrial and agricultural products 
from the E.U. and the rest of the world, together with multilateral trade 
liberalization, which it is assumed would increase international prices for 
all agricultural products by 15 percent.
The model is used to simulate the impact of these alternative policies on 
macroeconomic variables, production, international trade, and the incidence 
of poverty.
Simulation 1
In this scenario, Tunisia eliminates tariffs on industrial products from the 
E.U. in accordance with the provisions of the EMP (note that this simulation 
does not capture the effect of E.U. import liberalization on Tunisian exports). 
According to Table 5.9, this trade policy change would have a relatively weak 
macroeconomic impact. Real GDP would increase by 0.2 percent relative to 
the base year. The total output of goods and services would show a more 
important improvement, at a rate of 3.7 percent. Total final consumption 
would increase by 0.4 percent relative to the base scenario.
  Agricultural production would not be stimulated by the increase in the 
openness of the Tunisian economy to trade with Europe, which is not sur-
prising because agriculture remains outside the liberalization process in this 
scenario. Moreover, “other manufacturing” and nonmanufacturing industry
would expand, drawing mobile production factors (physical capital and unskilled 
labor), which would cause a drop in production in most agricultural activi-
ties. There would be a 71 percent decline in tariff revenue, but the model 
maintains the original level of fiscal revenue by a 99 percent increase in the 
VAT, from 4.2 percent to 8.3 percent (Table 5.10).
  Total imports would expand by 16 percent as a result of import liberaliza-
tion, but most of this would occur in nonagricultural goods. Imports of food 
and agricultural commodities would generally decline or increase only mod-
estly because the lower tariffs on nonagricultural imports would stimulate 
the demand for foreign currency, thus raising the cost of agricultural imports 
(Table 5.11).
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in Tunisia
 Base  value 
Sector  (millions of TND)  1  2  3  4
Cereals 591  –0.5  –0.1  –1.8  –1.8
Legumes 32  –1.8  –0.8  –0.1  –5.5
Other crops  220  –1.6  –8.7  –9.9 35.0
Fruits 840  –0.7  –0.6  –0.8 0.5
Vegetables 526  –0.9 0.0 0.0  –5.6
Other agricultural activities  29  7.5  4.3  6.9  –2.4
Livestock 1,011  –3.2  –6.7  –7.7  –2.7
Forestry 72  –1.2  –1.4  –1.5  –1.8
Fishing 276  –6.4  –6.6  –8.6  –9.6
Meat 633  –4.1  –8.2  –8.7  –3.5
Milk 191  0.1  –14.7  –20.4 8.4
Sugar 141  –1.3  –2.9  –6.6 64.0
Beverages 228  –4.0  –7.6  –7.7  –3.1
Other food processing  2,765  –1.5 0.1 0.7  –12.6
Other  manufacturing  11,404  16.4 18.3 23.6 23.5
Nonmanufacturing industry  2,362  8.7  9.7  15.9  14.4
Services 18,587  –0.9  –0.9  –0.8  –1.3
Source:   Authors’ calculations.
Notes:   Simulation 1 is the removal of tariffs on industrial goods from the European Union. Simu-
lation 2 is the removal of tariffs on all goods from the European Union. Simulation 3 is 
the removal of tariffs on all goods from all countries. Simulation 4 is the removal 
of tariffs on all goods from all countries plus multilateral trade liberalization. TND, 
Tunisian dinars.
Simulation
(% change relative to base scenario)
Table 5.9  Estimated impact of trade liberalization on macroeconomic 
variables in Tunisia
 Simulation
  (% change relative to base scenario)
Category Base  scenario  1  2  3  4
Real GDP (millions of TND)  38,673  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2
Total output (millions of TND)  39,910  3.7  4.1  5.6  5.2
Total investment (millions of TND)  4,760  8.5  8.5  10.9  9.6
Consumer price index  100  –2.3  –3.5  –4.1  –4.3
Tariff income (millions of TND)  1,328  –71.0  –79.8  –100.0  –100.0
Adjustment in average VAT (%)  4.2  98.8  119.3  149.6  193.7
Total real final consumption 
  (millions of TND)  14,586  0.4  1.9  2.6  2.9
Total imports (millions of TND)  8,326  15.9  18.0  22.0  22.5
Total exports (millions of TND)  8,030  23.2  26.1  32.0  33.7
Source:   Authors’ calculations.
Notes:   Simulation 1 is the removal of tariffs on industrial goods from the European Union. Simu-
lation 2 is the removal of tariffs on all goods from the European Union. Simulation 3 
is the removal of tariffs on all goods from all countries. Simulation 4 is the removal 
of tariffs on all goods from all countries plus multilateral trade liberalization. TND, 
Tunisian dinars; VAT, value-added tax.  Although total exports would increase significantly (by 23 percent) rela-
tive to the base scenario, the increase would be due largely to the industrial 
sector. Agricultural export performance would be mixed: among the major 
exports, fruit exports (including olives) would expand but fishery product 
exports would decline. These gains are due to the reduction in prices of 
imported input products and the increased demand for foreign currency 
(Table 5.12).
  Overall, poverty would decline slightly, from 8.1 to 7.7 percent. The gains 
in poverty reduction are entirely attributed to improvements in rural area; the 
urban poverty rate would increase slightly. The total number of poor people 
would decline by 4.7 percent, or more than 34,000 people (Table 5.13). Pre-
sumably, the import liberalization would lower the cost of imported goods for 
consumers, thus increasing their purchasing power, and would reduce the cost 
of productive inputs, which would increase agricultural returns.
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Table 5.11  Estimated impact of trade liberalization on food and 
agricultural imports in Tunisia
 Base  year 
Sector  (millions of TND)  1  2  3  4
Cereals 186.0  –4.9  –1.1 11.4  –17.2
Legumes 70.6  –4.5  –4.5 13.6  –13.6
Other crops  63.0  0.3  13.6  11.2  –0.8
Fruits 8.0  –7.0 62.8  203.0  214.3
Vegetables 13.0  –5.8 13.9 12.8 15.3
Other agricultural activities  7.6  0.8  24.2  37.3  51.3
Livestock 7.3  –2.3 22.8 24.0 25.0
Forestry 5.1  –6.9  –10.9  –12.1  –5.6
Fishing 1.6  2.4  1.6  4.0  0.8
Meat 9.9  –2.3 163.4 165.1  50.3
Milk 27.9  –4.8 59.6 76.4 –1.1
Sugar 87.4  –3.4  –1.6 11.4  –40.9
Beverages 7.2  4.2  103.6  105.2  –10.3
Other food processing  258.3  1.4  9.6  17.8  153.1
Other manufacturing  6,280.0  17.6  17.8  20.3  19.9
Nonmanufacturing industry  669.2  74.0  76.0  116.6  112.4
Services 623.8  9.2  9.2  15.3  14.6
Source:   Authors’ calculations.
Notes:   Simulation 1 is the removal of tariffs on industrial goods from the European Union. Simu-
lation 2 is the removal of tariffs on all goods from the European Union. Simulation 3 
is the removal of tariffs on all goods from all countries. Simulation 4 is the removal 
of tariffs on all goods from all countries plus multilateral trade liberalization. TND, 
Tunisian dinars.
Simulation
(% change relative to base scenario)Table 5.12  Estimated impact of trade liberalization on food and 
agricultural exports in Tunisia
 Base  year 
Sector  (millions of TND)  1  2  3  4
Cereals 1.5  20.8  47.1  78.4  149.5
Legumes 1.9  5.7  20.0  28.6  107.1
Other crops  1.0  13.9  41.8  54.1  1,121.1
Fruits  57.1  3.2  5.4 6.2 8.7
Vegetables 5.8  11.2  22.7  25.3  –0.2
Other agricultural activities  3.0  18.2  28.6  39.0  –2.4
Livestock 6.2  –5.3 0.6  2.6  19.7
Forestry  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Fishing 21.3  –19.8  –20.2  –27.5  –25.9
Meat 1.6  –8.5  –2.8  –2.8 318.3
Milk 1.8  12.5  17.5  21.3  908.8
Sugar  3.6  3.2 14.5 14.0  1,650.0
Beverages 16.9  1.6  3.3  4.7  11.2
Other food processing  271.3  0.8  9.5  12.2  9.4
Other  manufacturing  4,449.9  42.0  45.9 56.1 56.3
Nonmanufacturing  industry  641.8  11.9  13.0 19.6 18.9
Services 2,545.6  –8.2  –8.4  –10.8  –10.2
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
Notes:   Simulation 1 is the removal of tariffs on industrial goods from the European Union. Simu-
lation 2 is the removal of tariffs on all goods from the European Union. Simulation 3 is 
the removal of tariffs on all goods from all countries. Simulation 4 is the removal 
of tariffs on all goods from all countries plus multilateral trade liberalization. TND, 
Tunisian dinars.
Simulation
(% change relative to base scenario)
Table 5.13  Estimated impact of trade liberalization on incidence of 
poverty in Tunisia
 Simulation
Type of household  Base poverty  1  2  3  4
Poverty incidence (P0)
  National  8.1  7.7  7.7  7.6  5.4
  Urban areas  3.2  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.7
  Rural areas  15.8  14.3  14.3  14.1  7.9
Number of poor         
  National  735,215  –4.7  –4.9  –5.7  –33.7
  Urban  178,005  10.3  9.8  9.8  16.4
  Rural  557,210  –9.5  –9.5  –10.6  –49.7
Source:   Institut National de la Statistique and the authors’ calculations.
Notes:   Simulation 1 is the removal of tariffs on industrial goods from the European Union. Simu-
lation 2 is the removal of tariffs on all goods from the European Union. Simulation 3 
is the removal of tariffs on all goods from all countries. Simulation 4 is the removal of 
tariffs on all goods from all countries plus multilateral trade liberalization.Simulation 2
In this scenario the model is used to simulate the elimination of all tariffs on 
imports from the E.U., including tariffs on industrial and agricultural prod-
ucts. This scenario can be seen as extending the EMP into agricultural trade 
liberalization (though the effect of E.U. import liberalization is not included). 
As shown in Table 5.9, this simulation also has a weak macroeconomic impact: 
real GDP would expand by 0.3 percent compared to the base scenario, an 
additional 0.1 percentage points compared to Simulation 1 (the liberaliza-
tion of industrial imports from the E.U.). Real consumption would grow by 
1.9 percent compared to the base scenario, more than in Simulation 1. The 
loss in tariff revenue would be almost 80 percent of total government tariff 
revenue in the base year, somewhat more than with nonagricultural trade 
liberalization in Simulation 1. The model compensates by raising the VAT to 
maintain government revenue. Tunisian imports would expand more than in 
Simulation 1, responding to the broader import liberalization. Exports would 
expand in response to the greater demand for foreign currency.
  Overall output would increase by 4.1 percent relative to the base (0.4 
percentage points above Simulation 1). This increase in production shows 
the extent to which lowering tariffs might improve the efficiency of factor 
allocation through movement toward more profitable and more competi-
tive activities. However, the production of “other crops,” meat, dairy, and 
beverages would decline as a result of the reduced protection from imports 
from the E.U. There would be little change in the output of cereals, pulses, 
vegetables, and fruits, including olives (see Table 5.10).
  Imports of fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy products, beverages, and tobacco 
would increase substantially due to the reduction of import barriers on 
agricultural products. Nonagricultural imports would also increase by only 
slightly more than in Simulation 1 (see Table 5.11). Most agricultural exports 
except fishery products and meat would also expand (see Table 5.12). This 
illustrates the concept in international trade economics that a tax on imports 
is an implicit tax on exports. In this case, removing agricultural import tariffs 
would increase the demand for foreign currency, causing a depreciation of 
the exchange rate and stimulating exports, including agricultural exports.
  In general, the effect of this reform on poverty would be quite similar to 
that of Simulation 1. As in Simulation 1, a small increase in the urban poverty 
rate would be more than offset by the decrease in rural poverty rates. The 
change in poverty rates would be almost the same as in Simulation 1, though 
the number of poor people would decline slightly more than in Simulation 1.
Simulation 3
In this scenario we extend the elimination of Tunisian tariffs on E.U. imports 
to imports from non-E.U. countries as well. Real GDP would increase by 0.2 
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percent, indicating an additional gain of 0.5 percentage points compared to 
Simulation 2. Total imports would increase by 22 percent, while exports would 
grow by 32 percent, a significant increase relative to the previous simulation. 
The elimination of tariffs on imports from the rest of the world would increase 
the demand for imports and, hence, foreign exchange. The resulting depre-
ciation would make exports more competitive. This reform would induce a 
complete (100 percent) loss in tariff revenue. The model compensates by 
increasing the VAT from 4.2 percent in the base scenario to 10.5 percent.
  At the sectoral level, this reform would entail a drop in domestic pro-
duction in most agricultural activities. This decrease is explained by the 
lower prices associated with agricultural import liberalization, the increase 
in unskilled wages, and the limited mobility of land between agricultural 
activities.
  The effect of this reform on poverty would be similar to that of Simulations 
1 and 2 except that the decline in rural poverty would be slightly greater. The 
number of poor people would fall by 5.7 percent (about 42,000 people) com-
pared to the base scenario. Farmers’ incomes would be improved by higher 
prices for exports, lower costs for imported consumer goods, and lower costs 
for imported inputs such as seed and cattle feed.
Simulation 4
Along with the import liberalization in Simulation 3, this last scenario simu-
lates an increase in the prices of the main basic agricultural products as 
a result of a multilateral liberalization of trade in agricultural products. 
Agricultural protectionism in importing countries and production subsidies in 
high-income countries would depress world agricultural prices, which would
penalize all surplus farmers. Here we simulate a 15 percent increase in the
world prices of basic agricultural products, assumed to be the result of global
trade liberalization and the removal of all producer subsidies. This is a plau-
sible change in light of previous studies of the impact of removing all distor-
tions in the agricultural sector (see Chapter 3).
  In this simulation we see that total output in Tunisia would rise by 5.2 
percent relative to the base year, a reduction of 0.4 percentage points 
compared to Simulation 3. Real GDP would rise by 0.2 percent, while total 
consumption would rise by 2.9, the largest gain among the four simulations. 
Total imports would rise by 22 percent and exports increase by 34 percent 
relative to the base year.
  Global agricultural trade liberalization would enhance the competitive-
ness of “other crops” and sugar, causing a sharp increase in production. The 
increase in world prices would be transmitted to local markets, resulting in a 
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induce a reduction in the internal demand (see Table 5.10).
  The higher world prices of agricultural commodities would also cause 
reductions in most of the important agricultural and food imports (cereals, 
legumes, “other crops,” and sugar) while expanding the most important 
agricultural exports (fruit, consisting mainly of olives).3 In spite of the higher 
agricultural prices, the consumer price would decline relative to the base 
scenario, reflecting the importance of nonfood items in the consumption 
basket. Thus, global trade liberalization is associated with higher food prices, 
reduced agricultural imports, and higher agricultural exports (see Tables 5.11 
and 5.12).
  This situation was actually observed for olive oil in Tunisia during the 
2005 agricultural year, when high world prices led to a rise in domestic retail 
prices, which curbed local demand and, consequently, stimulated exports. 
This scenario would thus result in a favorable income gain for olive-producing 
farm households because of the rise in producer prices.
  Global trade liberalization, with the 15 percent increase in world agricul-
tural prices, would cause poverty to decline from 8.1 percent in the base sce-
nario to 5.4 percent. This is the largest drop among the four simulations, and 
it would be entirely the result of progress in rural areas, where the poverty 
rate would fall by half, from 15.8 percent in the base scenario to 7.9 percent. 
The fact that rural poverty would decline from 14.1 percent in Simulation 
3 (import liberalization for all goods from all countries) to 7.9 percent in 
Simulation 4 suggests that the higher agricultural prices would be responsible 
for the poverty reduction in rural areas, as well as the modest increase in 
urban poverty. Compared to the base scenario, the number of poor people in 
Tunisia would decline by one-third, or 248,000 people.
Summary
Tunisia has carried out a number of reforms as a result of its structural 
adjustment program, but its level of agricultural protection remains one of 
the highest in the world. At the same time, Tunisia has a relatively good 
investment climate, which contributed to significant inflows of foreign direct 
investment and a healthy growth rate through the 1990s.
  Like many MENA countries, Tunisia is a net agricultural importer. Its main 
exports are olives and dates, and its principal imports are wheat and maize. 
Multilateral liberalization is expected to raise agricultural prices. If all agricul-
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commodities with very modest or negligible import volumes.tural commodity prices rise proportionately, Tunisia will face declining terms 
of trade because it is a net agricultural importer. On the other hand, it would 
benefit from domestic liberalization due to efficiency gains. The combined 
effect is likely to be positive for Tunisia as a whole because most estimates 
show that efficiency gains would be larger than terms-of-trade effects.
  However, the combination of global and domestic liberalization would 
probably reduce agricultural prices because the effect of the loss of high lev-
els of protection (89 percent on average) would be greater than the modest 
increase in world prices (5–20 percent) due to global liberalization.
  Simulations using a CGE model linked to household survey data suggest that 
the removal of industrial tariffs on imports from the E.U. (which approximates 
Tunisian import liberalization under the EMP agreement) would cause both 
imports and exports to expand significantly, although almost all the change 
would be in nonagricultural trade. Real GDP would increase slightly (0.2 per-
cent) because of the efficiency gains associated with the removal of distortions. 
Poverty would decline from 8.1 to 7.7 percent. Significant gains in rural poverty 
reduction would more than offset the small increase in urban poverty.
  The removal of all tariffs on imports from the E.U. (approximating the 
Tunisian side of an extended EMP agreement) would cause large increases in 
imports of meat, beverages and tobacco, fruit, dairy products, and vegetable 
oil as import barriers on these goods were lifted. The effect on GDP and pov-
erty would be similar to that in the first simulation.
  The elimination of tariffs on imports from all countries would increase the 
imports of almost all agricultural commodities, as well as stimulate agricul-
tural exports to maintain the trade balance. The reduction in poverty would 
be slightly greater in this case than in the case of the first two simulations: 
poverty would decline from 8.1 percent in the base scenario to 7.6 percent. 
The rural poor would again be the main beneficiaries of these changes in 
trade policy.
  Finally, the elimination of all Tunisian tariffs plus global trade liberal-
ization (represented by a 15 percent increase in world agricultural prices) 
would not do much for the overall economy. This is partly because, as a net 
agricultural importer, Tunisia would lose out due to higher world agricul-
tural prices. Nonetheless, the agricultural sector would gain from the higher 
prices. Exports of fruit (mainly olives) would expand significantly, as would 
exports of a number of other agricultural commodities. As a result, poverty 
would decline to the lowest level among the four scenarios. Compared to the 
base scenario, rural poverty would be cut in half (from 15.8 to 7.9 percent) 
according to this simulation.
  Overall, it appears that trade liberalization would have only modest effects 
on the level of GDP, but it would have a significant effect in reducing pov-
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would be more pro-poor than the effect of domestic liberalization alone.
  We draw two general implications from the Tunisia case study. First, the 
impact of trade liberalization on rural poverty may be quite different from 
the impact one might assume based on simple indicators. As a net importer 
of agricultural commodities, Tunisia may be expected to experience terms-
of-trade losses from higher world agricultural prices. Furthermore, because 
Tunisia has a high level of agricultural import protection, we would expect 
its agricultural sector to lose from trade liberalization that would remove this 
protection. Yet the simulations suggest that trade liberalization would reduce 
rural poverty. Three factors explain these results:
•   For cereals, import liberalization would reduce prices more than global 
trade liberalization would increase them. But poor farm households would 
not lose much from lower cereal prices because cereal production is con-
centrated on medium and large farms (see Table 5.3). Furthermore, many 
rural poor households are likely to be net buyers who benefit from lower 
cereal prices.
•   Global trade liberalization would boost the world prices of agricultural 
commodities, including olives. This would benefit olive growers, and Table 
5.3 shows that tree crops (primarily olive trees) are concentrated among 
smaller farms.
•   The shift from producing cereals to more labor-intensive activities such 
as raising fruit, dairy products, and sugar would increase the demand for 
unskilled agricultural labor, thus increasing wage income among the rural 
poor.
  Second, the positive outcome of these simulations would be partly based 
on the ability of farmers to replace activities that were once protected, such 
as wheat and livestock production, by activities involving export commodities, 
such as the raising of olives, dates, and citrus. The need to facilitate the 
replacement of one set of activities with another highlights the importance 
of farmer training, marketing information systems, and extension services, 
as well as farm-level investments and the public infrastructure necessary to 
expand the newly competitive crops.
Appendix 5A: Method for Estimating the Impact of Trade 
Liberalization on Tunisia
Background on Micro-Macro Linkages
The most comprehensive way of modeling the overall impact of policy changes 
on the economy is through a CGE model, which incorporates many of the 
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sure distributive impacts, CGE models often map factor incomes among dif-
ferent types of households. The models have been applied in the analysis 
of policy changes in several developing countries. The change in the cost of 
living among segments of a population is then used to assess the impacts on 
income distribution. These studies provide an upper-bound measurement of 
the increase in income required for each group to purchase the same quanti-
ties of goods that they purchase in the base situation.
  Decaluwé et al. (1999) have evaluated the relevance of different types 
of macroeconomic general equilibrium modeling for measuring the impact of 
economic policy shocks on the incidence of poverty and on the distribution of 
income. Three approaches have been identified in the literature and imple-
mented using an archetypal economy, as follows:
1.   The first is based on a traditional form of the CGE model that specifies a 
large number of households, thus allowing the capture of only intergroup 
income inequalities.
2.   The second uses survey data to estimate the distribution function and 
average variations by group, thereby allowing for estimates of the evolu-
tion of poverty.
3.   The third approach involves directly incorporating individual datasets 
into the general equilibrium model according to the principles of micro-
simulation.
Studies have demonstrated the importance of intragroup information and 
therefore the relevance of microsimulation exercises. Even if we disaggregate 
the population of households into a few representative groups, we will still 
not be able to obtain relevant results regarding the evolution of total inequal-
ity. Indeed, decomposable income indexes show that intragroup inequality 
often contributes more to total inequality measures than does intergroup 
inequality. Accordingly, the most promising direction consists in seeking true 
integration between the CGE model and the observed heterogeneity of house-
holds as observed in a household survey.
  There are two main ways to achieve consistency between a macro-
economic framework and microeconomic surveys, as follows:
1.   The first, proposed by Cogneau and Robilliard (2000), has been labeled the 
“fully integrated micro-macro framework.” It is based on a standard CGE 
model wherein representative households and workers are replaced by a 
full sample of households and workers whose behavior is observed through 
household and labor force surveys. The advantage of this method is its 
ability to capture the impact of macroeconomic changes on workers and
households and also the feedback effects of microsimulation on the 
126  CHAPTER 5macroeconomic portion of the model. However, the method is very demand-
ing in computational resources and imposes the construction of a relatively 
simple CGE model.
2.   The second approach is the “sequential micro-macro framework.” The 
macroeconomic part of the model is an extended CGE model that is sup-
posed to describe the functioning of the economy under analysis. The link 
with the microsimulation model occurs through a vector of prices, wages, 
and aggregate employment. If one understands the change in the link 
variables resulting from a shock in the macroeconomic part of the model, 
one may modify the microeconomic household database in a way that 
is consistent with the link variables. This approach combines a standard 
multisector CGE model with a microsimulation model that describes real 
income generation behavior among a representative sample of households. 
The microsimulation model will be used to generate changes in individual 
wages and employment status in a manner that is consistent with the set of 
macroeconomic variables in the macroeconomic or CGE model. When this 
is done, the full distribution of the real household income corresponding to 
the shock or policy change initially stimulated in the macroeconomic model 
may be evaluated (Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson 2002).
  In building a CGE microsimulation model to assess the impact of trade 
policy reforms and external shocks on poverty in Tunisia, we have chosen to 
adopt the first approach, the fully integrated micro-macro framework, which 
involves directly incorporating a representative sample of households into the 
CGE model.
Tunisian Household Budget and Expenditure Surveys
The microsimulation approach requires data on income and expenditure pat-
terns among households in a sample. In the case of Tunisia, the quantitative 
data available from household budget surveys are limited to the expenditure 
side. Quantitative information on income sources, as well as on the level of 
savings (or debt), are not collected in Tunisian household budget surveys. 
However, important qualitative data allow an estimation of the different 
income sources. We believe that the mistakes linked to problems of estimat-
ing the different income positions of households are much less important than 
the mistakes relative to ignorance of the income effects in the analysis of the 
evolution of poverty.
  Seven national household expenditure surveys have been carried out, in 
1968, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Eight national household expen-
diture surveys have been carried out, in 1968, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 
2000, and 2005. The information gathered through direct observation of 
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households to be measured.
  The method of data collection consists of interviewing households during 
many visits. The direct observation of the expenditures of each sample house-
hold lasts four weeks. Nonetheless, for large expenditures that are made less 
frequently, such as the purchase of durable goods, the observation period 
lasts one year; in this case, the month-long enquiry is supplemented with 
retrospective accounts of the 11 months preceding the start of the survey. 
The part of the survey that is devoted to food consumption relies on measur-
ing the food intended for household consumption ration by ration and day by 
day during a week for each sample household.
  The survey questionnaire on household budgets and expenditures consists 
of a main questionnaire aimed at recording collective household expendi-
tures and a complementary questionnaire aimed at registering the individual 
expenditures of each household member with an income.
  For the part of the main questionnaire relative to expenditures, informa-
tion is requested on the expenditures each household member makes to sat-
isfy his or her needs and the needs of those household members in his or her 
charge, notably, the expenditure categories of a collective nature (such as food, 
housing, services). The main survey questionnaire is composed of four sections: 
the household roster, a list of the economic activities of members aged 15 
years and over, another list of the economic characteristics of active workforce 
members, and information on regular household expenditures (INS 2002).
Estimation of the Micromodule
As we have explained, every five years the Institut National de la Statistique 
(INS) carries out a survey on household budgets and consumption. The survey 
conducted in 2000 covered a sample of 12,018 households. Although the data 
from this survey were not available for this analysis, we were able to obtain 
raw data on approximately 400 households from the 1995 household expendi-
ture survey. The exploration and manipulation of these data revealed many 
inconsistencies, which give us some reservations regarding the quality of the 
data. The sample of 400 households is considered representative of the whole 
sample of 10,415 households surveyed in 1995.
  Table 5.14 provides details on the composition of the households according 
to the occupation of the head of household for the original sample and for the 
subsample used in this analysis. This indicates that the subsample is represen-
tative of the larger sample and, presumably, the population as a whole.
  We assume that the total revenue of each household is equal to its total 
expenditures; we ignore savings and debt. Indeed, a homogeneous savings 
level for all households in the sample will eventually be determined when the 
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we move to the estimation of the different sources of income. The qualita-
tive information collected on the professional status of the household head 
through the Tunisian household survey, as well as information on the other 
household members, allows us to sketch out a table of the income sources of 
each member and of the whole household. After constructing a table on the 
working members of each household in the available sample, we estimate the 
income of each household member. For this purpose we establish three main 
income sources: salaries, rents, and transfers. The main source of income in 
the majority of Tunisian households is salaries. Thus, based on the results 
of the employment survey conducted annually by the INS, we estimate the 
income derived from the salaries received by all members of each household 
with reference to the salary grid for 1996 and 1997 (INS 1998), which shows 
each professional category and the main economic activities. For indepen-
dent workers who do not earn salaries, we estimate a salary equivalent equal 
to the salary level for the same activity carried out by a salaried worker with 
the same qualifications.
  To simplify the estimation process, we assume that only poor households 
receive transfers, mostly in the form of government aid or transfers from 
other household members who work abroad (and who represent an important 
support for this category of households in Tunisia). Moreover, we suppose 
that poor households do not receive rents. These rents represent the income 
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN TUNISIA  129   
Table 5.14  Representativeness of the sample in Tunisia, by occupation of 
head of household, 1995
  Number and  Number and  Number and
 percentage  percentage  percentage
Socioprofessional  of households  of households  of households 
category of the  in the  in the  at the  Total
household head  whole sample  subsample  national level  population
Managers and   2,853  27.4  108  27.2  490,100  28.8  2,570,500  28.5
  professionals 
Those in other   2,955  28.4  111  28.0  490,300  28.9  2,725,500  30.3
  nonagricultural 
  activities 
Farmers  1,349 13.0  52  13.1  200,700 11.8  1,218,100 13.5
Agricultural wage   882  8.4  33  8.3  130,800  7.7  752,100  8.4
  earners 
Retirees and the   2,376  22.8  93  23.4  387,500  22.8  1,735,300  19.3
  unemployed 
Total  10,415 100.0  397  100.0  1,699,400 100.0  9,001,500 100.0
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from the Institut National de la Statistique.from capital invested by capital owners (such as in land). For independent 
workers engaged in a specific economic activity, two household categories
may be distinguished: poor households (in which the total income is below the
national poverty line) and nonpoor households (in which income is above 
the national poverty line).
  Finally, it is important to specify that the salaries and rents received 
by each household are differentiated according to the economic activities 
carried out by the members of the household who work as wage earners or 
as independent workers. Any amount left over in the total income of each 
household after accounting for the salaries (or equivalent salaries) represents 
transfers among poor households and rents among nonpoor households.
The SAM for Tunisia
In order to reduce the inconsistencies between the SAM and the 1995 house-
hold survey data, we chose to build another SAM for the year 1996.4 This 
allows us to balance out the SAM using an entropy program that makes the 
minimal adjustments necessary in the two datasets so that they are consis-
tent with each other. The data used to build the detailed 1996 SAM on Tuni-
sia are drawn from various sources, including input-output tables, national 
accounts, the government budget, and trade statistics. The microeconomic 
SAM for 1996 was constructed in several steps.
  In the first step we constructed a microeconomic SAM covering more than 
the 19 activities and commodities in the original input-output table established 
by the INS. The disaggregation of activities and commodities was carried out in 
order to match the commodity structure in the household expenditure data. 
Thus, the disaggregation involved mainly agriculture and agro-food processing 
commodities, given the importance of these commodities in household expen-
ditures in Tunisia. The macroeconomic SAM and the input-output table were 
fully consistent and balanced. Additional data on the various components 
of supply and demand have been provided by the INS. These cover sectoral 
imports and exports, final consumption, duties on imports, investment, stock 
variations, and other indirect taxes. Transfers among institutions and direct 
tax payments have also been provided by the INS.
  In the second step in building the microeconomic SAM, labor and capital 
accounts were disaggregated, the labor account into five categories (three in 
the agricultural sector and two in nonagricultural activities) and the capital 
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survey, for which a SAM is already available.account into three (land remuneration, other resources, and physical capi-
tal). Table 5.15 lists the different accounts in the SAM for Tunisia used in this 
study.
  When the micromodule is superimposed on the 1996 SAM table using oth-
erwise unchanged column coefficients, all sector accounts are, as expected, 
out of balance. An estimation approach is needed to generate a balanced SAM 
table. We selected a cross-entropy approach given the practical advantages 
and the theoretical basis of this approach in information theory (see, for 
example, Golan, Judge, and Miller 1996). Cross-entropy is a technique for 
solving underdetermined estimation problems. It has been applied to the esti-
mation of input-output tables (Golan, Judge, and Robinson 1994) and SAMs 
(Robinson and El-Said 2000; Robinson, Cattañeo, and El-Said 2001), as well as 
a wide range of other problems inside and outside economics. The underlying 
philosophy of entropy estimation is that all available relevant information 
should be used but no other information (Golan, Judge, and Miller 1996). 
More concretely, this means that the user may impose control values (in our 
case, by drawing on what is known for 1996). However, it is not necessary to 
impose values for what may not be known. Control values may be imposed 
exactly, or they may be imposed with allowance for measurement errors.
  In our case, the problem is to estimate a new micromodule with minimum 
entropy distance relative to the previous micromodule by drawing on the 
information presented in the 1996 SAM, subject to the constraint that the row 
and column totals of the new SAM should be equal for all accounts and that 
control values should be satisfied (exactly or by accounting for errors). The 
entropy distance depends on the differences between the two tables in terms 
of column coefficients and control values. Control values may be imposed 
exactly, or they may be imposed with allowance for measurement errors.
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Table 5.15  Dimensions of the Tunisian SAM
Activities  Production of cereals, legumes, other crops, fruits, vegetables, other 
      agriculture products, livestock; meat, dairy, sugar, beverages; forestry; 
fishing; other food-processing industries; other manufacturing industries; 
nonmanufacturing industries; and services
Labor factors  Nonwage agricultural workers, skilled wage workers in agriculture, unskilled 
      wage workers in agriculture, skilled workers in nonagriculture, and 
unskilled workers in nonagriculture.
Other factors  Land, other natural resources, and physical capital
Institutions  Government, 397 households, European Union, and the rest of the world
Other accounts  VAT, subsidies on production, subsidies on consumption, taxes on income, 
    changes in inventory, and saving-investment
Note:   VAT, value-added tax.CGE Model Structure
The CGE model used here for Tunisia is a standard neoclassical static model 
with imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Domestic 
prices are endogenous on each market (goods and factors). They equalize 
supply (imports and production for the domestic market) and demand (the 
final demand of households, the government, investors, and foreign partners; 
the intermediate demand of producers; and factor demand) so as to obtain 
equilibrium.
  Supply is modeled using the nested constant elasticity of substitution 
functions, which describe the substitution and complement relations among 
the various inputs. Producers are cost minimizers, and constant return to 
scale is assumed. Output results from two composite goods (intermediate 
consumption and value added), which are combined in fixed proportions. The 
intermediate aggregate is obtained by combining all products in fixed pro-
portions. The value added is then decomposed into two substitutable parts: 
labor and capital. The labor market is further disaggregated into five cat-
egories (nonwage agricultural workers, skilled wage workers in agriculture, 
unskilled wage workers in agriculture, skilled workers in nonagriculture, and
unskilled workers in nonagriculture) and capital into three categories (physical
capital, reserve of natural resources, and land). Substitutions among labor 
categories are implemented through a nested constant elasticity of substi-
tution structure for two main activities: agricultural activities and non-
agricultural activities. For agricultural activities, the first level of the con-
stant elasticity of substitution function describes the substitution between 
wage workers and nonwage workers, while the second level describes substitu-
tion between skilled and unskilled wage workers. For nonagricultural activities, 
there is substitution only between skilled and nonskilled wage workers.5
  The labor market is modeled according to labor type. For nonwage agri-
cultural workers (farmers), we assume that an economywide wage variable is
free to vary to ensure that the sum of demand from all activities equals the
quantity supplied, which is fixed. Each activity pays an activity-specific wage
that is the product of the economywide wage and an activity-specific wage (dis-
tortion) term. For the remaining four labor categories, we assume that there 
is unemployment and that the real wage is fixed. This assumption is appropri-
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ous trade policies. However, it does not incorporate some of the expected dynamic effects of 
trade policies, notably those on productivity, because factors availability and average efficiency 
are fixed in this version of the model. This feature is ignored because, in the long run, house-
hold features have to be changed, and the calibration of the model requires more than one 
household survey.ate in the Tunisian case because there is considerable unemployment among 
all wage-worker categories. Compared to the modeling of nonwage workers, 
the only change is that the economywide wage variable is fixed (or exogenized), 
while the supply variable is flexed (or endogenized). Each activity is free 
to hire any desired quantity of workers at the fixed activity-specific wage 
(which, implicitly, is indexed to the model numéraire).
  Income from labor and physical capital accrues to households using fixed 
shares derived from the SAM once the micromodule is fully integrated, as 
do all rents created by specific capital factors (natural resources and land). 
Total household demand is derived by maximizing the utility function sub-
ject to the constraints of the available income and consumer price vector. 
Household utility is a positive function of the consumption of the various 
products and savings; the income elasticity for each product is set to unity. 
Government demand and investment demand are disaggregated into sectoral 
demands once the total value is determined according to fixed coefficient 
functions.
  The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods originating in dif-
ferent geographical areas. Import demand results from a constant elasticity 
of substitution function aggregating domestic and imported goods. Export 
supply is symmetrically modeled as a constant elasticity of transformation 
function. Producers decide to allocate their output to domestic or foreign mar-
kets in response to relative prices. At the second stage, importers (exporters) 
choose the optimal demand (supply) across regions as a function of relative 
import (export) prices and the degree of substitution across regions. The 
substitution elasticity between domestic and imported products is set at 2.2, 
while it is set at 5.0 among imported products according to origin. The elas-
ticity of transformation between products intended for the domestic market 
and products for export is 5.0, while it is set at 8.0 among the different des-
tinations for export products.6
  Finally, several macroeconomic constraints are introduced into this model. 
First, the small country assumption holds. Tunisia is unable to change world 
prices; thus, its import and export prices are exogenous. Capital transfers are 
exogenous as well, implying that the trade balance is fixed so as to achieve 
balance of payments equilibrium. Second, the model imposes a fixed real 
government deficit and fixed real public expenditures. Public receipts thus 
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6 In the absence of the trade elasticities estimated for Tunisia, we use trade elasticities from 
the empirical literature devoted to CGE models. For example, see Burniaux, Nicoletti, and 
Oliveira-Martins (1992); Konan and Maskus (1997); or, more recently, Gallaway, McDaniel, and 
Rivera (2000).7 This closure policy can be understood as a net transfer from households to government (or the 
reverse). With one representative household, it is considered the most neutral way to assess 
trade reform. Other closures could be tested (by adjusting indirect taxes, for instance), but this 
would risk introducing new distortions, thereby making it more difficult to conceptually isolate 
the impact of the trade policy on income distribution and poverty.
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adjust endogenously in order to achieve the predetermined net government 
position by shifting the income tax of households.7 Third, investment is deter-
mined by the availability of savings from households, government, and abroad. 
Because government and foreign savings are exogenous in this model, changes 
in investment volumes reflect changes in household savings and changes in 
the price of investment. Policy impacts are compared relative to the situa-
tion observed in the base year in terms of macroeconomic aggregates, trade 
volumes, sectoral outputs, household welfare, and poverty indicators.CHAPTER 6
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Syria
T
he Syrian Arab Republic has approximately 17 million inhabitants, of 
whom about half live in urban areas. Its per capita GDP is US$831, 
above that of the poorest MENA countries (Djibouti and Yemen) but 
below the others. The agricultural sector is relatively large, accounting for 
23 percent of total GDP.
  The Syrian government adopted socialism in the late 1950s and kept control 
of major industries, though private services and retail trade were allowed. 
The economy has been adversely affected by various conflicts in the region, 
including the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and the Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon from 1976 until 2005. Limited economic reforms and a major expan-
sion in oil exports stimulated economic growth in the early 1990s, but growth 
has been sluggish since then. Although international trade and the exchange 
rate have been partially liberalized, the government still imposes significant 
controls on the economy, including price controls, state monopolies in certain 
sectors, agricultural subsidies, and a large number of state-owned enterprises. 
Overall, Syria’s per capita GDP grew at 2.2 percent per year during the 1990s, 
an improvement over its performance during the 1980s, when it fell in real 
terms.
  Like Jordan, Syria was adversely affected by the end of the United Nations 
Oil for Food program in Iraq and the subsequent war in Iraq, which disrupted 
trade flows. More recently, Syria has benefited from the conflict in Iraq and 
from high oil prices.
The Agricultural Sector
Agricultural Production
Wheat is the most important food crop in Syria. Unlike most MENA countries, 
Syria is self-sufficient in wheat. As discussed later, its self-sufficiency in 
wheat is the result of policies that impose high barriers on imports. Barley 
and maize are also grown, but domestic production is not sufficient to sat-
isfy demand. Cereal production is subject to weather-related fluctuations 
135because rainfall is unreliable. Syria also produces grapes, apples, and olives 
in the highlands and citrus fruits along the coast. Horticultural production is 
often irrigated. About 23 percent of Syrian cropland is irrigated, much of this 
because of the Euphrates Dam built in the 1970s.
  The main production units in Syrian agriculture are small and medium-
sized farms, because the agrarian reform caused the practical disappearance 
of traditional large-scale landowners. Between the two agricultural censuses 
for which data are available, conducted in 1981 and 1994, there was a 26 
percent increase in the total number of farm households, from 486,000 in 
1981 to 614,000 in 1994 (Table 6.1). The percentage of farmers whose main 
occupation was agricultural and who owned land was 71 percent of total farm 
households with land in 1994 compared to 64 percent in 1981. Furthermore, 
57 percent of farmers without land stated that their main occupation was 
farming, compared to only 15 percent in 1981. These changes show the grow-
ing numbers of farm households both with land and without land whose main 
occupation is farming. This is the direct result of the segmentation of land 
and the slow growth in the demand for labor in the nonagricultural sectors.
Agricultural Trade Patterns
The total exports of Syria were US$7.6 billion in 2002. Oil and fuel account 
for over half of the total value of exports, although it is estimated that the 
existing oil reserves will be exhausted within 12 years at the current extrac-
tion rates. Syrian agricultural exports are about US$1 billion, and the main 
commodities are cotton, sheep, tomatoes, and anise/fennel. As a group, fruit 
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Table 6.1  Characteristics of farm households in Syria, 1981 and 1994
Farm household type  1981 census  1994 census
Total number of farm households (1)  485,691  613,657
Farm households with land (2)  409,492  573,193
Farm households without land (3)  76,199  40,464
Farm households with land whose main occupation is   261,386  409,142
  agriculture (4) 
Farm households without land whose main occupation is   11,224  22,860
  agriculture (5) 
Percentage of farm households with land (2/1)  84  93
Percentage of landowners for whom agriculture is the main   64  71
  occupation (4/2) 
Percentage of landless for whom agriculture is the main   15  56
  occupation (5/3) 
Sources:   1981 census and 1994 census.and vegetable exports earn over US$300 million per year. Syrian wheat exports 
averaged US$48 million in value per year over 2000–02.
  Syria’s total imports in 2002 were US$5.9 billion, of which agricultural 
imports were US$860 million. The main agricultural imports are sugar, maize, 
and tea. Unlike most MENA countries, Syria has a modest surplus in agri-
cultural trade, although this is partly due to the tight restrictions on food 
and agricultural imports. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
imports of processed foods, frozen foods, snack foods, meat, fruits, and veg-
etables are, in general, prohibited (USDA 1999).
  Syria’s principal trading partners are the E.U. and other Arab countries. 
The E.U. represents the main market for Syrian exports, accounting for some 
60 percent of exports. The E.U. is a particularly important market for Syrian 
oil but also accounts for a significant share of Syria’s manufactured exports, 
such as cotton and textiles (the E.U. accounts for almost 40 percent of its 
manufacturing exports). The Arab countries are the second-largest market 
for Syria exports, accounting for slightly over 20 percent of total exports, 
followed by the United States (9.5 percent). Of the Arab countries, Iraq has 
historically been the major trading partner, although this trade has been 
disrupted by the conflict there. Exports to the Arab countries are mainly 
concentrated in foodstuffs, notably cereals, fruits, and vegetables.
  The E.U. is the most important source of Syrian imports; an average of 31 
percent of total merchandise imports originated in the E.U. during 1994–2000. 
Syria also maintains strong commercial links with former communist countries 
in Eastern Europe and with Russia and China, which together accounted for 
18 percent of total imports during 1994–2000. Arab countries supplied Syria 
with only about 8 percent of its merchandise imports.
Agricultural and Trade Policies
Agricultural Policy
Syrian agricultural policy is characterized by a high level of government inter-
vention. Before 1987, the prices of many agricultural products, such as cereal, 
fodder, industrial crops, potatoes, garlic, and some fruits, were determined by 
the government. Since 1987, a gradual process of economic reform has been 
under way, and some regulations on production, prices, and marketing have 
been relaxed. This process has intensified since 2002, when the government 
introduced a package of reforms aiming to reduce distortions and public inter-
vention in the economy.
  On the basis of these changes, the orientation of Syrian economic policy 
in general and of agricultural policy in particular has focused on price de-
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sidies. We analyze below the main components of Syrian agricultural policy, 
focusing on recent reforms, as well as on obstacles that still affect the agri-
cultural sector and farm incomes.
Land-Use Planning
In Syria, agricultural production is centrally planned by means of land-use 
plans, which vary from region to region. The land-use plans are prepared 
by the state based on its strategic goals and the technical characteristics 
of farms. The land-use plans often determine other aspects of Syrian agri-
cultural policy, namely, price and credit policy. The state seeks to ensure 
the achievement of the objectives assigned to the agricultural sector in the 
national economic development plan without taking into account farmer 
preferences. The discrepancy between government objectives and farmer 
objectives has always been manifested by the flouting of the rules on land 
use. This situation has made it difficult for farmers to acquire the necessary 
inputs whenever their plans differ from the government land-use plans. In 
addition, the situation results in weak performance by farms as a result of 
the lack of credit and support for unapproved production.
Procurement by State Monopolies
Wheat, cotton, tobacco, and sugar beets are considered strategic commodi-
ties. In order to stimulate production and control distribution, the state has 
a marketing monopoly over these products. The prices of these commodities 
are fixed using a well-established procedure. First, the cost of production is 
estimated jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture, the general trade union of 
farmers, the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of 
Industry, and other institutions. Once the average cost has been estimated, 
a margin of benefits is fixed for each crop on the basis of the relative impor-
tance of the crop in the Syrian economy as measured by the importance of 
each product in the final consumption of households and the demand for 
these crops as industrial inputs. These continually revised prices are pub-
lished each year before the beginning of the agricultural season. This price-
fixing mechanism has led to increases in producer prices that far exceed the 
rise in consumer prices, typically fixed by the state for the same products. 
One consequence of these policies is the accumulation of large stocks by 
state enterprises and large financial costs in the state budget.
Administered Prices
Another category of agricultural commodities is subject to administered 
prices but without a state monopoly on marketing. This is the case for barley, 
138  CHAPTER 6lentils, maize, and sunflowers. Farmers have the option of selling to state 
marketing boards at the official prices, but they can also sell on the private 
market. Indeed, like procurement prices, these prices are fixed on the basis 
of a study jointly conducted by representatives of the government, farmers, 
and processors. Prices are set according to the estimated average production 
cost plus a profit margin that is smaller than that accorded strategic prod-
ucts. Thus, the proposed prices are considered minimum guaranteed prices 
for farmers so as to protect them from unusually low market prices.
Consumer Price Policy
This category of prices is also fixed by the state administration and is meant 
for consumption products such as vegetables, fruits, milk, meat, eggs, rice, 
and oil. These prices are considered simple indicators that should not be 
applied in transactions between producers (and importers) and consumers, 
except for products that public institutions buy. These prices are also fixed 
by a committee that is generally made up of the Ministry of the Economy and 
the Ministry of Trade, as well as other departments involved in the sector.
  This pricing policy has undergone significant reforms during recent years. 
Many products, notably vegetables, have witnessed liberalization in prices 
and imports. Furthermore, state monopolies in the importation of certain 
products have been relaxed, opening the door to private importers. However, 
pricing policies have not undergone changes relative to many other products, 
leading to high fiscal costs because of the gap between producer prices and 
(lower) export or retail prices.
Input Policy
Syria’s agricultural input policy is based on the principle that all necessary 
inputs for agricultural production should be made available through the 
establishment of state monopolies in the production of inputs. However, the 
private sector participates in some marketing activities without authorization 
from the state administration. There is a state monopoly on the importation 
and distribution of chemical fertilizers. State trading enterprises import fer-
tilizers on behalf of the cooperative agricultural bank, which distributes the 
fertilizers to farmers. Payment is made either in cash or by means of loans 
granted by the same institution on the basis of conditions fixed in advance 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, there is a state monopoly on the 
production, importation, and distribution of seeds. The private sector is 
authorized to market pesticides with the approval of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and to import and distribute agricultural machinery.
  The partial liberalization of the importation and distribution of pesticides 
and agricultural equipment has helped increase the level of agricultural pro-
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.duction in the country. However, the continued monopoly on the importation 
and distribution of fertilizers has had negative effects. In addition to long 
delays in fertilizer delivery and the rationing of fertilizer among farms, this 
policy has led to additional costs, estimated at 30 percent of the farmgate 
price (Bakour 2004).
The Cost of Agricultural Subsidies
The cost of agricultural subsidies estimated by the State Planning Council is 
shown in Table 6.2. The value of subsidies is calculated as the difference in the 
value of these products at domestic prices and the opportunity costs of these 
products, measured by the international price after adjusting for transport 
costs and distribution margins up to the mill. The table shows that subsidies 
are equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP and that wheat subsidies account for 
about two-thirds of the total cost of food and agricultural subsidies.
  Another analysis, whose results are shown in Table 6.3, includes both 
direct subsidies and the losses of public enterprises in charge of market-
ing and processing agricultural commodities. Under this broader definition, 
subsidies for agricultural and food products in 2003 amounted to 6.8 percent 
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Table 6.3  Cost of government price intervention 
in Syria, 1998/99
  Value of subsidies
Subsidy type  (billions of SYP)  (% of GDP)
Wheat (1999)
  Public enterprise loss  26.29  3.24
  Subsidy to farmers  9.04  1.11
  Subsidy on standard flour  3.76  0.46
Cotton (1998/99)
  Public enterprise loss  6.42  0.79
  Subsidy to farmers  9.88  1.22
  Tax on domestic spinners  2.3  0.28
Sugar (1999)
  Public enterprise loss  3.72  0.46
  Subsidy to farmers  1.55  0.19
  Subsidy to consumers  1.63  0.20
Total
  Losses  36.43  4.49
  Subsidy to farmers  20.47  2.52
  Subsidy to consumers  5.39  0.66
  Tax on domestic industry  2.30  0.28
Source:   Westlake (2003).
Notes:   The official exchange rate on June 30, 1999, was SYP 41.85 
per US$1 according to www.oanda.com. SYP, Syrian £.of GDP. The table also shows the distribution of benefits between farmers 
and consumers. Sugarcane farmers and sugar consumers benefited in roughly 
equal amounts from the subsidies on sugar. In the case of wheat, some 85 
percent of the total price subsidies went to farmers.
  These figures are calculated at the aggregate level, without reference 
to the size distribution of the holdings and the land tenure status of farm-
ers. Little is known about the distribution of these gains among small-scale 
farmers and large-scale farmers. In absolute terms, it is safe to say that 
large-scale wheat farmers capture a disproportionate share of the subsidies 
because the subsidy benefits are proportional to wheat production. How-
ever, the percentage contribution of these subsidies to farm incomes among 
different farm groups depends on the importance of the subsidized crops 
within their incomes.
Recent Agricultural Policy Reforms
It is important to point out that the 1970s saw an increase in the use of pub-
lic monopolies in the marketing of many agricultural products in Syria. This 
involved the purchase and distribution of these products on local and foreign 
markets. These marketing monopolies were directed at various cereals, the 
main fruits, and crops and harvests for industrial processing. Disciplinary and 
penal sanctions were applied against individuals who did not respect the 
monopoly regulations, whether producers or traders.
  However, the beginning of the 1980s witnessed the introduction of a reform 
in the marketing policy for agricultural products. This reform involved the 
following:
•   the elimination of the system of compulsory importation of certain prod-
ucts (wheat, barley, lentils, chickpeas, maize, and others) by public 
enterprises and the elimination of the restriction on cereal purchases by 
the state trading enterprise from farmers who choose to sell;
•   the preservation of the state monopoly on the exportation of strategic 
products while granting concessions to the private sector to involve it 
in the exportation of cereals on condition of a prior agreement with the 
Grain Board;
•   the encouragement of the private sector to participate in export opera-
tions in fruits and vegetables through greater freedom in the use of foreign 
currency receipts, exemptions from the tax on agricultural production, 
and a reduction in the income tax;
•   authorization for public enterprises to process agricultural products and 
to obtain goods directly on the market at market prices without the obli-
gation to pay official prices, which are often higher than market prices; 
and
142  CHAPTER 6•   authorization for agricultural enterprises to market any of their produc-
tion that is not under state monopoly on local and foreign markets accord-
ing to the best interests of the enterprises.
Certainly these changes represent a movement toward liberalization in the 
marketing of agricultural products and in exportation. However, the results 
of these reforms have been modest for various reasons. First, the state 
monopoly on distribution has been maintained for strategic products, primar-
ily those for which the processing industries belong to the state. This covers 
mainly cotton, tobacco, and sugar beets. Second, there is an absence of 
export mechanisms able to facilitate trading relationships with foreign clients 
and foster new outlets. In addition, weaknesses in the marketing infrastruc-
ture and the high transaction costs in marketing have reduced the supply 
response in agriculture.
  Agricultural policy continues to be a subject of debate. Some are calling for 
the maintenance of the state marketing system based on administered prices, 
while others are calling for a more flexible system that responds to changes 
in supply and demand both in marketing and in fixing agricultural prices. In 
the latter case, public enterprises that process or export certain agricultural 
products must obtain their goods directly on the market through contracts with 
producers, cooperatives, or agricultural companies and wholesalers.
Trade Policy
Foreign trade is subject to a significant intervention, particularly through 
import barriers such as tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and technical bar-
riers to trade (NTBs). These import barriers are discussed in detail in the 
following paragraphs.
Tariffs
Syria’s current import tariffs range from 6 to 235 percent and average 35 per-
cent, including other duties and surcharges. There are 10 tariff bands. Statu-
tory tariffs range from 0 to 200 percent. These are supplemented by a unified 
duty that ranges from 6 to 35 percent, with the applied surcharge increasing 
with the level of the applicable tariff rate. The highest tariffs apply to the 
imports of certain types of vehicles. Tariffs of 100 percent or more apply to 
imports of certain fruits, vegetables, and processed foods, as well as textiles, 
ceramics, and glass products, all of which are produced locally. As discussed 
later, many of these products are also subject to quantitative restrictions on 
trade. Goods originating in GAFTA countries are duty free.
  The average tariff, weighted by the composition of imports, is currently 
only 8 percent, which is relatively low compared to the tariffs applied in other 
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But this low average tariff rate is misleading as an indicator of openness for 
two reasons. First, because it is an import-weighted tariff at the mean, it
gives less weight to those commodities on which the tariff rates are the high-
est. Second, it does not take into account the pervasive system of quantita-
tive restrictions, which raises effective protection (and thus the implicit tax 
on exports) substantially.
  If account is taken of the tariff equivalent of quantitative restrictions, 
the overall weighted average rate of protection exceeds 25 percent, making 
Syria one of the countries least open to trade in the MENA region (World Bank 
2004).1
Quantitative Restrictions
A quantitative restriction is any measure that limits the volume of trade directly 
rather than through import taxes. Examples include quotas, licensing require-
ments, and safeguard levies. In Syria, quantitative restrictions are implemented 
principally by the regulation of imports through four lists, as follows:
•   The first list comprises all products forbidden for importation for envi-
ronmental, security, or sanitary reasons. Officials indicate that this list is 
similar to ones used in OECD countries.
•   A second list encompasses all products forbidden for importation from 
non-GAFTA countries because of their negative impact on Syrian industry. 
All products on this list have an equivalent produced in Syria. The list cov-
ers a large number of agricultural and industrial products: flowers, animal 
products, forestry products, vegetable oils, sugar-based products, quarry-
ing products, plastic and rubber products, leather and leather products, 
wood products, paper products, silk, textiles and clothing, craft products, 
glass products, electrical machinery and materials, and so on.
•   The third list includes products that may be imported only by the public 
sector. This list includes, notably, oil and oil-related products, alcohol 
and beer, arms, cotton, some cereal products, tobacco, pharmaceutical 
products, salt, black cement, fish, fruits, olive oil, veterinary medicines, 
and phosphates.
•   The fourth list comprises products that were once imported only by par-
ticular public entities and that may now be imported by anyone provided 
that a commission is paid to the relevant public entities. This commission 
generally represents 3–5 percent of the import value before taxes. The 
most important products on this list are cars and transport machinery, 
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1 See Nashashibi (2002) for a comparison of trade openness among MENA countries.steel and steel products, wood, white cement, yarn for the textile industry, 
coffee, tea, rice, canned fish and meat, raw sugar, fertilizers, raw leather, 
and paper.
  Both public entities and private agents may theoretically import any 
products not included on these four lists. According to Syrian officials, there 
is thus no positive list of imports that are allowed in Syria. These Syrian offi-
cials made no mention of the existence of quotas, tariff quotas, or calendar 
restrictions or of the need to comply with particular standards.
  Measuring the impact of quantitative restrictions on prices is a difficult 
task. The most common method is the price-gap approach, which compares 
the domestic price of imported goods with the international price after 
adjustment for tariffs, shipping costs, costs of domestic transportation, and 
customs procedures and the impact of import and export financing schemes 
(Chemingui and Dessus 2004). The remaining price differentials between 
domestic and world prices thus measure the impact of quantitative restric-
tions on the domestic price of importable goods. This approach does have 
limitations because it is difficult to obtain accurate information on domestic 
and world prices at a sufficiently disaggregated level. In most cases, the esti-
mated tariff equivalent of quantitative restrictions covers a set of products.2 
In addition, it is impossible formally to assign the origin of the estimated 
residual price gap to an existing import regulation; for instance, corruption 
or quality differences might also partially explain the price gap.
  Given these qualifications, Table 6.4 presents estimates of the tariff 
equivalents of quantitative restrictions for selected agricultural commodi-
ties. Across all product categories (agricultural and nonagricultural), tariff 
rates are positively correlated with the tariff equivalents of quantitative 
restrictions, which suggests that both are used to support the same objective. 
Chemingui and Dessus (2004) estimate that across all product categories, the 
weighted average tariff equivalent of quantitative restrictions is 19 percent, 
compared to the weighted average tariff rate of 8 percent. Thus, quantitative 
restrictions probably represent the main source of trade protection in Syria.
Other Barriers to Trade
Two other barriers to trade tend to raise the cost of international trade 
between Syria and the rest of the world: (1) the use of a multiple exchange 
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN SYRIA  145   
2 The calculations carried out by Chemingui and Dessus (2004) cover, on average, 60 percent of 
the products within each group of imported products (and 50 percent on a weighted average). 
By default, the authors assumed that the share of imports not covered in each group faces the 
same tariff equivalent as the share of imports covered by their estimates.rate system in trade finance and (2) cumbersome customs procedures and 
inefficient trade logistics.3
  Syria’s import (and export) regime is complicated and rendered nontrans-
parent because of the multiple exchange rates for private and government 
entities. The exchange rate system in Syria has been tightly managed, with 
a total of 11 rates applied for different transactions. In the 1990s, many of 
these rates were unified, most recently in 2002, when the three exchange 
rates used for the valuation of imports were harmonized and, in 2004, with 
the unification of the rate used for budget calculations with the rate applied 
to other public sector operations.
  Until 2007, there were three exchange rates:
•   the official rate, determined by the Central Bank of Syria, valued at 46.5 
Syrian pounds (SYP 46.5) per US$1, which was used by the public sector for 
imports;
•   a free market rate, approximately SYP 53 per US$1, which was determined 
by supply and demand mainly on the Beirut foreign exchange market and 
was used for both commercial and noncommercial purposes; and
•   the so-called export proceeds rate, valued at SYP 51 per US$1, which was 
used to value foreign exchange that exporters are required to surrender.
As a result, imports were implicitly subsidized at different rates depending on 
the end user, while exports were implicitly taxed by an overvalued exchange 
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Table 6.4  Tariff equivalents of quantitative restrictions and tariffs on 
agricultural products in Syria, 2004 (percent)
  Tariff equivalent of  Tariffs on
Sector  quantitative restrictions  agricultural products
Fish products (SITC 03)  3.9  19.5
Fruits and nuts (SITC 057)  27.4  54.0
Other food, live animals, oils, fats,  19.9  7.8 
  and waxes (rest of SITC 0–4) 
Tobacco and beverages (SITC 1)  309.3  110.1
Source:   Chemingui and Dessus (2004).
Note:   SITC, Standard International Trade Classification.
3 The term technical barrier to trade used here does not perfectly match the international 
definition. In particular, the multiple exchange rate system in place may also be considered a 
nontariff measure because it directly affects the price of imports and exports. But because it 
also entails additional transaction costs, one is equally justified in considering it a technical bar-
rier to trade.rate, again at different rates depending on the export sector. Estimates car-
ried out by Chemingui and Dessus (2004) suggest that the average implicit 
subsidy on imports stemming from this system amounted to the equivalent 
of 2.7 percent of the value of imports. Similarly, the implicit tax on exports 
amounted to 8.9 percent of the total value of exports. These estimates are a 
function of the difference between the exchange rate that applies to public- 
and private-sector entities, as well as the magnitude of the foreign exchange 
surrender requirement.
  Customs procedures and regulations constrain trade through a lack of con-
sistency, a manual system for processing customs data, and the inadequate 
distribution of information on procedures and requirements. One additional 
implication of the complex system of customs tariffs and duties and the 
nontariff regime is that enforcement requires complicated and burdensome 
procedures. Estimates by Chemingui and Dessus (2004) suggest that the 
tax equivalent of the transaction costs related to the clearance of goods is 
around 15 percent.4 They also suggest that the implicit tax on exports due to 
transaction costs is around 15 percent. Moreover, the incidence of the system 
varies not only by sector but also by type of firm or product, depending on 
whether the producers or importers are public or private.
Recent Trade Policy Reform
A number of actions have been taken over the past few years to liberalize 
the trade regime. The fact that imports may be undertaken by the private 
sector has been a significant change, as has been the gradual unification of 
the various exchange rates that apply to private and public transactions. The 
foreign exchange surrender requirement was further reduced to 10 percent in 
2004. Traders in possession of import licenses are now also allowed to import 
directly. (They were previously required to use local agents.) Furthermore, 
it is no longer necessary to finance imports using foreign exchange generated 
from exports. There has also been a reduction in the number of prohibited 
imports, and explicit export taxes have been eliminated. Syria is gradually 
becoming integrated into the world economy at the regional and multilateral 
levels.
The Effect of Policy on Agricultural Prices
The pricing and commercialization policies applied in Syria, together with 
the trade policy, have protected Syrian farmers from the negative effects 
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4 This is consistent with the survey-based information in Zarrouk (2003), described earlier. Rela-
tive to the import procedures of other countries in the region, Syria’s are considered among the 
more problematic and costly by international traders.of volatility in world markets, particularly in the case of wheat, cotton, and 
sugar. Furthermore, government-administered pricing commands a signifi-
cant role in the rural economy because of its large-scale sequencing impact 
on resource allocations and farmer incomes down to the farm level (UNDP 
2005b).
  According to a recent study carried out by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO 2003), if farm incomes were not 
supported by government purchasing at official prices, farmers growing stra-
tegic crops, because of their high costs of production, would take losses in 
a normal-rainfall year, and, in the case of irrigated wheat and sugar beets, 
the losses would be higher. These losses would induce farmers to switch to 
other crops until only the lowest-cost producers remained in the market. The 
generous subsidies paid to producers and received by consumers are at the 
expense of the huge losses incurred by state-owned enterprises that purchase 
and process wheat, seed cotton, and sugar beets.
  It is important to note that the seven crops that the government considers 
strategic crops and on which it continues to set producer prices account for 
over half the total value of national crop production and occupy about three-
quarters of the 4.6 million hectares that are under cultivation in Syria. Wheat 
and cotton are, by far, the most important of the strategic crops in terms of 
farmgate value and employment creation.
  By comparing the equivalent import or export price at the farmgate, one 
may estimate the magnitude of support provided to farmers for strategic crops 
in Syria. This kind of analysis was carried out by Westlake (2003) using 1999 
data on six of the seven strategic crops. For sugar beets, the producer price 
in the late 1990s was almost three times import parity, rendering beets much 
more protected than any other crop in the country. Soft wheat producer prices 
were 66 percent higher than import parity. Cotton producer prices exceeded 
export parity by 31 percent as result of a steady decline in international prices 
for cotton fiber from 1995 to 1999. For barley, official prices were roughly 
equal to import parity but well above export parity. In the case of lentils 
and chickpeas, official prices were below the estimated export parity price. 
The analysis also showed that, to the extent that farmers may switch among 
crops in response to relative profitability, government price intervention has 
artificially stimulated the production of wheat, cotton, and sugar beets at the 
expense of barley, lentil, and chickpea production (Table 6.5).
Trade Agreements
At the regional level, in February 1997 Syria signed the agreement leading to 
GAFTA. In 1998 and 1999 it signed bilateral FTAs with Lebanon and Jordan, 
148  CHAPTER 6respectively, and in 2005 it signed an FTA with Tunisia. In October 1997, Syria 
formally started negotiations on the association agreement with the E.U. An 
agreement was reached in 2004 but has not yet been ratified by the European 
countries and so has not entered into effect. At the multilateral level, in 
October 2001 Syria requested accession to the WTO, but few advances have 
been achieved toward accession.
  The FTA signed between Syria and the E.U. (which has not entered into 
effect) calls for reinforcement of the trade relationship between Syria and 
the E.U. This will require significant reform in Syrian trade policy and in the 
application of instruments of protection in Syria. The main provisions of the 
Syria-E.U. association agreement relate to trade in agricultural products and 
are in four sections. The first section relates to E.U. imports of Syrian agri-
cultural products. Accordingly, annual tariff quotas have been set for Syrian 
exports of selected horticultural products (Table 6.6).
  For fresh tomatoes, a reduction of 60 percent applies to the MFN duty 
for quantities above the quota, although for products to which entry prices 
apply, this entry price is maintained. For other products, at the entry into 
force of the agreement the ad valorem duty will be set at zero for unlimited 
quantities. A list of these products has been annexed to the agreement. For
a certain number of other products, at the entry into force of the agree-
ment the ad valorem duty will be set at zero under a tariff quota covering tradi-
tional trade. A list of these products has also been annexed to the agreement. 
Finally, for a number of products, at the entry into force of the agreement the 
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Table 6.5  Comparison of official and parity producer prices in 
Syria, 2003
    Import parity  Official price as 
  Official producer  price at the  a percentage
  price (millions   farmgate (millions   of the import
Product  of SYP/year)  of SYP/year)  parity price
Import product
  Soft wheat  10,800  6,497  166
  Barley  7,500  7,316  103
  Sugar beets  2,150  746  288
Export product
  Lentils  16,000  18,799  85
  Chickpeas  17,800  28,852  62
  Cotton  29,290  22,291  69
Source:   Westlake (2003).
Note:   SYP, Syrian £.ad valorem duty will be reduced to a certain level. A list of these products 
has been annexed to the agreement.
  The second section includes regulations on the import by Syria of agricul-
tural products originating in the E.U. For these products Syria will dismantle 
its tariffs to reach a zero tariff sequentially according to the following 
schema: 0–5 percent at entry into force, 5–10 percent in year 4, 10–40 percent 
in year 7, 40–100 percent reduced to 40 percent at entry into force and then a 
linear reduction to zero in year 12, above 100 percent reduced to 70 percent 
at entry into force and a linear reduction to zero at year 12. Additionally, 
annual tariff quotas at zero duty have been set for European exports for the 
following products without entry price: oranges (1,500 tons), small citrus 
fruits (750 tons), and fresh apples (2,500 tons).
  The third section concerns processed agricultural products. Syria will grant 
annual tariff preference quotas for the following categories of these products: 
mineral water, soft drinks, spirits, cigarettes, and homogenized tobacco. Within 
the quotas, the applied tariff will be reduced by 40 percent when the agree-
ment comes into force.
  Finally, Syrian tariffs on fish will be dismantled over 12 years, with 0–10 
percent reductions immediately, 10–30 percent in 5 years, 30–80 percent in 
7 years, and all above 80 percent brought down to 80 percent at entry into 
force and dismantled over 12 years. On the other hand, all imports into the 
E.U. are to be dismantled by the third year after entry into force, with the 
exception of tuna, on which an annual quota of 100 metric tons will apply. 
(Currently, Syria does not export fish to the E.U.)
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Table 6.6  Proposed changes in European Union quotas for Syrian exports
   Initial
   quota
Commodity  Season  (metric tons)  Increase in quota
Potatoes January  1–April 30  25,000  Annual increase of 1,000 metric tons 
        for two years
Potatoes June  1–July 31  5,000  No change
Fresh tomatoes  All year  15,000  Annual increase of 3% for two years
Oranges January  1–May 31  25,000  Annual increase of 3% for two years
Small citrus  November 1–February 28  13,000  Annual increase of 3% for two years
Lemons October  1–March 30  7,000  Annual increase of 3% for two years
Fresh grapes  November 1–July 31  3,000  Annual increase of 3% for two years
Fresh apples  All year  20,000  No change
Olive oil  All year  10,000  Annual increase of 1,000 metric tons 
        for two years
Source:   Draft European Union–Syria Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreement.Poverty
According to the United Nations Development Programme, 11.4 percent of 
the Syrian population is unable to meet their basic food and nonfood needs. 
Furthermore, measured by the lower household-specific expenditure poverty 
lines, poverty in Syria rises to 30.1 percent, representing almost 5.3 million 
individuals. Measured according to the international measure of US$2 a day, 
10.4 percent of Syrians are poor (UNDP 2005b).
  Although poverty is generally more prevalent in rural Syria than in urban 
areas, the greatest difference is geographical. As shown in Table 6.7, in the 
northeastern region both rural and urban areas suffer from the greatest inci-
dence, depth, and severity of poverty; the southern urban region has very 
low levels of poverty; and the middle and coastal regions have intermediate 
levels of poverty. The same report shows that poverty decreased between 
1996–97 and 2003–04 for Syria as a whole, but regional patterns differ. The 
incidence of poverty declined rapidly in the middle and southern regions, 
especially in rural areas. Poverty declined moderately in urban areas of 
the northeastern and coastal regions. However, poverty actually rose in 
rural parts of these regions. Over this period, inequality in Syria as a whole 
rose slightly: the Gini coefficient rose from 0.33 to 0.37. However, a large 
increase in average per capita expenditure outweighed the effects of this 
increased disparity.
  Results from the 2003–04 surveys show that lack of education is the char-
acteristic with the strongest correlation to poverty in Syria. More than 18 per-
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Table 6.7  Poverty measures in Syria, by region, 2003–04
Population 
group  P0  P1  P2 Poor  Nonpoor  Overall
Urban
  Southern  5.8  1.23  0.45  10  21  19
  Northeastern  11.2  1.79  0.44  20  21  21
  Middle  9.0  1.64  0.46  5  7  7
  Coastal  9.3  1.95  0.60  3  4  4
Rural
  Southern  10.7  2.03  0.64  10  11  11
  Northeastern  17.9  3.51  1.01  38  22  24
  Middle  11.1  1.81  0.49  9  9  9
  Coastal  9.7  1.92  0.57  4  5  5
  All Syria  11.4  2.13  0.62  100  100  100
Source:   UNDP (2005b).
Note:   Poverty estimates are based on the lower poverty line.
 Poverty  measures  Percentage sharecent of the poor population was illiterate, and poverty was most widespread, 
deepest, and most severe among these individuals. Poverty was inversely 
correlated with educational attainment, so even a moderate improvement 
in education could reduce the ranks of the poor. In urban areas the poverty 
headcount ranged from 11.7 percent among illiterate persons to only 1.5 
percent among university graduates. The corresponding rates in rural areas 
were 16.5 and 5.0 percent (UNDP 2005b).
  The same study shows that the highest poverty rates were among those 
self-employed in marginal and unskilled activities and among nonwage work-
ers. Agriculture and construction were overrepresented within poor groups. 
Moreover, the poor were more likely to work in the informal sector, which 
employed 48 percent of the poor. Unemployment rates correlated with pov-
erty; the poverty incidence among the unemployed was higher than average 
in urban areas. Table 6.8 shows that more than 50 percent of the poor in 
rural areas are farmers, while only 38 percent of the nonpoor in rural areas 
are farmers.
  Table 6.9 presents the main poverty indicators for heads of household 
working in agriculture. Only 9.3 percent of urban heads of household working 
in agriculture are poor, while 18 percent of agricultural households in rural 
areas are poor. It is worth noting that 17 percent of agricultural households 
are poor compared to 11 percent of all Syrian households.
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Table 6.8  Distribution of the population 
in Syria, by location, poverty status, and 
agricultural or other pursuits, 2005 (percent)
Population   Other
group Agriculture  activities  Total
Urban
  Poor  5.7  94.4  100.0
  Nonpoor  5.2  94.8  100.0
  Total  5.3  94.8  100.0
Rural
  Poor  50.4  49.6  100.0
  Nonpoor  38.2  61.8  100.0
  Total  40.0  60.0  100.0
All Syria
  Poor  33.9  66.1  100.0
  Nonpoor  21.5  78.5  100.0
  Total  22.9  77.1  100.0
Source:   UNDP (2005b).The Impact of Wheat Market Liberalization on the Poor
Background
Syria’s recently adopted five-year plan (2006–10) gives high priority to meet-
ing the challenge of reducing the fiscal deficit by 7 percentage points of GDP 
over the period. The main strategy for achieving this objective is to reduce 
expenditure by phasing out subsidies and to increase revenue by adopting a 
value-added consumption tax.
  Phasing out subsidies would have a significant effect on the fiscal deficit. 
First, the cost of agricultural and energy subsidies is large, about 18.9 per-
cent of GDP. Second, unlike raising taxes, this measure can yield significant 
efficiency gains given the large deadweight loss associated with this policy. 
Third, the policy reform is an opportunity to make government subsidies 
more equitable, converting them to a powerful instrument for redistribution 
and poverty reduction. Fourth, the short-term contractionary impact on the 
economy will be smaller and the contribution to the adjustment of external 
accounts larger than using other fiscal measures. Finally, by pushing for greater 
efficiency in resource allocation and protecting budgetary spending on edu-
cation, health, and infrastructure, this reform will improve the economy’s 
long-term growth and balance-of-payments prospects (Chemingui and Fetini 
2006).
  In this section we examine the economic and distributional effects of the 
removal of wheat subsidies. We focus on wheat because of its importance 
in agricultural policy: wheat output represents 12 percent of total agricul-
tural production, but this sector receives two-thirds of the total support to 
farmers. There is a close link between the removal of wheat producer sub-
sidies and trade liberalization in the sense that restrictions on wheat imports 
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Table 6.9  Poverty measures for households 
in Syria whose heads are working in agriculture, 
2005
 
Population         Percentage of
group  P0  P1  P2   population
Urban 9.3  1.7  0.4  5.4
Rural 18.0  3.5  1.1  40.6
All Syria  17.0  3.3  1.0  23.5
Source:   UNDP (2005b).
Poverty measurefacilitate the government policy of supporting wheat prices. In other words, 
it would be difficult to sustain the high support prices for wheat if imports 
were liberalized. In this sense, simulating the reduction in wheat subsidies 
corresponds to a policy of reducing agricultural trade protection.
  For this analysis we have developed a static CGE model linked to data 
from the Syrian household expenditure survey. The model is used to assess 
the direct and indirect implications of reducing the producer price of wheat 
to international levels and increasing the consumer prices of wheat products 
through a reduction in subsidies. The assessment will focus on the overall 
economic structure and on household consumption and welfare.
Methods
The model used in this study is a static CGE model based on the standard 
static CGE model developed by Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). The 
Syrian standard CGE model explains all of the payments that are recorded in 
the SAM with which it is associated. The model is based on a SAM that was, 
in turn, based on the input-output table built by Chemingui and Fetini (2006) 
to assess the effect of phasing out subsidies on energy products. The model 
includes ten households, each representing one decile of the Syrian popula-
tion. This allows us to examine the impact of alternative policies on different 
income groups in the country. A more detailed description of the model is 
provided in the appendix to this chapter.
  The model is used to simulate three scenarios:
•   a reduction in the subsidies on wheat production and wheat consumption 
by 20 percent,
•   a reduction in the subsidies on wheat production and wheat consumption 
by 50 percent, and
•   the elimination of the subsidies on wheat production and wheat consump-
tion.
The decrease in the wheat producer price and the increase in the consumer 
prices for wheat products would have multiple effects on the economy and 
on households. The change would affect virtually all households as consumers 
and some households as producers as well. The most immediate and publicly 
visible impact of the proposed reform of subsidies would be on the cost of 
living for wheat-consuming households, which would face higher prices for 
wheat products such as bread. In addition, the decline in the producer price 
of wheat would negatively affect the income of wheat-producing farmers. In 
addition to these two direct effects, there would be indirect effects whereby 
the new set of relative prices would induce a reallocation in resources; farm-
ers would reallocate land and labor from wheat to competing crops, and con-
154  CHAPTER 6sumers would substitute other foods for wheat products. Other households
would be affected by the reallocation of consumer spending and by the re-
allocation of factors of production.
  We calculated the incremental effects on sectoral production and prices 
and the overall cost of living caused by the proposed reform in wheat prices 
and the prices of wheat derivates. We did this by combining a SAM that shows 
the input structure for the production of all final goods and a consumer 
expenditure survey that shows the amount of each final good purchased by 
households differentiated by decile welfare groups. It is important to note 
that the current version of the SAM does not differentiate farmers from non-
farmers; household categories are defined only by their level of per capita 
consumption. The income sources for each category of household are com-
posed of labor income, capital income, remittances, and other transfers.5
Results
The macroeconomic effects of the reduction or elimination of the wheat 
subsidies would be relatively modest, as shown in Table 6.10. Aggregate con-
sumption, imports, and exports would change by less than 1 percent even 
with the full elimination of the subsidies (Simulation 3). The positive (albeit 
small) effect of the subsidy removal would be due to the elimination of a 
policy distortion that creates an inefficiency loss in the economy. The largest 
macroeconomic effect would be on government savings, which would increase 
by 2.77 percentage points of GDP as a result of the elimination of the subsi-
dies. In other words, government savings would increase from 0.78 percent of 
GDP to 1.99 percent of GDP. Private savings would decline by 3.65 percentage 
points of GDP as a result of the subsidy removal.
  Table 6.11 shows the impact of subsidy reduction or removal on the prices 
and output in various sectors of the economy. Not surprisingly, the sectors 
most affected would be the wheat and food processing (including milling) 
sectors. The producer price of wheat would decline by 4 percent with a 
20 percent reduction in subsidies and by 16.5 percent with the complete 
elimination of the subsidies. The lower producer prices imply a decline in the 
profitability of wheat production and some substitution toward other crops. 
Because of the relatively inelastic supply of wheat, even complete elimina-
tion of the subsidy would cause a decrease in wheat production of less than 
2 percent. Thus, farmers will be the direct losers from this reform, at least 
in the short run.
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Table 6.10  Estimated impact of wheat subsidy removal on macroeconomic 
indicators in Syria
    20% reduction  50% reduction  Elimination
    in wheat  in wheat  of wheat 
 Base  year  subsidies  subsidies  subsidies
Indicator  value  (% change)    (% change)  (% change)
Real absorption  1,184.90  0.13  0.31  0.49
Real household consumption  764.01  0.19  0.48  0.76
Total real exports  431.95  0.17  0.46  0.77
Total real imports  403.74  0.19  0.49  0.82
 Percentage
  of GDP  (% change)  (% change)  (% change)
Investment 20.58  –0.02  –0.06  –0.10
Private savings  25.32  –0.89  –2.25  –3.65
Trade deficit  –4.21 0.00  0.01  0.02
Government saving  –0.78 0.70  0.01  2.77
Tariff revenue  1.52  0.00  1.74  0.02
Source:   Simulation results using a computable general equilibrium model for Syria.
  The policy reforms would have mixed effects on the wheat milling indus-
try. The sector would benefit from the lower price of wheat, but, on the 
other hand, it would lose subsidies for wheat processing, and the volume of 
wheat production (and thus processing) would decline. Thus, the food pro-
cessing sector, which includes wheat milling, would face better prices but a 
smaller volume (see Table 6.11). It appears that the net effect on the sector 
would be slightly positive in that the price increase would be greater than 
the volume decrease. The impact of these policy changes on output in other 
sectors would generally be positive because of the elimination of the distor-
tion in the economy but small because the effects would be indirect.
  The magnitude of the welfare loss for the average consumer would not 
be very great because the share of wheat in household expenditures is low 
and because a relatively small share of households grow wheat.6 Disaggregat-
6 The impact on welfare (welfare loss) is a relative concept in that it measures what is needed 
in terms of money to keep expenditures per group at the same level as before the increase 
in prices. A subsidy reduction by SYP 1 would matter more to the poorest consumers than to 
the richest and would contribute to a higher welfare loss for the former than for the latter. In 
absolute terms, the impact would differ according to the amount of expenditure by different 
household groups in the wheat product and the other products linked to it, so those households 
consuming more of a subsidized product (and therefore allocated more subsidies) would lose 
more if the prices for consumer goods were increased.AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN SYRIA  157   
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.ing the welfare losses resulting from the reduction in wheat subsidies shows 
that the richest 10 percent of the population would gain the most from the 
reforms and the top 50 percent would gain something, while the poorest 50 
percent of households would lose (Table 6.12). This difference reflects the 
original unequal distribution of benefits from subsidies among different con-
sumers and producers of these products and the similar distribution of income 
sources among categories. However, the effects would be quite small; the 
welfare changes associated with full subsidy removal would be less than 1 
percent for all groups except the richest 10 percent of households.
Summary
The Syrian agricultural sector is characterized by a high degree of government 
intervention, including fixed prices, state marketing boards, state monopolies 
in the marketing of strategic crops, state monopolies in the distribution of 
fertilizer, and high barriers to the importation of agricultural commodities and 
food products. Reforms to liberalize the agricultural sector have been intro-
duced in recent years, but the sector remains one of the most highly regulated 
agricultural sectors in the MENA region.
  On the one hand, agricultural policy toward the main strategic crops 
has been successful in achieving national self-sufficiency in wheat and rapid 
growth in the production of the country’s main agricultural export commod-
ity, cotton. It has also prevented the development of large disparities in the 
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Table 6.12  Estimated impact of wheat subsidy removal 
on welfare in Syria, by income decile
  Change in household welfare
  (equivalent variation as a percentage of income)
 20%  50%  Elimination
Population   reduction in  reduction in  of wheat 
decile  wheat subsidies   wheat subsidies  subsidies
Poorest  –0.06  –0.19  –0.42
2  –0.06  –0.22  –0.47
3  –0.02  –0.10  –0.26
4  –0.01  –0.08  –0.21
5  –0.02  –0.03  –0.12
6 0.04  0.03  –0.01
7 0.05  0.08  0.08
8 0.09  0.11  0.13
9 0.53  0.23  0.34
Richest 0.19  1.35  2.20
Source:   Simulation results using a computable general equilibrium model 
for Syria.incomes of rural and urban households. On the other hand, the policy has 
achieved these objectives at a high cost in terms of government budgetary 
resources and the efficiency of resource allocation within the agricultural 
sector. Subsidies in agriculture and energy have also contributed to an 
unsustainable budget deficit. With the depletion of oil reserves over the 
coming 10–15 years, the government will need to find alternative sources of 
economic growth and fiscal revenue. The latest five-year plan envisages the 
phasing out of subsidies and the implementation of a value-added tax.
  Broad domestic liberalization of the agricultural sector would result in 
substitution away from wheat, sugar beets, and cotton and toward barley, 
lentils, and chickpeas. Completion of the EMP agreement with the E.U. will 
expand the exports of fruits, vegetables, and olive oil if Syrian producers can 
meet exacting quality and food safety requirements.
  About two-thirds of the agricultural subsidies are devoted to maintain-
ing a high producer price for wheat and low consumer prices for bread and 
other wheat products. By banning the private importation of wheat and by 
not importing through the state marketing board, government policy keeps 
the domestic price of wheat 66 percent higher than the import parity price. 
Wheat is the most important staple food, as well as an important source of 
income for farmers, so the government is particularly sensitive to the impact 
of reducing or removing import protection and subsidies for wheat. Using a 
CGE model that simulates the effect of policy changes on households in 10 
income categories, we examined the effect of liberalizing wheat markets by 
removing import protection and eliminating subsidies. The macroeconomic 
effects would be relatively modest, although government savings would 
increase by almost 3 percent of GDP. Complete liberalization would reduce 
the producer price of wheat by about 17 percent and production by about 2 
percent. The effects of subsidy removal on the welfare of Syrian households 
would be regressive in the sense that high-income households would gain 
while lower-income households would lose. The magnitude of the effects, 
however, would be quite small: less than 1 percent of the base incomes for 
all but the richest income group.
  It is important that one keep three factors in mind in interpreting these 
results. First, the impact on farmers (particularly wheat farmers) will be 
larger than the impact on the poorer deciles because each decile includes 
both farmers and nonfarmers, thus diluting the adverse impact of the reforms 
on wheat farmers. If one-third of the poorest decile are farmers and we 
assume that there would be no impact on nonfarmers, the impact on poor 
wheat farmers would be a decline of 1.3 percent (0.42/0.33) in welfare.
  Second, the distributional impact will vary among farmers. Farmers growing 
and selling large quantities of wheat will lose the most in absolute terms from 
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The impact of the reforms in terms of percentage changes in real incomes 
will depend on net sales of wheat as a percentage of household incomes. If 
net sales are a large share of incomes, the negative effect will be large. More 
information on the share of incomes from wheat and other crops would be 
needed to explore the distributional impact among farmers.
  Third, the impact of liberalization on the poor depends partly on comple-
mentary policies. For example, if the wheat market reforms were imple-
mented along with a reduction in energy subsidies, the combined effect 
would be more pro-poor. The study recently carried out by the World Bank 
(Chemingui and Fetini 2006) shows that, in the case of subsidies on energy 
products, 80 percent of the people will be better off; the maximum gain 
would accrue to the poorest decile, which would obtain a net gain equiva-
lent to 35 percent of the decile’s overall consumption. Only the two richest 
deciles would experience a net loss (equivalent to 2.5 percent and 5.5 per-
cent of decile consumption, respectively). Alternatively, the wheat subsidy 
reduction could be implemented in conjunction with a safety net program 
that used a portion of the fiscal savings for targeted programs for the poor.
  One aspect of agricultural policy that is more important in Syria (and 
Egypt) than in the other countries under consideration is that the support 
for wheat farmers is provided in large part through direct subsidies from the 
government rather than through the taxation of consumers through import 
tariffs. This increases the feasibility of a political solution whereby a portion 
of the savings from reducing these subsidies could be used to compensate 
those who would lose from the reforms. One possibility would be to use some 
of the fiscal savings to implement a direct income-support program that 
would compensate wheat farmers for losses associated with the reforms. The 
compensation should be a fixed amount based on historical production or 
area and could be phased out over a number of years, giving wheat farmers 
the time and resources necessary to develop alternative income sources (see 
Olhan 2006 and Chapter 8).
Appendix 6A: Methods for Estimating the Impact of 
Trade Liberalization on Syria
The model used in this study is a static CGE model and directly inspired by 
the prototype developed by Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). The Syrian 
standard CGE model explains all of the payments that are recorded in the SAM 
with which it is associated. The model is based on a SAM that was, in turn, 
based on the input-output table built by Chemingui and Fetini (2006) to assess 
the effect of phasing out subsidies on energy products.
160  CHAPTER 6  Regarding domestic supply, each producer (represented by an activity) 
is assumed to maximize profits, defined as the difference between revenue 
earned and the cost of factors and intermediate inputs. Profits are maximized 
subject to constraints that capture the production technology and optional 
rigidities in factor employment. At the top level, the technology is specified 
by a constant elasticity of substitution function or, alternatively, by a Leontief 
function of the quantities of value added and aggregate intermediate input. 
Value added is itself a constant elasticity of substitution function of primary 
factors, whereas the aggregate intermediate input is a Leontief function of 
disaggregated intermediate inputs. Each activity produces one or more com-
modities according to fixed yield coefficients. As noted, a commodity may 
be produced by more than one activity. Revenue from the activity is defined 
by the level of the activity, yields, and commodity prices at the producer 
level. Factor incomes are distributed to domestic and foreign institutions in 
fixed shares that are defined by factor and activity. The value added is then 
decomposed in two substitutable parts: aggregate capital-labor and land. The 
aggregate capital-land is further disaggregated into land and capital. Land is 
used only by agricultural activities as described in the SAM. Labor is further 
disaggregated into agricultural labor and urban labor. Agricultural labor is fully 
employed and perfectly mobile across agricultural activities, while urban labor 
is also fully employed and perfectly mobile across nonagricultural activities.
  In the CGE model institutions are represented by households (deciles), 
enterprises, the government, and the rest of the world. The households (dis-
aggregated as in the SAM) receive incomes from the factors of production 
(directly or indirectly via the enterprises) and transfers from other institutions. 
More specifically, each household receives fixed shares of factor income flows 
(disaggregated by factor and source, either domestic activities or the rest of 
the world). Transfers from the rest of the world to households are fixed in 
foreign currency.
  The households use their incomes to save, consume, and make transfers 
to other institutions. In the current model, direct taxes and transfers to other 
institutions (both domestic and the rest of the world) are defined as fixed 
shares of household income, whereas the savings share is flexible for selected 
households. Household consumption at market prices (adjusted for taxes 
and subsidies) is allocated across different commodities according to linear 
expenditure system demand functions derived from the maximization of a 
Stone-Geary utility function. Instead of being paid directly to the households, 
factor incomes may be paid to one or more enterprises.
  Enterprises may also receive transfers from other institutions. Enterprise 
incomes are allocated to savings and transfers to other institutions. Enterprises do
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN SYRIA  161   not consume. Apart from this, the payments to and from enterprises are 
modeled in the same way as the payments to and from households. The gov-
ernment collects taxes and receives transfers from other institutions. In the 
current model, all taxes are at fixed ad valorem rates. Transfers from the 
rest of the world are exogenous in foreign currency, whereas transfers from 
domestic institutions are fixed shares of the net (posttax and savings) incomes 
of these institutions. The government uses this income to finance its own 
consumption, commodity and activity subsidies, and transfers to other insti-
tutions. Government consumption is fixed in real (quantity) terms, whereas 
government transfers to domestic institutions (households and enterprises) 
are indexed to the consumer price index. Government savings (the difference 
between government income and spending) is a flexible residual. The final 
institution is the rest of the world.
  Commodities pass through a chain, the first stage of which consists of 
the generation of aggregated domestic output from the output of different 
activities for a given commodity. These outputs are imperfectly fungible as a 
result of, for example, differences in timing, quality, and location among dif-
ferent activities. A constant elasticity of substitution function is used as the 
aggregation function. The demand for the output of each activity is derived 
through the problem of minimizing the cost of supplying a given quantity of 
aggregated output, subject to this constant elasticity of substitution func-
tion. Activity-specific commodity prices serve to clear the implicit market 
for each disaggregated commodity. At the next stage, aggregated domestic 
output is allocated between exports and domestic sales on the assumption 
that suppliers maximize sales revenue for any given aggregate output level, 
subject to imperfect transformability between exports and domestic sales, 
expressed by a constant elasticity of transformation function.
  On international markets, export demand is infinitely elastic at given 
world prices. The price received by domestic suppliers for exports is expressed 
in domestic currency (to the border) and export taxes (if any). The supply 
price for domestic sales is equal to the price paid because of domestic demand 
(from the supplier to satisfy demand) per unit of domestic sales. If the com-
modity is not exported, total output is passed to the domestic market.
  Domestic demand is made up of the sum of the demand deriving from 
household consumption, government consumption, investment, and inter-
mediate inputs. If the supply of a commodity destined for domestic use is 
made up of both imports and domestic output, all domestic market demand is 
a composite commodity made up of imports and domestic output, the demand 
for which is derived on the assumption that those who account for domestic 
demand minimize their costs, subject to imperfect substitutability. Total 
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which is not satisfied by domestic production and toward the domestic output 
of nonimported commodities. Demand prices are adjusted for commodity taxes 
and subsidies. The derived demand for imported commodities is met through 
international supplies that are infinitely elastic at given world prices. The 
import prices paid because of domestic demand also include import tariffs (at 
fixed ad valorem rates). Similarly, the derived demand for domestic output is 
met by domestic suppliers. Flexible prices balance between the demand for 
and the supply of domestically marketed domestic output.
  Finally, several macroeconomic constraints are introduced in the model. 
First, the small country assumption holds; the Syrian economy is unable to 
change world prices, so its imports and exports prices are exogenous. Capital 
transfers are exogenous as well, and therefore the trade balance is fixed so 
as to achieve the balance-of-payments equilibrium.
  The SAM used here is based on the input-output table built by Chemingui 
and Fetini (2006) to assess the effect of phasing out subsidies on energy prod-
ucts. This input-output table is converted to a SAM using additional information 
on income formation and transfers among different institutions. The activity 
structure of the SAM has been updated for this study by adding new sectors and 
commodities (wheat and wheat derivatives) and by aggregating others (mainly 
energy products). The specification of the agricultural sectors has also been 
rendered consistent with the need for meaningful mapping between input-
output sectors and household expenditure items so as to be able to measure 
the effects of subsidy reforms on household welfare. The specification of the 
input-output structure has been based on detailed microeconomic data at the 
sectoral level but also at the enterprise level in some cases.
  Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported products is set 
at 2.2. The elasticity of transformation between products intended for the 
domestic market and products for exports is 5.0. Trade elasticities come from 
the empirical literature devoted to CGE models. They are not specific to Syria. 
See, for instance, Burniaux, Nicoletti, and Oliveira-Martins (1992); Konan and 
Maskus (1997); or the more recent Gallaway, McDaniel, and Rivera (2000). 
Devarajan, Go, and Li (1999) econometrically estimated substitutions elastici-
ties for Syria and obtained results close to 0.1 for both Armington and CET 
elasticities. These elasticities are not distinguished by product, which explains 
their low levels to a large extent. Nor are they statistically significant.
  Substitution elasticities in the production function are the following: 0.5 
between intermediate consumption and value added, 1.0 between aggregate 
capital and labor, 0.0 between the physical capital and land, and 0.4 between 
various types of labor.
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changing the values for international trade substitution elasticities as well as 
substitution elasticities between fixed and mobile factors. For trade elastici-
ties, halved values for imports and exports are tested. This cut in substitut-
ability between domestic and foreign products reduces the magnitude of the 
impact of a cut in tariffs, but consumers do not turn toward foreign products. 
When substitution elasticity between capital and labor and between different 
types of capital (physical and land) are doubled, the cost of trade liberaliza-
tion is lower, but the direction of the impact does not change.
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Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Morocco
T
he Kingdom of Morocco has approximately 30 million inhabitants, about 
half the population of Egypt. A little more than half (57 percent) of 
the population lives in Casablanca, Rabat, and other urban areas. It is 
a lower-middle-income country, with per capita GDP of about US$1,667, close 
to the average for the MENA countries.1
  Since joining the WTO in 1995, Morocco has been liberalizing its agricul-
tural trade policies. The state monopoly on the importation of staple foods 
has been dismantled except for the import of common wheat flour. Quantita-
tive import restrictions have been converted to tariffs, resulting in tariffs as 
high as 339 percent. The tariffs on agricultural imports average 33 percent. 
Consumer subsidies are being maintained on common wheat flour and sugar. 
Variable import duties are used to stabilize and support the farmgate prices 
of wheat, barley, maize, rice, and sorghum (WTO 2003).
  Morocco joined the WTO in January 1995 and signed the EMP agreement 
with the E.U. the following year. The EMP agreement calls for the elimination 
of Moroccan industrial duties between 2000 and 2012. Morocco is among the 
first MENA countries with existing agreements with the E.U. to have signed 
the EMP in 2005. Under the EMP, the E.U. is committing to allow greater 
access to its markets and contribute greater financial assistance to its Medi-
terranean partners (World Bank 2009). In 2003 Morocco signed an FTA with 
the United States; this will be implemented over 10 years.
  In spite of these agreements, Morocco retains a relatively high tariff 
structure. The World Bank estimates that the simple average tariff rate is 
among the highest 1 percent among the world’s countries. Morocco’s progress 
in reducing tariffs over 2000–04 has been about average compared with that 
of other countries in the world (World Bank 2005).
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1 This is the per capita GDP in 2006, measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2008b).The Agricultural Sector
Agricultural Production
Morocco’s agricultural sector contributes 16 percent to its GDP, provides 
45 percent of its total employment, and accounts for 6 percent of its total 
exports. Morocco has more agricultural potential than many MENA countries 
because of suitable soils and rainfall combined with irrigation potential. Cur-
rently, agriculture satisfies about one-half to two-thirds of Morocco’s grain 
requirements through the cultivation of wheat, barley, and maize in the 
rainfed areas. Wheat is the main agricultural import, followed by sugar and 
soybean oil.
  Because grains are grown under rainfed conditions, harvests and thus 
import requirements vary sharply from one year to the next. In 2002 Morocco 
produced 5.0 million metric tons of barley and wheat and imported about 3.9 
million tons, which represents a self-sufficiency ratio of about 56 percent. 
The following year, favorable rains increased wheat and barley output to 8.3 
million tons, causing imports to decline to 2.3 million tons, representing 78 
percent self-sufficiency. The government has several programs to extend and 
upgrade irrigated areas so as to make agricultural supply less vulnerable to 
weather, in particular by strengthening a national program to encourage local 
irrigation and use water more efficiently (FAO 2004).
Agricultural Trade Patterns
Morocco’s total exports were US$22 billion in 2006, while its agricultural 
exports were US$1.3 billion, or 6 percent of the total. Unlike in most other 
MENA countries, agricultural exports in Morocco are dominated by fruits and 
vegetables. Citrus fruits, tomatoes, olives, potatoes, and other horticultural 
crops are grown, often under irrigation, and exported to Europe. Exports are 
facilitated by the short distance across the Straits of Gibraltar to Spain. Fruit 
and vegetable exports account for about 65 percent of Moroccan agricultural 
exports.
  Morocco’s total imports were US$25 billion in 2006, of which agricultural 
imports accounted for US$2.3 billion, or 9 percent. As in many MENA coun-
tries, the largest agricultural import in Morocco is wheat. Over 2004–06, 
Morocco imported an average of US$460 million in wheat. Imported wheat 
competes with domestically produced wheat, which accounts for 50–60 
percent of consumption, depending on the year. Morocco also imports raw 
sugar, soybean oil, and maize. Maize is mainly supplied by imports; there is 
no sizeable domestic production. There is substantial domestic production of 
barley, but not at a level sufficient to supply local needs (World Bank 2008b; 
FAO 2009a).
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Moroccan agricultural policy has gone through three main phases. The first 
phase, from the time of its independence in 1956 until the middle of the 
1980s, was characterized by significant intervention by the government in all 
activities and throughout the production process. The second phase, from the 
mid-1980s until 1995, involved the implementation of a structural adjustment 
program that reduced government intervention in the economy and encour-
aged the expansion of the private sector. In the third phase, since 1995, 
Morocco has increased its integration into the world economy, consolidated 
by a series of trade agreements. These three phases of agricultural and trade 
policies are described in detail in the following sections.
The Preadjustment Period
Since its independence, Moroccan agricultural policy has been conceived to 
achieve ambitious but contradictory objectives. In fact, on the one hand the 
policy has aimed to exploit the comparative advantages of the Moroccan agri-
cultural sector in exports, but it has also attempted to meet internal demand 
through domestic production by encouraging import-substitution production.2
  The agricultural policy of the mid-1960s is associated with the “policy of 
dams,” which, as a symbolic objective, aimed at the irrigation of a million 
hectares by 2000. The state promoted the construction of dams through public 
investment, subsidies, elimination of taxes, loans, price policies, supervision, 
and distribution. Public investment in the basic infrastructure was massive, 
with investment in water resource mobilization reaching close to 30 percent 
of public investments during this period. The agricultural investment code, 
promulgated in 1969, regulated the use of irrigated lands and encouraged the 
modernization of farming and the intensification of agricultural production. 
To help farmers come into line with the state policy in agriculture, an exten-
sive system of subsidies and incentives was provided to foster modernization. 
Irrigation water was heavily subsidized.
  The production pricing policy was selective. The state regulated the prices 
of certain basic products for the internal market, such as grains, milk, and 
some industrial crops. However, there was no regulation of the prices of fruits 
(including citrus), vegetables, or olive oil products, which were promoted as 
export crops. At the beginning of the 1970s, agricultural policy attempted to 
maintain income levels among farmers through subsidies without raising con-
sumer prices for agricultural products. For some commodities (sugar, oilseeds 
and milk), the government supervised the entire supply chain.
AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND POVERTY IN MOROCCO  167   
2 This section is largely based on Akesbi (2002).  The results of these policies did not meet expectations. Furthermore, 
the fiscal burden of the agricultural and consumer subsidies increased over 
time. While the world prices of basic products (grains, oil, meat, and milk) 
decreased, producer prices in Morocco rose, and consumer prices remained 
stable. These budgetary imbalances were the main cause of a crisis in Moroc-
can public finances in the middle of the 1980s and the subsequent adoption 
of a structural adjustment plan under the supervision of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund.
The Structural Adjustment Period
In the middle of the 1980s, Morocco undertook a wide-reaching program of 
economic reform aimed at stabilizing the national economy and laying the 
groundwork for greater growth in the medium and long terms. As in many 
developing countries, the adjustment program was adopted in Morocco to 
escape a situation of crisis and insolvency and to gain access to international 
credit. The worsening fiscal deficits and mounting debt were the main results 
of the costly and inefficient policies. The structural adjustment program 
aimed to reduce the budget deficit, establish a coherent pricing policy, 
move the real exchange rate closer to equilibrium, and correct the country’s 
trade imbalance. One of the main elements of this effort to reconstruct the 
national economy was the Sectoral Adjustment Program for Agriculture.
  In the medium term, the objectives of this sectoral adjustment program 
were to stimulate the agricultural sector to raise economic growth, reduce 
the trade deficit, and create employment. This was to be achieved by liber-
alizing agricultural markets and encouraging private investment. Within this 
framework, priority was given to increasing the production of agricultural 
products in which Morocco had a comparative advantage. The components of 
the program included
•   adjusting and liberalizing producer prices and progressively eliminating 
subsidies to create a favorable environment for the participation of the 
private sector and the liberalization of activities;
•   rationalizing state intervention, progressively disengaging the state from 
trade activities that could be adequately run by the private sector, and 
consolidating the state’s main role as a regulator; and
•   improving the efficiency of public expenditures and investment in line 
with development objectives and the priorities in agricultural policy.
Specific policies included the concession of some state land to the private 
sector, the redefinition of the role of public enterprises, the elimination of 
barriers to internal and foreign trade (namely, monopolies, quotas, and mar-
keting regulations), the elimination of most subsidies for agricultural inputs 
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for irrigation water and for agricultural equipment were maintained, as was 
the large public investment in water resources.
  Producer pricing controls on agricultural commodities were eliminated for 
hard wheat, barley, maize, rice, milk, and cattle feed. Consumer pricing for 
dairy products and grains was liberalized. Only the prices of soft wheat flour, 
sugar, and vegetable oil remained controlled and subsidized by the state. 
Except for a few sensitive or strategic products (grains, sugar, oil, meat, and 
dairy products), the marketing channels for agricultural and food products 
were liberalized. Likewise, importation and exportation operations for agro-
food products were liberalized except for sensitive products.
The Global Integration Period
The adoption of a structural adjustment program was only the beginning of a 
much more thorough reform of the Moroccan economy. Starting in the mid-
1990s, the government signed a number of trade agreements that committed 
Morocco to greater liberalization in trade, thus consolidating the reforms 
carried out under the structural adjustment program.
  In 1994 Morocco signed the GATT, agreeing to the different commitments 
incumbent on the developing countries. A year later, like other southern 
Mediterranean countries, Morocco signed a partnership agreement with the 
E.U. that provided for the creation of a free trade area between the two 
partners over a period of 12 years. Trade liberalization through the adhesion 
of Morocco to free trade areas was also manifest in GAFTA, implemented 
beginning in 2005. Morocco likewise signed FTAs with the countries of the 
Agadir initiative (Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia), the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation, Turkey, and the United States (see Table 2.9 and Figure 2.3).3 Some 
of the more important trade agreements are discussed in the next section.
Trade Agreements
GATT and the WTO
The commitments of Morocco under the GATT and WTO are limited to mar-
ket access. In fact, Morocco does not provide export subsidies, which are 
the focus of a commitment for reduction. In addition, its level of aggregate 
market support is well below the allowable level. Concerning market access, 
Morocco has changed all NTBs into tariffs. For products such as grains, sugar, 
milk, meat, and oilseeds and their by-products, which were subject to NTBs, 
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3 The European Free Trade Association includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.tariff equivalents have been set. The bound tariff rates for these products 
allow for high levels of import protection. For products that were subject 
to tariff barriers alone, the bound rates have been set at 60 percent. This 
product category covers all fresh or processed agricultural products except 
basic products.
  In both cases, Morocco has committed itself to progressively reduce these 
tariff rates by 2.4 percentage points per year over 10 years. The products that 
are currently targeted for minimum access are mainly meat, milk, and cereals. 
Because the bound tariff rates are quite high, the level of protection remains 
high. Because the tariff reductions over 10 years are fairly small, the impact of 
the GATT and WTO on protection in Morocco has been quite modest.
The EMP Agreement with the E.U.
Morocco’s partnership agreement with the E.U. is based on the principle of 
reciprocity. It provides for the gradual elimination of tariffs on all industrial 
products. Agricultural products, as defined by the E.U., are excluded from 
the EMP implementation agreement.4 However, the schedule for tariff elimi-
nation is not the same for all products. The agreement provides for the rapid 
dismantling of the tariffs on products that are not produced domestically and 
on equipment. In contrast, it provides for slower tariff reductions on goods 
that compete with domestic production.
  The E.U. and Morocco signed an additional agreement at the beginning 
of 2004 relative to trade in agricultural products. This agreement promotes 
the access of Moroccan products to the European market and sets up high 
preferential quotas for European agricultural products on the Moroccan mar-
ket depending on the level of production of these products in Morocco. The 
EMAA for Morocco is set to be further enhanced by the new EMP action plans 
that will increase political, social, and trade relations between the E.U. and 
Morocco and back the ambitious programs with financial assistance (European 
Commission 2009).
The Morocco–United States Free Trade Agreement
The FTA between Morocco and the United States was established to enhance 
the economic and trade relations between the two countries. In terms of 
foreign trade, the United States is the fourth most important trade partner 
of Morocco. On the Moroccan side, the agreement goes beyond tariff reduc-
tion to include measures to improve the environment of trade and economic 
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4 A complete list of the agricultural products is found in Annex I of the Rome Treaty and was 
updated after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It comprises all land-based, breed-
ing, and fishing products as well as the related primary processed products.exchanges with a view to attracting more foreign investment in the country. 
The U.S. market is considered a potential outlet for Moroccan products, 
notably for agricultural and textile and clothing products. But, as in the case 
of the European market, access to the U.S. market is constrained by qual-
ity norms as strict and rigorous as those applied at Morocco’s entry into the 
European market.
  In Morocco there is a concern that opening the Moroccan market to sub-
sidized U.S. grain will undercut local grain production, thus increasing rural 
poverty and causing excessive migration to urban areas. During the FTA 
negotiations, the Moroccan side recommended that a special framework be 
established for the grain sector before total liberalization, given the reper-
cussions on the living standards of grain producers, an important segment 
of the Moroccan population. The United States argued that the advantage 
of the agreement for Morocco resides in the structural changes in Moroccan 
agriculture that will make it more competitive and exploit its comparative 
advantages. But Moroccan negotiators are skeptical of the argument in light 
of the generous support given to farmers by U.S. agricultural policy.
  Within the framework of this agreement, it is clear that the United States 
will profit from the level of agricultural trade on account of the privileges 
given to European agricultural products, without bearing a corresponding 
financial cost for the development of the Moroccan economy as the E.U. did 
through the Middle East and Developing Africa Fund.
  The FTA between Morocco and the United States was signed in June 2004 
and came into force in January 2006. In contrast to the gradual pace of imple-
mentation of the EMP agreement (over 1995–2012), the pace of implementa-
tion of the Morocco-U.S. FTA is quite rapid. Another contrast is that the E.U. 
agreement provides for financial assistance to help upgrade the Moroccan 
economy and legislation to take advantage of the new export opportunities, 
while the U.S. agreement does not provide for financial support.
Poverty
Based on the 1998/99 household survey of Morocco, poverty remains largely
a rural phenomenon. Almost 1 Moroccan in 4 is poor in rural areas compared 
to 1 in 10 in urban areas. Although the rural population represents 46 percent 
of the total population, 66 percent of the poor live in rural areas. However, 
the percentage of the poor who live in urban areas has increased from 27 to 
34 percent. In both rural and urban areas, the poor generally lack education 
and live in large households with many children and few working members.
The incidence of poverty is much higher among children than it is among 
adults; 44 percent of children under age 15 are poor versus 16 percent of 
adults. Among the poor, 64 percent are illiterate (compared to 53 percent 
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western regions (World Bank 2001).
  At the national level, the distribution of the poor by sector of activity of 
the head of household shows that most of the poor work in the agricultural 
sector (57 percent), followed by services (26 percent) and construction (13 
percent). In urban areas, among 58 percent of the poor the breadwinner is 
working in services, while in rural areas, agriculture is the dominant source 
of income among 75 percent of the poor.
  Because of the dynamics of urbanization in Morocco, the structural causes 
of urban and rural poverty are closely related. Poor rural households engaged 
in productive activities typically have access to agricultural land, but their 
landholdings are small, rarely irrigated, and less productive. Moreover, due 
to a lack of land titles and registration, they cannot obtain formal credit and 
invest in their property. They often have nonagricultural sources of income, 
working in the informal sector and moving back and forth throughout the year 
between rural and urban areas. The urban poor face multiple deprivations 
such as lack of employment and inadequacy of access to land, housing, and 
basic services.
The Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Poor
In this section, we examine the impact of trade liberalization on the rural 
poor in Morocco. First we discuss the issues and describe the results of an 
earlier study that simulated the distributional impact of wheat import liber-
alization. Then we describe the methods and findings of a new analysis with 
a CGE model that has been used to study the impact of various types of trade 
liberalization on the Moroccan economy. Although the model does not simu-
late the impact on different types of households, it does simulate the impact 
on the returns to four types of labor, including unskilled agricultural labor. 
Because small-scale farmers earn most of their income from unskilled agricul-
tural labor (including labor allocated to production on their own farms), this 
is a close approximation of the impact of trade liberalization on small-scale, 
low-income farmers in Morocco (this analysis is described in more detail in 
Thomas et al. 2008).
Background
In Morocco, as in most developing countries, policymakers and researchers 
are concerned about the possible impact of agricultural trade liberalization. 
First, there is the concern that trade liberalization will adversely affect the 
rural poor, particularly small-scale farmers. Simulation studies (as well as 
economic logic) suggest that multilateral trade liberalization will raise the 
price of agricultural commodities, including wheat. Morocco would lose, 
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affected? The answer partly depends on Moroccan wheat import policy, the 
liberalization of which could partly offset, nullify, or even reverse the effect 
of higher world prices on domestic prices. Second, there is concern about the 
closed markets of trading partners. For example, if Moroccan farmers switch 
out of wheat and into horticultural crops, will there be export opportunities 
for these products in the E.U. or the United States?
  The impact of agricultural reform on households has been difficult to 
address because the tools used to examine the economywide impacts of 
reform in agriculture have traditionally been able to assess only the impacts 
on a relatively small number of household types (Abdelkhalek 2002). Accord-
ingly, identifying the households that are net sellers (which would gain from 
higher prices) and those that are net buyers (which would gain from lower 
prices) has been difficult.
  Grain producers in Morocco are protected by tariffs on imports as high as 
100 percent. This policy encourages farmers to grow wheat even if the costs of 
production exceed the costs of importing wheat. The high cost of production is 
partially absorbed by the government, which implements a complicated system 
of subsidies to mills and consumers. The cost is also shared by the consumers, 
who pay a higher price for wheat products than they would if wheat could be 
imported without trade tariffs. A policy that eliminated the border tariffs for 
cereals without any reform in the agricultural sector in developed countries 
would result in significantly lower producer prices for wheat and somewhat 
lower consumer prices for wheat products. This policy would benefit consum-
ers, who would pay less for their flour and bread, but hurt producers, who 
would have to compete with lower-cost imported wheat.
  A study carried out by Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) is one of the few that 
has used household survey data to examine the distributional impact of trade 
liberalization in the MENA region. It focused on the impact of removing tar-
iffs on imported grains. The study used a CGE model to simulate the effect 
of reducing and eliminating wheat import tariffs. The price changes associ-
ated with different liberalization scenarios were combined with data on the 
sources of income and the allocation of expenditures for 5,117 households in 
the 1998–99 Morocco Living Standard Survey. The impact of each policy simu-
lation on each household was calculated using standard methods of short-
term welfare analysis. The results were aggregated to calculate changes 
in the mean income and incidence of poverty. According to this study, the 
elimination of wheat import tariffs would result in a 24 percent reduction 
in the producer price of grains and a 27 percent reduction in the consumer 
price of grain products. Not surprisingly, urban households would gain from 
the elimination of protection on grains because they are net consumers of 
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the urban rich because food in general and grains in particular account for a 
larger share of their budgets. Overall, the urban poverty rate would decline 
from 12.2 to 11.8 percent. In rural areas, the impact would be more complex. 
Most of the rural poor (60 percent) are net buyers of grain products, so they 
would benefit from the lower import tariffs. However, the losses of the net 
sellers is greater, on a per household basis, than the gains of the net consum-
ers. Thus, full liberalization of wheat would increase rural poverty from 28.3 
to 34.2 percent. Overall, the incidence of poverty in Morocco would rise from 
19.6 to 22.1 percent. The average loss for the poorest quintile would be about 
10 percent of household income.
  The authors note two limitations in the analysis. First, the CGE model upon 
which it was based assumes that wage rates are fixed. As farmers switch out 
of wheat and other grains and into other crops, it is likely that the demand 
for unskilled labor would increase because grains tend to be less labor inten-
sive than alternative crops. Thus, this study did not take into account the 
effect of trade liberalization in raising rural wages, which would benefit the 
rural poor, offsetting the losses associated with price changes and possibly 
reversing the overall welfare impact. Second, the CGE did not capture the 
dynamic gains from trade liberalization, defined as the gains associated with 
a higher rate of economic growth due to a higher rate of technology adoption 
and/or investment.
Methods
In our analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on Morocco we used the 
MIRAGE CGE model of the global economy. The MIRAGE model is a multi-
sector, multiregion CGE model developed for trade policy analysis by the Cen-
tre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris and 
is being used at CEPII and the International Food Policy Research Institute.
  The MIRAGE model uses the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) 6.2 data-
base for national accounts and international trade data and the MAcMap–HS6 
database for bilateral data on applied rates of protection. The applied rates 
of protection combine AVEs of tariffs (ad valorem and specific), tariff quo-
tas, prohibitions, and antidumping duties. They are computed at the bi-
lateral level, accounting for the preferential trade agreements that have been 
implemented through 2004. The bilateral measures of protection are aggre-
gated across regions and products using a weighting methodology based on 
reference groups of countries instead of import weights.5 The GTAP database 
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5 This methodology reduces the endogeneity bias in measuring protection when aggregating 
across products and regions (Bouët et al. 2004).contains 57 sectors and 96 countries and regions. Because the GTAP database 
includes only two Maghreb countries, Morocco and Tunisia, it was augmented 
with social accounting matrixes for Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania.6
  Two versions of MIRAGE were used in this analysis:
•   The static version assumed perfect competition in all sectors, and the 
trade policy changes were assumed to occur instantaneously in one period. 
The results reflect changes generated from various trade integration sce-
narios relative to a benchmark representing the state of the world before 
the tariff changes. It was a long-run simulation in that it assumed all sec-
tors had fully adjusted to the new trade policy and a new equilibrium had 
been reached. The loss in tariff revenue from import liberalization was 
offset by increases in lump-sum taxes.
•   The dynamic version of the model has a sequential recursive set-up (with 
the results in each year feeding into the simulation for the next year), 
and capital supply was modified each year due to depreciation and invest-
ment. In this way, the dynamic version could capture the effects of trade 
liberalization on investment and economic growth. In addition, some of 
the sectors were modeled under imperfect competition: textiles, wearing 
apparel, petroleum and coal products, and all services with the exception 
of trade and transport. The dynamic MIRAGE model generated a baseline 
extending from 2001 to 2020 based on World Bank projections of GDP and 
population levels through 2020. In this application of the model, the time-
line for the implementation of changes in tariffs spanned 2006–2016, and 
the simulation results reflected deviations from the baseline at the end of 
the period, 2020.7
Although MIRAGE did not simulate the effect of policy simulations on differ-
ent types of households (there was only one representative agent whose pro-
pensity to save was constant), it traced these effects across labor categories. 
The model assumed full employment of factors and wage flexibility. Skilled 
labor was the only factor that was perfectly mobile, while unskilled labor was 
imperfectly mobile between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors accord-
ing to the ratio of remunerations between the two sectors.
  The static version of the model was used to simulate the impact on 
Morocco of various options of trade integration: (1) liberalization within the 
AMU; (2) in addition to (1), bilateral liberalization between each Maghreb 
country and the E.U.; (3) In addition to (1), bilateral liberalization between 
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6 The input-output data for the three missing Maghreb countries were constructed from input-
output data for GTAP countries with a similar economic structure (Thomas et al. 2008).
7 See Decreux and Valin (2007) for a more detailed description of the MIRAGE model.each Maghreb country and the United States; (4) multilateral liberalization 
among the Maghreb countries, the E.U., and the United States; and (5) global 
trade liberalization. The dynamic model was used to consider the impact of 
multilateral liberalization among the Maghreb countries, the E.U., and the 
United States (Simulation 4), with and without three additional measures: 
liberalization of services, trade facilitation, and increased domestic invest-
ment. More information on the methods used in this analysis is available from 
Thomas et al. (2008).
Results
The results of the trade liberalization simulation using the static version of 
the MIRAGE model are shown in Table 7.1. The first simulation shows the 
impact of an AMU, which would eliminate tariff restrictions among Algeria, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. This “south–south” trade liberaliza-
tion would have only a very modest impact on Morocco, increasing exports 
by 0.5 percent, but would have a negligible effect on the terms of trade, 
national income, and returns to labor. The explanation is that the North 
African economies have a relatively similar structure, so there would be few 
gains from liberalizing trade among them.
  On the other hand, bilateral FTAs between each of the Maghreb countries 
and the E.U. would have a significant impact on Moroccan exports, boosting 
them by 37.5 percent. Moroccan exports would gain from this type of trade 
liberalization because the E.U. currently maintains high tariffs on fruits, veg-
etables, oilseeds, and vegetable oils (particularly olive oil). Although exports 
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Table 7.1  Estimated impact of trade liberalization in Morocco using the static 
MIRAGE model (percent change)
         Returns  to 
       Returns  to  unskilled 
       unskilled  labor  in  Returns
  Total  Terms  National  labor in   other  to skilled
Trade scenario  exports  of trade  income  agriculture  sectors  labor
Arab Maghreb Union  0.5  0.0  0.0  –0.0 0.1  0.1
EU25-Maghreb bilateral   37.5  –5.9  –0.3  –1.1  –0.2 0.0
  FTAs 
U.S.-Maghreb bilateral   4.8  –0.6  –0.3  –6.4  –0.2 2.3
  FTAs 
U.S.-EU25-Maghreb FTA  39.8  –6.1  –0.1  –6.6 0.1  2.5
Full trade liberalization  47.8  –8.1 0.8  –8.3 0.5  5.7
Source:   Thomas et al. (2008).
Notes:  EU25, European Union (25 members as of 2004); FTA, Free Trade Agreement; U.S., United 
States.would increase, the terms-of-trade effect would be negative, meaning that 
the prices of Moroccan exports would decline and/or the prices of its imports 
increase. The net effect would be a small decline in national income. The 
impact on the returns to unskilled labor would be negative but small (see 
Table 7.1).
  Bilateral FTAs between the Maghreb countries and the United States would 
have a similar but more muted effect. Moroccan exports would expand, but 
only by 4.8 percent, partly because U.S. agricultural tariffs are initially 
lower and partly because there is less trade between Morocco and the United 
States. Again, there would be a small decline in national income, but the 
distributional effects would be stronger: the returns to unskilled agricultural 
labor would decline by 6.4 percent, while returns to skilled labor would rise 
by 2.3 percent. The adverse impact on unskilled labor would presumably be 
due to the fact that an FTA with the United States implies that there would 
be wheat imports and lower wheat prices (see Table 7.1).
  Regional FTAs between the Maghreb countries and the E.U. and the United 
States would result in an almost 40 percent increase in exports for Morocco 
but a 6.1 percent decline in the terms of trade. Competing countries would 
now have better access to U.S. and particularly E.U. markets, thus depress-
ing the price of Moroccan exports. Overall, national income in Morocco would 
decline by 0.1 percent, less than in the previous scenarios. Like the U.S. FTA, 
the regional FTA would result in a significant decline in the returns to unskilled 
agricultural labor and a small increase in the returns to skilled labor.
  Full trade liberalization would generate the largest benefits for Morocco. 
Exports would grow by 47.8 percent thanks to more open borders in countries 
that import Moroccan goods. Although the terms of trade would decline by 
8.1 percent, national income would grow by 0.8 percent. In this case, the 
expansion of exports would more than offset the disadvantage of the shift in 
prices in generating net gains for Morocco. These gains would be unequally 
distributed, however: returns to unskilled agricultural labor would fall by 8.3 
percent, while returns to skilled labor would rise by 5.7 percent (see Thomas 
et al. 2008).
  Under the dynamic framework of MIRAGE, Scenario 4 from the static ver-
sion was simulated to examine the effect of (1) trade liberalization in services, 
(2) trade facilitation, and (3) increased domestic investment (see Table 7.2).
  Restrictions on trade in services are an important barrier to trade, but 
they are difficult to measure because they result from a complex set of 
laws, regulations, and local standards rather than from a simple tariff rate. 
However, CEPII has estimated effective rates of protection in services by 
using a gravity model and assuming that differences between actual trade in 
services and what would be expected based on proximity represent implicit 
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of protection of over 80 percent in construction and around 50 percent in 
business services and in trade and transportation. Although the restrictions on 
services are imposed by importing countries, they do not generate tariff rev-
enue. They act as export taxes on services in the exporting countries, where 
they reduce the number of firms. Reducing or eliminating these export taxes 
is expected to have pro-competitive effects on exporting firms, increasing 
their numbers, decreasing their profits, and decreasing the price of imported 
services (Thomas et al. 2008). The liberalization of trade in services was 
simulated by assuming that the rates of protection (export tax in exporting 
countries) would be cut by 50 percent. As shown in Table 7.3, the liberaliza-
tion of services would further increase the expansion in exports associated 
with the U.S.-E.U.-Maghreb regional FTA. The terms of trade would remain 
somewhat negative with or without liberalization in services, but the change 
in national income would switch from –0.2 with the regional FTA to +0.2 with 
the regional FTA and liberalization in services. These gains would be associ-
ated with increased efficiency as the high rates of protection on services were 
brought down. However, the effect on the returns to unskilled agricultural 
labor would remain negative. Presumably, small-scale farmers are not major 
consumers of the types of services that are heavily protected in Morocco and 
thus would not benefit from their liberalization.
  Trade facilitation refers to measures that increase the speed and effi-
ciency of the administrative procedures associated with moving goods into 
and out of the country, particularly processing goods through customs. Previ-
ous studies suggest that trade facilitation costs in developing countries are 
5 percent of the value of trade in industrial goods and 7.5 percent of the 
value of trade in agro-food products (see Thomas et al. 2008). The simulation 
assumed that measures to improve trade facilitation could cut these costs by 
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Table 7.2  Trade liberalization scenarios under the dynamic version of MIRAGE
Trade scenario  EU25 and U.S. (2009–13)  Maghreb countries (2009–18)
Base: The U.S.-EU25-Maghreb FTA  2009–13: Eliminate all tariffs    2009–18: Eliminate all tariffs
    on imports on goods    on imports on goods
Liberalization of services  2009–13: Reduce by 50% the   2009–18: Reduce by 50% the
    export tax on services    export tax on services
Trade facilitation  No change  Reduce trade costs by 50%
Increased domestic investment in   No change  Increase the saving rate by 5%
  Maghreb countries   
Source:   Constructed from Thomas et al. (2008).
Notes:  EU25, European Union (25 members as of 2004); FTA, Free Trade Agreement; U.S., United States.50 percent. As shown in Table 7.3, adding trade facilitation to the regional 
FTA would further boost exports and contribute to a higher national income 
compared to the regional FTA without trade facilitation. Trade facilitation 
would also have a modest effect in partially offsetting the negative effect 
of the regional FTA on the returns to unskilled agricultural labor, reducing it 
from –7.5 percent to –7.2 percent.
  Finally, FTAs are expected to improve the environment for private-sector 
productive investment by increasing the size of the market, facilitating the 
inflow of new technology, and reassuring investors regarding the stability of 
the policy environment. This was simulated by assuming a 5 percent increase 
in the propensity to save in the Maghreb countries. The higher savings would 
result in greater domestic investment, which in turn would increase the pro-
ductive capacity of the economy in future years. As shown in Table 7.1, add-
ing increased investment to the effect of the regional FTA would have modest 
effects on exports and the terms of trade but would increase national income 
from –0.2 to +1.6 percent. In addition, it would have the strongest effect of 
the three complementary measures in offsetting the negative impact of the 
FTA on returns to unskilled agricultural labor.
Summary
The Kingdom of Morocco is a lower-middle-income country with a population 
of about 30 million, more than half of which lives in urban areas. The agricul-
tural sector accounts for about 16 percent of GDP. Like most other countries 
in the region, Morocco is a net agricultural importer whose main agricultural 
import is wheat. The agricultural exports of Morocco are the second-largest 
among MENA countries. Fruits and vegetables, which typically account for 20–30 
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Table 7.3  Estimated impact of trade liberalization in Morocco using the 
dynamic MIRAGE model (percent change)
         Returns  to 
       Returns  to  unskilled 
       unskilled  labor  in  Returns
  Total  Terms  National  labor in   other  to skilled
Trade scenario  exports  of trade  income  agriculture  sectors  labor
U.S.-EU25-Maghreb FTA  37.8  –2.5  –0.2  –7.5  –0.2 3.4
  + liberalization of 
      services  42.6  –2.6 0.2 –7.7 0.3  4.9
  + trade facilitation  47.9  –2.1 1.2 –7.2 1.4  6.8
  + increased investment  50.5  –2.2 1.6 –5.3 3.9  10.8
Source:   Thomas et al. (2008).
Notes:  EU25, European Union (25 members as of 2004);   FTA, Free Trade Agreement; U.S., United States.percent of agricultural exports in MENA countries, represent almost three-
quarters of the agricultural exports of Morocco.
  Since the mid-1980s, Morocco has carried out a series of economic reforms 
to allow the market to play a larger role in production and consumption deci-
sions, including price liberalization, a reduced role for state enterprises, and 
the promotion of private investment. Morocco has signed an EMP agreement 
with the E.U. whereby tariffs on manufactured goods will be reduced over 
time. Morocco has also signed an FTA with the United States that entails 
gradual reduction in both industrial and agricultural protection. Nonetheless, 
the level of agricultural protection remains relatively high.
  A study by Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) suggests that although many rural 
households are net buyers of grains, lower grain prices tend to adversely 
affect rural poverty. These results, however, do not take into account the 
effect of global trade liberalization, which would be expected to increase the 
world price of wheat and other grains.
  Our analysis used two versions of the MIRAGE CGE model, a static version 
and a dynamic version. The static version of the model was used to simulate 
the impact of alternative types of trade liberalization. It appears that an FTA 
with the other Maghreb countries in the context of the AMU would have little 
impact on the Moroccan economy because of the similarities in the economies 
in the region. A bilateral FTA with the E.U. would stimulate exports signifi-
cantly but would have a small negative effect on national income and returns 
to unskilled agricultural labor. Global trade liberalization would combine a 
strong positive effect on exports and a small positive effect on national income 
but would have a large negative effect on unskilled agricultural labor.
  Simulations with the dynamic version of the MIRAGE model show that 
liberalization in services, trade facilitation, and increased investment would 
have a positive effect on exports and income, but they would not fully offset 
the negative effect of trade liberalization on the returns to unskilled agricul-
tural labor.
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Summary and Policy Implications
Summary
A
lthough trade liberalization has reduced barriers to trade in numer-
ous sectors, the agricultural sector remains highly protected in many 
countries. Most countries use a variety of measures, including tariffs, 
tariff rate quotas, and nontechnical barriers, to protect their farmers from 
import competition. Some countries (particularly high-income countries) pro-
vide direct support to farmers in the form of subsidized inputs and price sup-
ports. As a result, agriculture is one of the most distorted sectors in the world 
economy. Economic theory and most empirical studies suggest that the ben-
efits of trade liberalization exceed the costs, at least on balance. However, 
policymakers are reluctant to reduce trade protection for their own industries 
and farmers unless they are assured that other countries will reciprocate.
  These issues are of interest to most developing countries because of the
dependence of the rural poor on agricultural income and because of the im-
portance of food prices to the well-being of the urban poor. This concern is 
even greater in the MENA region because most of the countries in this region 
are dependent on food imports to meet consumption requirements. Further-
more, the high level of protection for farmers in the MENA region implies 
that full trade liberalization would have a larger impact in this region than 
elsewhere.
  The objectives of this report are
•   to examine current agricultural trade policies in the MENA region;
•   to evaluate the degree of agricultural liberalization likely to occur as part 
of various trade agreements;
•   to analyze the impact of further trade liberalization on the poor, particu-
larly the rural poor; and
•   to explore policy options for mitigating the negative effects of agricultural 
trade liberalization on the poor, particularly the rural poor.
  As defined by the World Bank, the MENA region comprises 21 countries. In 
this study we focus on the eight countries that are neither major oil exporters 
181nor high-income countries: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza.
Basic Characteristics
In addition to their cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities, the MENA 
countries under consideration have other climatic and demographic similari-
ties, as follows:
•   Most of the MENA countries are semiarid and have limited water and 
arable land per capita, making agricultural production highly dependent 
on rainfall. The exceptions are Egypt and Djibouti, where virtually all crop 
production is irrigated.
•   The overall population density of the region is low compared to other 
developing areas, though the West Bank and Gaza and the Nile River Basin 
in Egypt are quite densely populated.
•   The region is also more urbanized than the average for developing coun-
tries. The share of urban population ranges from 43 to 87 percent.
  In terms of the economies of the countries in the region, we can identify 
the following patterns:
•   Seven of the eight countries under consideration are classified as lower-
middle-income countries according to the World Bank. The exception is 
Lebanon, which is an upper-middle-income country.
•   The economic performance of many of the MENA countries has been rela-
tively weak; real per capita GDP growth was 2.0 percent per year during the 
1990s. Per capita growth was negative over the decade in Djibouti. Perfor-
mance was only slightly better (2.2 percent) during 2000–06, but this was a 
period in which the global economy was emerging from a recession.
•   The region has been adversely affected by various conflicts, including the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the insurgency in Algeria (until recently), and the 
Iraq war, which has affected the economies of Jordan and Syria.
•   The slow economic growth means there has been little expansion in formal-
sector employment, resulting in persistent problems of unemployment, 
particularly among youth.
Nonetheless, strong economic performance in Lebanon and Tunisia suggests 
that these problems are not insurmountable.
Agricultural and Trade Patterns
The eight MENA countries also exhibit some common features with regard to 
agricultural trade patterns:
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exports, exceeding 10 percent only in Syria.
•   Wheat is a staple food and a major import for many of the MENA countries. 
It represents more than 15 percent of agricultural imports in Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia.
•   Most of the MENA countries are net food importers.
•   Some countries in the region have relatively high levels of protection for 
farmers: Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are among the 15 most protected 
economies, according to Bouët (2006).
•   The commodities that are the most protected in the region are wheat, 
sugar, dairy, and livestock products.
•   The E.U. is the most important trading partner for most of the countries 
in the region.
  The MENA countries have signed a series of multilateral, regional, and 
bilateral trade agreements. The URAA imposes some commitments on mem-
ber countries; some of the more important commitments are
•   to convert quantitative restrictions into tariffs or tariff rate quotas,
•   to bind tariff rates by setting a maximum rate for each tariff line,
•   to reduce bound tariff rates by an average of 36 percent and a minimum 
of 15 percent for each item, and
•   to reduce trade-distorting measures of support for agriculture by 20 per-
cent, on average.
  Developing countries have been given more modest targets for tariff rate 
reductions and more time to comply, while the LDCs are effectively exempted 
from meeting most commitments under the URAA. The direct impact of these 
commitments on the MENA countries has been modest. Syria and West Bank 
and Gaza are not WTO members. Djibouti, as an LDC, is exempt from most 
URAA commitments. For the remaining five countries, the bound rates are 
often far above the applied tariff rates, particularly for agricultural products. 
Thus, commitments to reduce the bound rate have had little effect on the 
actual level of agricultural protection.
  As part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the E.U. has EMAAs with 
four of the MENA countries under consideration (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Tunisia) and interim agreements with two others (Lebanon and the West Bank 
and Gaza). These EMAAs commit the parties to phasing out almost all tariffs on 
manufactured goods, though the MENA countries have a longer period in which 
to comply. Although there are plans to incorporate agriculture at a later date, 
there are no firm targets or schedules for agricultural liberalization.
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the LDCs have duty-free access to E.U. markets for almost all goods. Among the 
eight countries under consideration, only Djibouti can take advantage of the 
initiative’s provisions. Bananas, rice, and sugar were temporarily exempted.
  Under the U.S.–Middle East Free Trade Initiative, the United States has 
signed bilateral FTAs with Jordan and Morocco and intermediate agreements 
with other MENA countries. The effect of the U.S.-Jordan FTA will be small 
because Jordan’s level of protection is already low and because the volume 
of U.S.-Jordan trade is small. The effect of the U.S.-Morocco FTA will be 
larger because Moroccan trade barriers are higher. Of particular importance, 
Morocco’s wheat tariffs will be phased out over 10 years.
  The U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act allows duty-free access to 
U.S. markets for Sub-Saharan African countries that meet certain criteria in 
human rights, reducing corruption, and fighting terrorism. Djibouti qualifies, 
but its exports to the United States are negligible. The other Sub-Saharan 
African countries in the MENA region (Somalia, the Sudan, and Yemen) do not 
qualify.
  A number of bilateral and regional agreements within the MENA region have 
been signed, including that establishing GAFTA and the Agadir Agreement. 
Nonetheless, a number of MENA countries, most notably Egypt and Tunisia, 
have reduced tariff barriers unilaterally in recent years. In other words, trade 
liberalization does occur outside the context of global, regional, and bilateral 
trade agreements.
The Impact of Trade Liberalization
The evidence suggests that global trade liberalization will increase world 
agricultural prices by reducing agricultural support policies in OECD coun-
tries and by reducing protection. Wheat production is subsidized by the E.U. 
and the United States, and numerous countries (including those in the MENA 
region) impose high tariffs. Studies indicate that trade liberalization would 
increase world wheat prices by 5–12 percent. Rice is also subsidized by the 
E.U. and the United States, while Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other 
countries severely limit imports. Global models suggest that trade liberaliza-
tion would raise the world price by 3–35 percent. Sugar producers are sub-
sidized and protected from imports in many countries, making sugar one of 
the most distorted agricultural markets. Partial equilibrium models of trade 
liberalization suggest that sugar prices would rise by as much as 48 percent, 
while general equilibrium models show increases of less than 5 percent. Like-
wise, removing distortions in world cotton markets would increase the world 
price by 2–13 percent. Dairy production in the E.U., Japan, the United States, 
and many developing countries is protected through a complex system of sup-
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that global trade liberalization would increase the price of nonfat dry milk 
by 13 percent.
  Almost all the MENA countries are net agricultural importers, so there 
is clearly some basis for concern that these countries will lose as a result 
of global trade liberalization. Our analysis confirms that the terms-of-trade 
effect of a 15 percent increase in all world agricultural prices on the eight 
MENA countries would be approximately US$922 million, or 0.4 percent of 
regional GDP. The actual impact of trade liberalization, however, is likely to 
be more positive for three reasons:
•   First, the previous analysis overstates the cost of higher world agricultural 
prices because it assumes no response on the part of producers and con-
sumers in the region. A net importer that is almost self-sufficient could 
actually benefit if the higher prices induced it to become an exporter of 
one or more commodities (Anderson 2003).
•   Second, it assumes that the price increase would be the same for all com-
modities. A net importer could gain if the increases in agricultural prices 
were not proportional across commodities. For example, Egypt could gain 
from global liberalization if the price of cotton (which it exports) were to 
increase more than the price of wheat (which it imports).
•   Finally, the analysis estimates the terms-of-trade effect of trade liberal-
ization, but it does not include the efficiency gains associated with reduc-
ing distortions in domestic agricultural markets. Most studies of trade 
liberalization suggest that the efficiency effects would be larger than the 
terms-of-trade effect.
  Several dozen studies have been undertaken to examine the macro-
economic impact of various types of trade liberalization in the MENA region. 
Most of these studies use CGE models to simulate the effect of alternative 
trade policies. The results of these studies may be summarized as follows:
•   Multilateral trade liberalization generally results in net gains to countries 
in the region, with real GDP expansion of 1–3 percent.
•   The benefits of trade liberalization to a country depend largely on the 
degree of domestic liberalization carried out by the country. Most of the 
gains from agricultural trade liberalization are associated with domestic 
reform rather than with changes in trade policy in other countries. This 
confirms this well-known concept in studies of trade liberalization: what 
you do determines what you get.
•   The benefits of multilateral trade liberalization are generally greater than 
the benefits of bilateral trade liberalization with the E.U. or the United 
States.
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the benefits of regional trade agreements within MENA.
•   Trade liberalization usually results in lower production and more imports of 
wheat but in higher production and more exports of fruits and vegetables.
  In contrast, only a few studies have examined the distributional impact 
of trade liberalization, such as the effect on farmers or other poor groups 
in the MENA countries. One of the most thorough studies suggests that the 
lower agricultural prices associated with removing agricultural protection in 
Morocco could exacerbate poverty (Ravallion and Lokshin 2004). In the fol-
lowing sections we summarize the results of our analysis of the distributional 
impact of trade liberalization in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco.
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Egypt
Until 1987, agricultural policy in Egypt was characterized by various forms of 
state intervention in production, marketing, and trade. The policy of import 
substitution industrialization meant that the agricultural sector was heavily 
taxed through low official prices and compulsory sales. At the same time, 
some commodities were protected by import restrictions. During the late 
1980s and the 1990s, Egypt gradually liberalized its agricultural markets and 
reduced the level of import protection. Wheat markets remained distorted by 
a combination of import controls, fixed producer prices, consumer subsidies 
on certain types of bread, and government control over the channels leading 
to the subsidized bread. In 2004 a series of significant tariff reductions was 
implemented, leading the World Bank to declare that Egypt had made more 
progress in trade liberalization than almost any other country. Even so, the 
degree of protection is higher in Egypt than in 40 percent of the countries of 
the world.
  Full global trade liberalization would increase the prices of agricultural 
commodities by 5–15 percent. This would probably negatively affect the econ-
omy because Egypt is a net agricultural importer, though the exact effect 
would depend on the price changes for each commodity. Given proportional 
increases for all agricultural commodities, Egypt would gain from higher rice 
and cotton prices but lose from higher wheat and maize prices. Domestic 
trade reform would reduce the domestic prices of imported commodities such 
as wheat, thus partly offsetting the effect of global trade liberalization, as 
well as providing efficiency gains.
  We analyze the data from the 1998 Egypt Integrated Household Survey to 
examine the distributional effect of changes in agricultural prices. Changes 
in income for each household in the sample are estimated using hypothetical 
increases in agricultural prices and the composition of the income and expen-
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and net buyers lose from higher prices.
  According to this analysis, higher wheat prices would reduce poverty 
among wheat producers because two-thirds of these producers are net sellers 
of wheat. For example, a 40 percent increase in wheat prices would result in 
a 3 percentage point decline in the poverty rate among wheat farmers. How-
ever, even a 40 percent increase in wheat prices would reduce the overall 
poverty rate by just 1 percentage point. This is because significant gains by 
the small number of wheat farmers would be largely offset by the small losses 
by the rest of the population.
  A 40 percent increase in the price of rice or horticultural products would 
reduce poverty among growers but erode the purchasing power of urban 
households. The net effect would be to increase the national poverty rate by 
about 1 percentage point. This is because, compared to the case of wheat, 
the proportion of rural households that grow these crops is smaller and the 
share of households that are net buyers is larger.
  For cotton and sugar, a 40 percent increase in price would reduce pov-
erty among growers but have a negligible effect (less than 0.5 percent) on 
national poverty. This is because these two crops are not widely grown and 
because consumption of the final product associated with these crops is not 
a significant part of the spending patterns of urban households.
  Overall, the results show that price increases have positive effects on 
growers of the relevant crops, but the overall effect of price increases on 
national poverty is generally small or negligible because only a small share of 
the population grows each crop. Even a 40 percent increase in all five crop 
categories has a small effect, raising rural and urban poverty rates by 1–2 
percentage points. One implication of this analysis is that agricultural trade 
policy is a relatively ineffective policy instrument for assisting poor rural 
households.
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Tunisia
Like Egypt, Tunisia adopted a structural adjustment program in the 1980s 
that reduced the intervention of the state in markets, including agricultural 
markets. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia maintains high tariffs on many products, includ-
ing agricultural commodities. At the same time, Tunisia has a relatively good 
investment climate, which contributed to significant inflows of foreign direct 
investment and a healthy growth rate through the 1990s.
  Tunisia’s main exports are olives and dates, while its principal imports 
are wheat and maize. Like many MENA countries, Tunisia is a net agricultural 
importer. Multilateral liberalization is expected to raise agricultural prices. If 
all agricultural commodity prices were to rise proportionately, Tunisia would 
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gain from domestic liberalization due to efficiency gains. The combined effect 
is likely to be positive for Tunisia as a whole because most estimates show 
that efficiency gains are larger than terms-of-trade effects. The net effect 
on agricultural prices and, hence, on farmers is ambiguous because domes-
tic trade liberalization would reduce domestic agricultural prices relative to 
world prices, while multilateral trade liberalization would increase world 
prices. The effect of trade liberalization on labor markets and the returns to 
unskilled labor in particular would also influence the poverty impact.
  In order to study the distributional impact of trade liberalization in Tuni-
sia, we used a CGE model linked to data on 397 representative households 
from a household expenditure survey. The CGE simulated the effect of various 
policies on prices, wages, and returns to other factors, while the household 
survey data were used to simulate the effects of these changes on poverty 
and income distribution. Four simulations were examined: the removal of tar-
iffs on industrial imports from the E.U., the removal of all tariffs on imports 
from the E.U., the removal of all tariffs on imports from any country, and 
the removal of all Tunisian tariffs combined with global trade liberalization, 
which it is assumed would raise agricultural prices by 15 percent.
  According to these simulations, the removal of industrial tariffs on imports 
from the E.U. (which approximates Tunisian import liberalization under the 
EMP agreement) would cause both imports and exports to expand significantly, 
although almost all the change would be in nonagricultural trade. Real GDP 
would increase slightly (0.2 percent) because of the efficiency gains associ-
ated with the removal of distortions. Poverty would decline from 8.1 to 7.7 
percent. Significant gains in rural poverty reduction would more than offset 
the small increase in urban poverty.
 Eliminating  all tariffs on imports from the E.U. (approximating the Tuni-
sian side of an extended EMP agreement) would cause large increases in 
imports of meat, beverages and tobacco, fruit, dairy products, and vegetable 
oil as import barriers on these goods were lifted. The effect on GDP and pov-
erty would be similar to that in the first simulation.
  Removing tariffs on imports from all countries would increase the imports 
of almost all agricultural commodities, as well as stimulate agricultural exports 
to maintain the trade balance. The reduction in poverty would be slightly 
greater than in the first two simulations: poverty would decline from 8.1 
percent in the base scenario to 7.6 percent. The rural poor would again be 
the main beneficiaries of these changes in trade policy.
  Finally, the elimination of all Tunisian tariffs plus global trade liberalization 
(represented by a 15 percent increase in world agricultural prices) would not 
do much for the overall economy. This is partly because, as a net agricultural 
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agricultural sector would gain from the higher prices. Exports of fruit (mainly 
olives) would expand significantly, as would exports of a number of other agri-
cultural commodities. As a result, poverty would decline to the lowest level 
among the four scenarios. Compared to the base scenario, rural poverty would 
be cut in half (from 15.8 to 7.9 percent) according to this simulation.
  Thus, it seems that trade liberalization would have only minor effects on 
the level of GDP but would have a substantial effect in reducing poverty. Fur-
thermore, the combined effect of global and domestic liberalization would be 
more pro-poor than the effect of domestic liberalization alone.
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Syria
The agricultural sector in Syria is one of the most highly regulated in the 
MENA region. The government uses a variety of policy instruments to control 
production and marketing, including administered prices, state marketing 
boards, state monopolies in the marketing of strategic crops, state monopo-
lies in the distribution of fertilizers, subsidies, and high tariff and nontariff 
barriers on food and agricultural products. Reforms in recent years have only 
begun to dismantle some of these restrictions.
  Although Syria has been successful in achieving wheat self-sufficiency and 
promoting cotton exports, these accomplishments have come at a high cost 
in terms of inefficiency and an unsustainable fiscal burden. The likely deple-
tion of oil reserves over the coming 10–15 years is forcing the government to 
reduce costs and find new sources of revenue.
  The domestic liberalization of the agricultural sector would result in 
substitution away from wheat, sugar beets, and cotton and toward barley, 
lentils, and chickpeas. The completion of the EMP agreement with the E.U. 
would expand exports of fruits, vegetables, and olive oil if Syrian producers 
could meet the high quality and food safety requirements.
  About two-thirds of agricultural subsidies are devoted to maintaining a 
high producer price for wheat and low consumer prices for bread and other 
wheat products. By banning the private importation of wheat and by limit-
ing imports through the state marketing board, government policy keeps 
the domestic price of wheat 66 percent higher than the import parity price. 
Wheat is the most important staple food, as well as an important source of 
income for farmers, so the government is particularly sensitive to the impact 
of reducing or removing import protection and the subsidies for wheat.
  In this report we use a CGE model to simulate the effect of trade policy 
options on households in 10 income categories. In particular, we focus on 
the effects of liberalizing wheat markets. The macroeconomic effects would 
be relatively modest, although government savings would increase by almost 
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of wheat by about 17 percent and production by about 2 percent. The effects 
of subsidy removal on the welfare of Syrian households would be regressive: 
high-income households would gain, while lower-income households would 
lose. The size of the effects would be quite small, however: less than 1 per-
cent of the base income of all but the richest income group.
  These results need to be interpreted with three factors in mind. First, the 
impact on farmers (particularly wheat farmers) will be larger than the impact 
on the poorer deciles. This is because each decile includes both farmers and 
nonfarmers, thus diluting the adverse impact of the reforms on wheat farm-
ers. Second, the distributional impact will vary among farmers; it will be 
the most adverse among farmers for whom wheat sales are a large share of 
household income. The impact of lower wheat prices will be positive on urban 
households (particularly the poor) and rural households that are net buyers of 
wheat. More information on the share of income from wheat and other crops 
would be needed to explore the distributional impact among farmers. Third, 
the impact of liberalization on the poor will depend partly on complemen-
tary policies. For example, a recent study suggests that if the wheat market 
reform were implemented through a reduction in energy subsidies, the com-
bined effect would be more pro-poor than wheat subsidy removal alone.
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty in Morocco
The Kingdom of Morocco is a lower-middle-income country with a population 
of about 30 million, more than half of which lives in urban areas. The agricul-
tural sector accounts for about 16 percent of GDP. Like most other countries 
in the region, Morocco is a net agricultural importer, and its main agricultural 
import is wheat. After Turkey’s, Morocco’s agricultural exports are the larg-
est among the exports of MENA countries. Fruits and vegetables, which typi-
cally account for 20–30 percent of the agricultural exports of MENA countries, 
represent almost three-quarters of the agricultural exports of Morocco.
  Since the mid-1980s, Morocco has carried out a series of economic reforms 
to allow the market to play a larger role in production and consumption deci-
sions, including price liberalization, a reduced role for state enterprises, and 
the promotion of private investment. Morocco has signed an EMP agreement 
with the E.U. whereby tariffs on manufactured goods will be reduced over 
time. Morocco also signed an FTA with the United States that entails gradual 
reduction in both industrial and agricultural protection. Nonetheless, the level 
of agricultural protection remains relatively high.
  Our analysis uses two versions of a global CGE model called MIRAGE, a 
static version and a dynamic version. The static version of the model is used 
to simulate the impact of alternative types of trade liberalization. It appears 
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have little impact on the Moroccan economy because of the similarities in the 
economies in the region. A bilateral FTA with the E.U. would stimulate export 
significantly but have a small negative effect on national income and returns to 
unskilled agricultural labor. Global trade liberalization would combine a strong 
positive effect on exports and a small positive effect on national income but a 
large negative effect on the returns to unskilled agricultural labor.
  Simulations with the dynamic version of the MIRAGE model show that 
liberalization in services, trade facilitation, and increased investment would 
have a positive effect on exports and income but would not fully offset the 
negative effect of trade liberalization on the returns to unskilled agricultural 
labor.
Policy Implications
In this section we examine the implications of these findings on policies and 
programs in the MENA countries. How can policymakers in these countries 
maximize the benefits of trade liberalization and minimize the costs, par-
ticularly with regard to the poor, particularly the rural poor? We divide the 
discussion into four topics: global trade liberalization, regional and bilateral 
trade liberalization, domestic liberalization, and complementary policies.
Policy on Global Trade Liberalization
As discussed earlier, global trade liberalization will likely increase world agri-
cultural prices by 3–20 percent, imposing a terms-of-trade loss on all eight 
of the countries under consideration (though the loss would be small in Syria 
and Tunisia). The net food-importing countries have used the likely terms-of-
trade loss associated with global trade liberalization to request special con-
cessions in the form of reduced commitments to open their own borders. This 
position reflects the mercantilist perspective of trade negotiation, according 
to which import liberalization is a sacrifice that must be incurred to open up 
markets in other countries.
  However, it is difficult to understand this position in terms of economic 
welfare. The mercantilist perspective is incomplete in that it takes into 
account only the gains and losses of producers, ignoring the effects of trade 
policy on consumers. As discussed earlier, economic studies on trade liber-
alization suggest that most of the benefits to a country deriving from trade 
liberalization would result from reforms within the country. Empirical stud-
ies of protection consistently demonstrate that the cost (in terms of higher 
prices to consumers) of saving each job in a protected sector is several times 
larger than the income earned through the job. Thus, the net food-importing 
countries appear to be demanding the right to forgo the efficiency gains asso-
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trade losses associated with reforms in other countries.
  However, this analysis takes into account only the impact of trade liberal-
ization on aggregate income or GDP. Policymakers in the MENA countries are
also interested in equity considerations, such as the impact on poverty and 
unemployment. The effect of agricultural trade liberalization on poverty 
would vary widely across countries, in part because the effect of liberaliza-
tion on agricultural prices is ambiguous. Global agricultural trade reform is 
likely to increase world agricultural prices, but domestic trade liberalization 
will reduce domestic agricultural prices relative to world prices. The net 
effect of liberalization on domestic agricultural prices will depend largely on 
the initial level of protection. If the level of domestic protection is high (as 
in Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia), full trade liberalization is likely to reduce 
domestic agricultural prices. If, on the other hand, domestic protection is 
modest (as in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon), full trade liberalization may have 
no effect or only slightly increase domestic agricultural prices.
  Furthermore, the estimated impact of changes in agricultural prices on 
poverty is ambiguous. Higher agricultural prices would benefit farmers who can 
produce a marketed surplus but would hurt the urban poor and rural net buy-
ers. The net effect would depend on the income sources and spending patterns 
of the poor. If the sales of tradable agricultural commodities are an important 
source of income and tradable food items are a small share of their expendi-
ture, higher agricultural prices will reduce poverty. Alternatively, if the sale of 
tradable commodities is not important and tradable food accounts for a large 
share of their spending, higher agricultural prices will increase poverty.
  Based on the analysis presented in this report, higher cereal prices would 
tend to reduce overall poverty, but the effect would range from small to 
negligible. In Egypt, higher wheat prices would reduce poverty (though this 
would not be true for other commodities). In Tunisia, global trade liberaliza-
tion, which implies higher agricultural prices, would result in the greatest 
poverty reduction among the four simulations. In Syria, reducing subsidies 
on wheat production, which lowers producer prices, would have an adverse 
(though very small) effect on the poorest decile. And in Morocco, import 
trade liberalization, which lowers domestic agricultural prices, would tend 
to reduce the returns to unskilled agricultural labor.
  Thus, the link between trade liberalization and agricultural price changes 
is ambiguous, and the effect of agricultural price changes on poverty is weak. 
This suggests that trade policy is a poor instrument for addressing overall pov-
erty in the MENA region. Nonetheless, the impact of trade liberalization on 
certain agricultural producers may be substantial. Below we discuss targeted 
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economically.
  Thus far, we have assumed that adjustment to a new trade regime is 
costless. In fact, there are transition costs associated with any policy change 
that affects relative prices. As resources are reallocated within the economy,
there will be a period during which factors of production will be under-
utilized. For example, as labor moves from formerly protected sectors to newly 
profitable ones, costs will be associated with unemployment and retraining. 
These transition costs are real and constitute an argument for phasing in the 
trade reform and for providing training and credit to assist those sectors that 
are adversely affected. Because the transition costs will be temporary, while 
the efficiency gains will be permanent, it is unlikely that transition costs rep-
resent a valid argument against implementing the trade reforms. The fact that 
the costs occur in the short term while the benefits accrue over time does, 
however, help explain the political resistance to trade liberalization.
  Of course, the MENA countries should push aggressively for market access 
for the agricultural commodities that they export. Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco 
have a strong interest in opening up the E.U. market for fruits and vegetables. 
This would include taking steps to ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations regarding fruit and vegetable imports into the E.U. are based on 
scientific evidence and are not a reflection of protectionist sentiment. Like-
wise, Tunisia would benefit from a reduction in E.U. tariffs on olive and olive 
oil imports, while Egypt would gain from reduced domestic support by the 
United States and (to a lesser extent) the E.U. for their cotton growers.
  In contrast, none of the MENA countries would gain from global trade lib-
eralization (including reductions in domestic support) in the wheat market. 
Such reforms would increase the world price of wheat by 4–20 percent, thus 
adversely affecting the terms of trade of importers in the region. The effects 
of these higher prices on consumers could be offset in many countries by 
reducing import tariffs to retain the original domestic price.
Policy on Regional Trade Liberalization
The benefits of regional integration within the MENA region have been limited 
to date. There are three explanations for this, two of which may be corrected 
and one of which cannot. One reason for the limited benefits of regional trade 
agreements such as GAFTA is that these agreements tend to be fairly flexible, 
allowing numerous exceptions for sensitive goods, permitting protection to 
vary by season, and granting countries the right to suspend tariff reductions 
under certain circumstances. Because the costs of protection rise more than 
proportionately with the level of protection, allowing a relatively small num-
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generate significant gains for member countries, GAFTA and other regional 
agreements will have to insist on a greater level of discipline on tariffs and 
NTBs. One approach might be to gradually reduce the maximum level of tariff 
protection, thus constraining the highest tariffs first.
  The second reason for the modest benefits associated with these trade 
agreements is that regional trade is hampered by a variety of factors in addition 
to trade policy. The infrastructure linking the MENA countries is generally poor. 
Transportation services in the region are characterized by a lack of competition 
and high costs, and many of the countries suffer from cumbersome customs 
procedures that raise the cost of trade. One study estimates that the delays 
and uncertainties associated with customs clearance alone are equivalent to 10 
percent of the cost of the goods being traded (Dennis 2006a). Unfortunately, 
multiple and overlapping regional trade agreements may actually contribute 
to these costs because tariff rates differ depending on the country of origin. 
These different rates give traders an incentive to misrepresent the origin of 
imports, thus forcing customs officials to require additional documentation and 
further slowing the process. Thus, measures to streamline customs procedures 
and introduce greater competition in regional transportation services would 
enhance the benefits of regional trade agreements.
  The third reason for the modest gains associated with regional trade agree-
ments is the similarity in the economic structures of member countries. If all 
member countries import wheat and maize, export fruits and vegetables, and 
have similar wage rates, the gains from trade are likely to be limited. There 
will still be some gains from trade even if two countries have identical factor 
endowments (labor, land, capital, and other factors of production) because 
each country can specialize in different products so that both countries will 
gain from economies of scale. However, the basic point is that the gains will 
be less than they would be for trade between countries with different wage 
rates, different agroclimatic conditions, and different types of skills. Trade 
models tend to confirm that there would be benefits from economic integra-
tion among MENA countries, but the benefits would be substantially smaller 
than the benefits associated with multilateral trade liberalization or liberal-
ization with developed countries.
Position with Regard to Bilateral Liberalization
The E.U. has signed EMAAs with four of the eight MENA countries under con-
sideration and is preparing agreements with three more.1 Although the E.U. 
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1 The four countries with EMAAs are Egypt (2004), Jordan (2002), Morocco (2000), and Tunisia 
(1998). Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza have interim association agreements, while Syria 
is a candidate for an AA.is the largest trading partner for all of these countries, studies suggest that 
the impact of the agreements on welfare in the MENA countries is positive but 
rather small, typically less than 1 percent. The main reason for this is that 
the agricultural sector is largely excluded from the agreements. Simulation 
studies confirm the economic intuition that the gains from the agreements 
would be much larger if the agreements included liberalization in the agri-
cultural sector. Because the broader Barcelona process envisages agricultural 
liberalization at some later date, the four countries with EMAAs should begin 
to explore the feasibility of a second round of negotiations that would include 
agriculture. While recognizing the political sensitivity of agricultural prices, 
leaders in the MENA countries should keep in mind that most of the benefits 
of an expanded AA will be related to the degree of domestic liberalization 
within their own countries. At the same time, the benefits will be larger 
if domestic liberalization is combined with a reduction in the trade barri-
ers to agricultural imports in the E.U., which is the rationale for insisting 
on reciprocity. Liberalization in E.U. tariff and nontariff barriers on fruits, 
vegetables, olive oil, and sugar would be particularly beneficial to the MENA 
countries. If the MENA countries are not able to persuade the E.U. to explore 
agricultural liberalization, they would be advised to pursue the same objec-
tives in the context of WTO multilateral trade negotiations.
  The United States has signed FTAs with Jordan and Morocco and has 
interim trade and investment framework agreements with Egypt and Tuni-
sia. The United States is a relatively minor trading partner with all of these 
countries, so the MENA countries should not expect large effects, positive or 
negative, as a result of increased trade with the United States. On the other 
hand, these agreements may facilitate foreign direct investment in the MENA 
countries in two ways. First, the agreements typically include measures to 
create a more favorable climate for private investment, including the stream-
lining of bureaucratic procedures and greater transparency in regulations. 
Second, the agreements constitute a signal that the government is committed 
to greater integration in the global economy, which is in itself an encouraging 
sign for prospective investors.
Position with Regard to Unilateral Liberalization
Economic analysis suggests that, in general, unilaterally reducing import pro-
tection and domestic support for agriculture will increase aggregate output.
Under fairly plausible assumptions, it is easy to demonstrate that the static ben-
efits of lower domestic prices to consumers are greater than the static losses
to producers. Yet policymakers, trade negotiators, and many noneconomists 
see reducing domestic protection as the price a country must pay to gain 
access to markets in other countries. Is economic analysis flawed, perhaps 
based on simplifying assumptions that do not hold in the real world? Or is the 
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weight to the interests of producers over consumers?
  A common argument for protectionism in general is the infant industry 
argument, whereby industries learn to be competitive while growing under 
the protection of trade barriers. Although there is a large body of literature 
on this topic, it is not relevant in this context because the infant industry 
argument is rarely invoked to defend agricultural protection.
  In the case of agricultural protectionism, a more common argument is that, 
in developing countries in general and in the MENA region in particular, poor 
farmers cannot compete with large-scale technologically advanced farmers in 
developed countries, particularly if the latter receive production subsidies. 
Certainly commercial farmers in developing countries are hurt by the subsidies 
given to farmers in the E.U., the United States, and other countries, as well as 
the high barriers to agricultural imports in many countries. But in spite of these 
subsidies, Egypt is a competitive exporter of cotton and rice, Morocco exports 
tomatoes to Europe, and Tunisia is a major exporter of olive oil. This suggests 
that the MENA countries can compete in markets where they have comparative 
advantages. Small farmers in the MENA region can compete in some commodi-
ties because their costs for labor and land are lower and because they enjoy a 
climate that is more suitable for the production of some agricultural commodi-
ties, particularly during the European winter. However, they face challenges 
in meeting the quality and food safety standards for export.
  Another argument revolves around the concept that import barriers on 
agricultural products reduce poverty among poor agricultural producers. How-
ever, the analysis presented in this report suggests that higher agricultural 
prices have small and mixed effects on the poor; for example:
•   in Egypt, simulations reveal that higher wheat prices reduce poverty while 
higher rice and horticultural prices lower poverty, but the effects are quite 
small;
•   in Syria, the removal of wheat subsidies (lowering the producer price but 
raising the consumer price) adversely affects poor households, but again 
the effect is very small;
•   in Tunisia, global trade liberalization, which implies higher agricultural 
prices, tends to reduce poverty, particularly in rural areas; and
•   in Morocco, removing agricultural protection lowers prices and reduces 
the returns to unskilled agricultural labor.
  There are several reasons for these small and mixed effects, as follows:
•   Higher agricultural prices benefit some poor households (farmers with net 
sales), but they hurt other poor households (the urban poor and net buyers 
in rural areas).
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relatively small because in most MENA countries, less than half the popula-
tion is in farming and a significant share of farmers are net buyers.
•   Farmers who are net sellers tend to be richer than the average farmer, so 
higher farm incomes do not always translate into lower poverty.
•   Even those farmers who are both poor and net sellers rely on nonagricul-
tural activities for a significant share of their incomes.
In other words, agricultural protection is a costly and imprecise tool with 
which to address the problem of rural poverty. In the sections that follow we 
discuss alternative policies that address rural poverty more directly.
  Another argument for agricultural protection is that it serves as a use-
ful bargaining chip in international negotiations, giving developing countries 
something to offer in exchange for greater access to markets in high-income 
countries. Although there is some merit in this argument, it is not clear that 
developing countries see agricultural protection merely as a means to extract 
reciprocal liberalization among trade partners. The fact that the LDCs have 
been able to avoid almost all of the disciplines built into the URAA suggests 
that they view agricultural protection as an end rather than a means.
  Although political considerations may limit the ability of governments to 
implement unilateral trade liberalization, policymakers and trade negotia-
tors should at least be aware that in many situations the aggregate benefits 
exceed the costs. The example of Egypt’s trade reforms of 2004 indicates 
that there is some scope for trade reform outside the context of reciprocal 
trade agreements.
Complementary Policies to Facilitate Adjustment
Several studies have indicated that the size of the gains from trade liberal-
ization depends on the existence of complementary policies and programs. 
The gains are smallest (or the losses largest) when consumers and producers 
are limited in their ability to respond to new opportunities and new prices. 
Studies of trade liberalization in Morocco and Tunisia show that if factor mar-
kets are flexible, the benefits of trade liberalization are three to five times 
greater than when factor markets are rigid (see Dennis 2006b). Flexible fac-
tor markets allow factors of production (such as land, labor, and capital) to 
be reallocated from formerly protected sectors to newly profitable sectors. 
Examples of rigidities in MENA factor markets include:
•   regulations limiting the use of temporary workers and expatriates,
•   the complicated bureaucratic procedures involved in dismissing workers,
•   large severance allowances,
•   delays in the application for and issuance of land and construction permits,
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•   difficulties in closing a business.
Although these bureaucratic problems are common in many countries, busi-
ness climate surveys suggest that they are more severe in the MENA countries 
than in most developing countries. As described in Chapter 2, in a ranking of 
countries based on the ease of doing business, only three MENA countries are 
in the top half (Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon are ranked in the 45th to 49th 
percentiles), and several are in the bottom 15 percent (Egypt and Djibouti) 
(IFC 2009).
  Of course these regulations apply mainly to the formal sector. In agricul-
ture, flexibility is more likely to be enhanced by effective agricultural ser-
vices such as extension and market information systems that provide farmers 
with useful information about the agronomic and economic aspects of shifting 
into new commodities. It is sometimes claimed that farmers are not able to
shift into new crops because of agroclimatic limitations. This view is contra-
dicted by numerous studies showing that farmers respond to incentives in the 
form of input and output prices, as well as new technology.
  Another type of complementary policy that enhances the economic effect 
of trade liberalization is trade facilitation. This category includes measures to 
reduce the transaction costs related to international trade, including exces-
sive documentation requirements, authorizations from multiple agencies, 
unclear or subjective criteria for the application of duties, and delays and 
uncertainties related to customs clearance.
Complementary Policies to Support Agriculture
As discussed earlier, global trade liberalization will raise world agricultural 
prices, but domestic trade reform will partially or completely offset this 
effect. For MENA countries with a high level of agricultural protection, such 
as Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, the combined effect would probably be a 
reduction in agricultural prices. Furthermore, the analysis presented in this 
report suggests that lower agricultural prices tend to raise the incidence of 
poverty, although the net effect is small because some poor households (such 
as urban consumers and net buyers in rural areas) gain. Policymakers may be 
interested in providing additional assistance to farmers both in the interest of 
alleviating poverty and as compensation to ensure political support for trade 
reform. This assistance may take the form of support for agricultural produc-
tion or direct assistance to farm (or rural) households.
  Under WTO rules, support for agricultural production is classified as amber 
box, blue box, or green box support. Amber box support includes various 
types of agricultural support prices and input subsidies. Some of the MENA 
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WTO members; others are WTO members and are subject to restrictions on 
amber box expenditures.2 In the WTO, developing countries are allowed de 
minimis amber box support for a commodity equivalent to up to 10 percent of 
the value of output. However, as discussed earlier, these policies are costly 
ways to help farmers and are not efficient in providing assistance to poor 
households.
  Blue box support refers to agricultural support prices that are combined 
with policies to limit production through quotas or land set-asides. These are 
exempt from WTO restrictions based on the idea that the production limits 
prevent the support prices from distorting agricultural trade. Although these 
are legal under the URAA, it is not advisable to implement blue box policies 
in the MENA region for three reasons. First, it is difficult to justify the direct 
and administrative costs of such programs in terms of their benefits to the 
overall economy, nor are the programs particularly effective as anti-poverty 
measures. Second, these programs are difficult to administer and monitor. 
The producer subsidy creates a strong incentive to evade production limits, 
creating a need for monitoring and enforcement as well as the potential for 
corruption. Third, it is likely that blue box programs will be limited under 
the Doha Round. Both the E.U. and the United States have proposed limiting 
blue box expenditures to 2–5 percent of the value of production. De Gorter, 
Ingco, and Ignacio (2004) propose eliminating blue box support and counting 
these programs as amber box support.
  Green box support for agriculture is exempt from WTO restrictions. It 
includes programs for the following:
•   agricultural research and extension,
•   pest and disease control,
•   inspection services,
•   marketing and promotion services,
•   marketing infrastructure,
•   public stockholding for food security,
•   natural disaster relief,
•   income insurance and safety net programs,
•   environmental protection, and
•   regional assistance.
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2 Among the eight MENA countries under consideration, Syria and the West Bank and Gaza are 
not WTO members, and Djibouti is considered an LDC. Lebanon is a WTO observer, which means 
that it intends to apply for membership within five years and will eventually be subject to WTO 
rules. Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have declared amber box expenditures and were obliged to 
cut them by 13.3 percent over 1995–2005 (de Gorter, Ingco, and Ignacio 2004).Although most of these may be considered to support agriculture, they are 
allowed under WTO rules because, supposedly, they provide “no, or at most 
minimal trade distorting effects or effects on production” (WTO 1994, 59). In 
fact, some of these services may significantly facilitate agricultural produc-
tion and exports. They are presumably exempted because they provide nec-
essary services for the agricultural sector. In economic terms, they provide 
public goods that, because of externalities or difficulty in charging users for 
the services, are undersupplied by the private sector. One implication is that 
it is possible for well-designed government services in these areas to generate 
benefits for the public that exceed the costs of the program in value.
  As discussed elsewhere, domestic trade liberalization in the MENA coun-
tries is likely to stimulate diversification from grain production into alterna-
tive crops such as oilseeds and fruits and vegetables. As the process of diver-
sification proceeds, the importance of these services will inevitably rise. As 
farmers diversify into new crops, they will require more information about 
production methods and marketing opportunities. As they switch to perish-
able crops, disease and pest control will become more important. As they 
attempt to supply increasingly quality-sensitive consumers in urban areas 
and in foreign markets, grading and inspection services will become critical. 
Policymakers may facilitate this process by promoting agricultural institutions 
that provide public services, particularly for small and vulnerable farmers. 
Farmer associations are one strategy to reduce the cost of delivering inputs 
and technical assistance and facilitate the marketing of agricultural products. 
Funding is necessary because agricultural research and extension services 
cannot be effective if they are forced to recover costs by selling seeds and 
fertilizer. But greater funding is not sufficient: the institutions must be 
designed to provide incentives so that the services are demand driven, allow-
ing them the flexibility to respond to changing demands.
Complementary Policies to Support Farmers
One type of green box program does not involve the provision of public goods: 
decoupled payments to farmers. Payments are decoupled when they are not 
based on current production but rather on some fixed criterion such as pro-
duction or area planted in a base year. Over the past 15 years, economists 
and policymakers have become increasingly interested in agricultural reform 
that shifts from producer subsidies and import protection toward decoupled 
payments to farmers. The appeal of such reform is that decoupled payments 
may provide equivalent support to farmers at a lower fiscal and economic 
cost. The fiscal cost is lower for a given level of farm income support because 
the decoupled payments are direct income support rather than indirect sup-
port through agricultural prices. The economic cost is lower because decoupled 
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not influence farm decisions.
  Decoupled payments to farmers have been tried in the E.U., Mexico, and 
the United States, among other countries (see Baffes and de Gorter 2004). 
We summarize these three experiences as follows:
•   In the 1985 U.S. farm bill, the basis for payments was shifted from cur-
rent production to current area and historical yield. The 1996 farm bill, 
known as the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, replaced 
traditional agricultural programs with decoupled payments under produc-
tion flexibility contracts that were to be phased out over six years. The act 
was undermined by the U.S. Congress, which provided supplemental farm 
aid in the form of emergency relief and loan deficiency payments almost 
every year.
•   The E.U. has also moved toward decoupled payments to farmers. In 1992 
the E.U. reformed the common agricultural policy to reduce price sup-
ports and switch from current planted area to area planted in a base year. 
Over the 1990s, decoupled payments rose so that they accounted for more 
than 20 percent of total producer support, while import protection was 
reduced. In 2003 the E.U. decided to increase decoupled payments to 
account for three-quarters of the support for crop production.
•   Mexico introduced a decoupled payment program in 1994 in preparation 
for the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Procampo program 
shifted Mexican agricultural policy from support prices and input subsidies 
to a system of fixed payments based on historical area, thus compensating 
farmers for the reduction in import protection associated with the new 
agreement. The program was made more progressive by setting a mini-
mum 1 hectare even for farms below this size and by capping the maxi-
mum payment allowed. As in the United States, the program was partially 
undermined in 2002 by the reintroduction of price supports.
  Perhaps most relevant to the MENA countries is the case of Turkey. In 
2000 Turkey was providing US$6.4 billion in support for agriculture, of which 
US$1.4 billion was price support and input subsidies and US$5 billion was 
in the form of import protection. In 2001 Turkey launched its Agricultural 
Reform Implementation Program with support from the World Bank. The 
objectives of the program were to (1) introduce direct income support pay-
ments, decoupled from production decisions; (2) phase out agricultural price 
supports and input subsidies; and (3) implement a system of direct income 
payments, decoupled from production levels. The program began with a pilot 
project to experiment with alternative methods of establishing a registry of 
farms. Then a massive farm registration program was launched that eventu-
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approximately US$90 per hectare per year up to 50 hectares. Over 2001–04, 
the payments increased while price supports and input subsidies were phased 
out, so that by 2004 the payments accounted for over 70 percent of the total 
(Cakmak 2004; Olhan 2006).
  The impact of the program has been mixed, though the interpretation of 
trends has been complicated by an economic crisis in 2001 during which real 
GDP fell by 7.5 percent. Between 1999 and 2003, the total area cultivated 
declined by 4 percent. The production of wheat, barley, and maize increased 
by 5–6 percent, while cotton output expanded by 21 percent. The area under 
olive groves and orchards increased by 5 percent and 7 percent, respectively. 
On the other hand, the production of sugar beets and tobacco fell by one-
fourth and one-half, respectively, in response to the elimination of price 
supports (Olhan 2006). Overall, the agricultural value added per worker in 
agriculture rose 10 percent between 1998–99 and 2003 (Cakmak 2004).
  In summary, decoupled payments to farmers represent a promising approach 
to reducing the economic distortions associated with agricultural price sup-
ports, import protection, and input subsidies while compensating farmers and 
minimizing any adverse impact on poverty. At the same time, it should be 
recognized that most MENA countries use import protection to support farm 
prices rather than as direct subsidies. In this situation, switching from import 
protection to a program of decoupled payments implies both a loss in tariff 
revenue and significant new expenditure.
Complementary Policies to Assist the Rural Poor
Decoupled payments are a political solution to the problems of phasing out 
costly programs involving support prices, input subsidies, and import protec-
tion and of compensating farmers for their loss. Although the incidence of 
poverty is generally higher among farmers than among the general popula-
tion, such programs cannot be considered safety net programs because they 
do not target poor households. Decoupled payments to farmers exclude poor 
nonfarmers, including agricultural wage laborers, owners of microenterprises, 
and the urban poor. Furthermore, among farmers, benefits are generally 
proportional to farm size, so the benefits are likely to be greater for richer 
farmers than for poor farmers.
  If the objective is to assist poor and vulnerable households regardless of 
their occupation, a different type of program should be considered. A wide 
variety of safety net programs have been established in developing countries 
with the explicit objective of reducing poverty or at least some of the nega-
tive effects of poverty. Although a thorough review of alternative safety net 
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the main types of programs.
  Universal food subsidies reduce the cost of selected foods (usually basic 
staples) for the benefit of all consumers. The advantages include relatively 
simple administration (no targeting) and the fact that the relative benefits 
are greater for poor households because food (particularly basic staples) 
is a larger share of the budgets of poor households. In the 1980s, Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia offered universal food subsidies for goods such 
as bread, wheat flour, cooking oil, and sugar. These programs have become 
less popular in the past 15 years for several reasons: their high fiscal cost, 
the leakage of benefits to nonpoor households, and the low coverage among 
some groups of poor households, particularly in rural areas. One review of 
15 food subsidy schemes has found that in only three of them were the per 
capita benefits greater among the poor than among the nonpoor (Coady, 
Grosh, and Hodinott 2002).
  Targeted food subsidies make subsidized food available to selected house-
holds geographically through low-price shops located in poor neighborhoods 
or through some form of ration cards that entitle bearers to purchase food 
at subsidized prices. Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia have attempted to introduce 
targeting into their food subsidy programs (Coady 2004). In Egypt, however, 
corruption and political pressure led to a situation in which large numbers 
of nonpoor households held ration cards. Efforts to narrow eligibility faced 
strong political opposition (Kherallah et al. 2000).
  Labor-intensive public works programs usually combine infrastructure 
development (such as road building) with hiring policies to maximize their 
pro-poor impact. If designed well, they may improve community infrastruc-
ture and provide assistance to the poorest households with able-bodied 
members. If the wage rate is set appropriately (somewhat below the prevail-
ing wage rate), the program is self-targeting in that the better-off members 
of the community will not find it worthwhile to participate, while the poor 
will. One drawback of these programs is the high cost of supervising the work 
relative to that in cash transfer programs. In addition, these programs cannot 
assist those unable to work because of age or disability. Finally, there is a 
trade-off between the goal of providing quality public infrastructure, which 
often requires semiskilled labor, and the goal of serving the poorest members 
of the community, who do not have these skills. One example of this is the 
Second Rural Employment Program in Algeria. This US$95 million program, 
funded by the World Bank, focuses on northwest and north central Algeria 
and emphasizes public works to maintain natural resources and reduce soil 
erosion (World Bank 2003b).
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among researchers and policymakers in the past 10–15 years. These programs 
provide cash grants to households that comply with certain requirements, 
usually keeping children in school, attending health clinics, or receiving pre- 
and postnatal care. Like food-for-work programs, conditional cash transfers 
serve a dual purpose: providing assistance to poor households and encourag-
ing investments in human capital that reduce the chance that poverty will 
be transmitted to the next generation. The Progresa Program was launched 
in Mexico in 1997 and phased in over three years, eventually reaching 2.6 
million rural families. Eligibility is determined in two stages by first selecting 
poor villages and then selecting poor families within these villages. Progresa 
is one of the more widely studied conditional cash transfer programs, in part 
because the gradual expansion of the program has been randomized by vil-
lage, allowing quasi-experimental tests of the impact of the program. Studies 
show that it has been successful in increasing school attendance, reducing 
the incidence of child labor, and improving child health (Gertler 2004; Skou-
fias 2005). Conditional cash transfer programs have also been implemented 
in Bangladesh, Nicaragua, and Turkey, among other countries.
  Although this section provides only a brief glimpse of alternative safety 
net programs, it demonstrates that there are a number of interesting and 
effective programs for providing assistance to poor rural families in develop-
ing countries. These programs may be used in conjunction with trade liber-
alization programs to alleviate some of the adverse effects of liberalization 
and facilitate transition to a more market-oriented agricultural sector.
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gricultural  trade  liberalization  has  been  resisted  by  many  developing-
country policymakers, including those in the Middle East and North Africa, 
for fear it could hurt domestic farmers and exacerbate poverty. The authors 
of Trade Liberalization and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa argue, 
however, that this concern about liberalization might be misplaced. Drawing on 
case studies from Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, the study uses household 
survey data and computable general equilibrium models to simulate the effects 
of  various  liberalization  scenarios  on  different  types  of  households  in  these 
countries, especially poor households. The results indicate that agricultural trade 
barriers are not an effective means of protecting the poor and that the benefits 
from many forms of agricultural trade liberalization to the region’s consumers 
outweigh the costs to producers. If complemented with other domestic programs—
including  agricultural  research  and  extension,  information  services,  disease 
control, and social safety nets—the reforms have the potential to reduce poverty 
in these nations. The study findings are a valuable resource for policymakers 
and development specialists evaluating the role trade liberalization can play in 
economic development and poverty reduction.
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